Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

Truman Papers

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 11:25 a.m.

top secret

The final meeting of the Foreign Ministers opened at 11:25 a.m. on August 1, 1945 under the chairmanship of Mr. Byrnes.

German Reparations

Mr. Byrnes stated that he would read a list of questions which were pending. First was the question of German Reparations. He inquired whether the Committee [Subcommittee] was ready to report and stated that he was informed that this Committee was now in session. Therefore, for the time being the subject would be passed over. He believed Mr. Vyshinski was on the subcommittee and wondered whether there was anything Mr. Vyshinski could say.

Mr. Vyshinski replied that the subcommittee had examined this matter and that some questions were in a state of suspense. Also new questions had arisen.

Mr. Byrnes stated his assumption that the Committee would not be able to report in this case.

Mr. Molotov agreed.

Mr. Byrnes announced that the subject would therefore be submitted to the Big Three at 3 p.m.

Mr. Vyshinski stated that this had been assumed.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that the agenda for the Big Three be prepared as the meeting progressed.

German Economic Principles

The second question concerned German economic principles. The same subcommittee had this question and was drafting on it, particularly on paragraph 19.¹

Mr. Molotov pointed out that not one economist was present.

Mr. Bevin interjected to state that the meeting might settle the matter if the economists were absent.

German Fleet

Mr. Byrnes stated that the third question concerned the disposition of the German fleet. He understood that there was a division of opinion on this subject and wondered whether it could be discussed profitably at this meeting.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that members of the Committee were not present.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had received a report² from the U. S. representative and assumed that the British and Soviet delegates had also received reports. He inquired whether this is true.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the members of the Committee be called in since he did not know about their last conclusions.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that he had been advised regarding the differences of opinion and that the British Foreign Minister had also received information. If members of the Committee were called in the question could be discussed.

Mr. Molotov then stated that he would try to become acquainted with recent developments while the meeting was in session. He went on to suggest an adjournment of ten minutes when the representatives arrived in order that the matter might be studied.

War Crimes

Mr. Byrnes then raised the matter of war crimes which had not been settled by the Big Three.³ The British draft on this subject⁴ had the approval of the U. S. delegation and the substantial approval of the Soviet delegation which desired, however, to name certain criminals.

Mr. Bevin stated that the British delegation was opposed to naming the specific criminals and felt on this matter like the American delegation. He thought that it would be misunderstood if it was done before the court sat. It would contravene certain principles upon which the British Judiciary works. The British therefore feel strongly that the British proposal meets the case. It also feels that every step should be taken in our power to get on with the trials at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the U. S. delegation, as stated yesterday, feels that the determination of prisoners to be prosecuted should be left to the prosecutors selected by the three governments and that the decision should not be taken from them.⁵ He hoped that our Soviet friends could agree.

Mr. Molotov suggested reference to the Big Three.

Mr. Byrnes agreed.

Allied Property Used in Satellite Reparations

Mr. Byrnes next raised the matter of the use of Allied property in the settlement of satellite reparations.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that on this question it was difficult to do without the Commission [without consideration by a subcommittee?] particularly since the proposal had only been received yesterday.

Mr. Byrnes replied that the proposal⁶ had been circulated on the 25th of July.

Mr. Molotov insisted that that had been a different document.

Mr. Byrnes stated his belief that he was misunderstood. He asked for the consideration of the document circulated on the 25th which referred to the property of Allied nationals.

Mr. Molotov again asked whether they were discussing the July 25th document.

Mr. Byrnes confirmed this.

Mr. Bevin then asked for a copy.

Mr. Molotov stated that it was probable that the July 25th document had not been circulated at a regular meeting but had been distributed in a Committee. He and Mr. Vyshinski had only seen this document yesterday. It is an important question which should be given full consideration. He again wondered how the meeting could proceed without the commission. He asked whether the commission could consider the matter today.

Mr. Byrnes agreed and stated that a Committee would be appointed.

Mr. Bevin again asked which document was meant and read one before him.

Mr. Byrnes agreed that this was the document.

Mr. Molotov interjected that Mr. Bevin knew as little about it as the Russians. He pointed out that there were two documents.

Mr. Byrnes asked to look at the two documents and then stated that on July 25 the paper in Mr. Byrnes’ hand regarding the removal of Allied property from Rumania [Germany]⁷ had been circulated. On the same day another one regarding the use of Allied property in satellite reparations⁸ had been distributed. This was the one which he wished to have discussed.

Mr. Molotov inquired about the first document.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the paper referring to Germany was withdrawn. He would not ask for consideration.

Mr. Bevin stated that the question now concerned the appointment of a drafting committee.

Mr. Byrnes named Mr. Russell and Mr. Cannon.

Mr. Molotov named Mr. Gusev and Mr.———.⁹

Mr. Bevin named Mr. Turner and Mr. Coulson.

German External Assets

Mr. Byrnes stated that the next paper circulated concerned German external assets.¹⁰ This subject was before the economic subcommittee and would have to be passed.

Oil for Western Europe

Mr. Byrnes stated that the document regarding oil for Western Europe¹¹ was also before the Economic Subcommittee which was waiting to hear from the Soviet representative.

Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the latest British proposal regarding Allied oil equipment in Rumania¹² had not yet been acted upon.

Mr. Molotov stated that on this question the Soviet delegation had made a written proposal¹³ to the British five days ago.

Mr. Bevin asked whether he would receive this written proposal today.

Mr. Molotov repeated that it had been sent several days ago, probably on July 28.

Mr. Bevin then stated that he had the document before him now. Mr. Bevin pointed out that there were real differences between the British and Soviet drafts since the British have proposed arbitration and the Soviet proposal was for a joint Soviet-British investigating committee.

Mr. Molotov stated that this Commission would make a general spot investigation of all documents and facts.

Mr. Bevin replied that the British preferred a neutral, since investigation on a lower level would mean no agreement.

Mr. Molotov replied that until now the question had been discussed on a diplomatic level. The Soviet Government now proposes that representatives of both sides should be appointed to investigate. Neither the documents nor the facts in this case have been examined.

Mr. Bevin wished to know what would happen when the investigation had been made.

Mr. Molotov stated that they hoped for a settlement. If the Committee failed, however, the next step should be examined. However, no investigation had yet been made.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to add that when the paper on this subject¹⁴ had been presented, the U. S. delegation had pointed out that American as well as British interests were invloved.¹⁵ Therefore any Commission must have an American representative.

Mr. Molotov replied that so far as the American proposal was concerned, a bilateral commission should also be set up.

Mr. Byrnes agreed. He thought that they should first make an effort to settle this matter between themselves. He pointed out that American experts have been there for several weeks but up to now have been unable to obtain any agreement from the Soviet experts. He thought that the orderly way to settle this matter is for Mr. Molotov to have his experts meet ours.

Mr. Bevin stated that he wished clarification. He inquired whether it was proposed to set up two bilateral commissions.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had suggested two bilateral investigations.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether a date could be agreed upon since our experts were already there. He suggested a meeting in 10 days.

Mr. Molotov agreed.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this meeting would be in Rumania.

Mr. Molotov stated that it would be on the basis of their documents.

Mr. Byrnes asked that the investigation not be limited by any document.

Mr. Molotov agreed that the Commission should discuss this matter.

Mr. Byrnes insisted that the Commission should not be limited by a document but should be permitted to investigate the facts.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Russians would not limit discussions.

Mr. Byrnes agreed.

Mr. Bevin stated his assumption that steps would be taken to give all necessary facilities to the experts to go about in Rumania.

Mr. Molotov replied that this went without saying. Both the British and Russians would take the necessary steps.

Protocol

Mr. Byrnes then stated that he had been advised by the Protocol Committee of certain differences. He wished to know whether his colleagues had also received a report on this subject in order that the points of difference could be discussed. He stated that the questions before the meeting are:

1. Trusteeship Territories.

Mr. Molotov interjected to state that the Soviet delegation had circulated a document regarding activities in Germany and Austria hostile to the Soviet Union.¹⁶

Mr. Bevin stated that this document had been sent to London for the preparation of a reply.

Mr. Molotov asked whether it could not be agreed that the British and American delegates will insist upon a rapid investigation of this case and take measures to stop such activities.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had thought that we had made it plain that we had taken steps to investigate. An inquiry had been sent to the Army Commander.¹⁷

Mr. Molotov suggested that the meeting might confine itself to the following:

The American and British Delegates had taken steps to investigate and will let the Soviet Government know of the results and also stated that activities of hostile organizations will not be tolerated.

Mr. Byrnes repeated that we have asked for a report from our Army Commander. If he reports that there is nothing to these allegations there will be nothing to do. If these statements are substantially correct, proper steps will be taken.

Mr. Molotov asked whether if it were evident that such organizations existed, then they would not be tolerated.

Mr. Byrnes replied that when a report was received, it would be sent to Mr. Molotov. Then there could be a discussion of the steps to be taken.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that at Crimea we had undertaken not to allow hostile activities against the U. S. S. E.¹⁸ Therefore he could see no necessity for another document. If the Soviet Union had complaints to the effect that such activities were being carried on contrary to the agreement, attention should be called to that fact as had been done. It would then be our duty to act in accord with the spirit of the agreement.

Mr. Molotov agreed that this was sufficient. He went on to refer to another document presented by the Soviet Union regarding the repatriation of Soviet citizens coming from the Baltic and the Western Ukraine who were now in Norway and England.¹⁹ This document had been circulated on July 29. The memo was of primary interest to the British.

Mr. Bevin stated his belief that this case which had been handed to him after his arrival would be an easy matter to settle through diplomatic channels. He had asked London to go into it immediately and he undertook to deal with it immediately upon his return.

Mr. Molotov stated that this is satisfactory. Mr. Molotov went on to state that he was going to circulate another document dealing with complaints received from citizens who state that the agreement with the Soviet Union regarding Soviet prisoners of war is not being observed. This was a sore question with the Soviet Union. Many Soviet nationals had not yet been returned to their homes despite the fact that the war had been over for some time. He wished to ask that Soviet representatives on repatriation be admitted to camps where Soviet nationals were held.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that this matter had nothing to do with the Protocol.

Mr. Byrnes replied that Mr. Molotov had asked for delay in consideration of the Protocol in order that other matters could be taken up.

Mr. Molotov continued that the question was contained in the document circulated beforehand [just circulated?].²⁰ He had no other questions if his colleagues promised to assist on this.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had been informed that our military was doing everything in their power. They want all of these people to return. We have enough people to feed without encouraging other people to remain. Mr. Molotov could rest assured that we would do everything possible to facilitate this matter.

Mr. Molotov repeated that he wished to have some attention paid to this question which was a burning one. There were many complications.

Trusteeship Territories

Mr. Byrnes again referred to disputed questions before the Protocol Committee. The first question under dispute concerned trusteeship territories. He was informed that the Soviet representative had taken the position that the proposal should mention that the Soviet Government intended to raise with the Council of Foreign Ministers the disposal of all territories subject to trusteeship.²¹ The U. S. and British delegations want agreement among the [Big] Three to limit discussion to the disposal of Italian territory. They felt that only this could be mentioned in the Protocol.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet memorandum²² which was circulated dealt with two questions. The first concerned the Italian colonies and the second the League of Nations Mandates. The Soviet question had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. The Soviet delegation had agreed.²³ He wished to ask that in drawing up the Protocol there should be a short recapitulation of the Soviet memorandum inserted with the conclusion that the declaration had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He wished to ask that the tone of the Soviet memorandum be reflected in the Protocol.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this was not in accord with his recollection of the action taken by the Big Three. The fact is that the Soviet paper had asked for consideration of the whole question. Nevertheless discussion at the table was limited to Italian Colonies. The U. S. delegation contended that the question of what should be done to the Italian Colonies depended in the first instance on whether the Colonies would be separated from Italy. This question should be determined in the Peace Treaty, originally to be prepared in the Council of Foreign Ministers and therefore the question regarding trusteeship for Italian Colonies should be settled in the London Council of Foreign Ministers. The question of trusteeship as presented in the Soviet request was much broader and it was not his understanding that the Big Three had agreed to refer it to the Council of Foreign Ministers. In the discussion reference had been made to the language of the United Nations Charter²⁴ which provided for agreement in certain circumstances²⁵ but he did not understand that the Big Three had agreed to refer the whole question of trusteeships to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would not press this matter. He would accept the wording of the British proposal with a slight amendment. He stated that the amendment would read as follows: (He read).²⁶

Mr. Byrnes agreed.

Black Sea Straits

Mr. Byrnes next raised the question of the Black Sea Straits. He stated that on this question he did not think there would be much trouble in reaching agreement. The Soviet draft had referred to the recognition of “necessity”. The British draft had mentioned “need”.²⁷

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no objection to “need”.

Western Frontier of the U. S. S. R.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the third question concerns the Western Frontier of the U. S. S. R. There are a number of questions in dispute here including the title and the Soviet representative had also objected to certain qualifying words which make it clear that the arrangement is provisional and subject to the peace settlement.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the President had taken a position on all discussions such as this that it must be understood that the cession of territory would have to be left until the peace settlement.²⁸

Mr. Molotov stated that everyone agreed to this.

Mr. Byrnes replied that it seemed to him then that we should be careful to use language which would not mislead people into believing that we intended an immediate transfer of territory. The question was no doubt misunderstood because of the difference in language. The word “transfer” would in English carry a meaning of the cession of territory.²⁹

Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to the title which would read “pending final settlement of territorial questions at the peace settlement”.

Mr. Byrnes asked what difference the title made as long as the Soviet Union got the territory it wanted.

Mr. Molotov asked for suggestions.

Mr. Byrnes replied that as long as there is no difference between us, they should be able to find words. He suggested that the title be changed to “city of Koenigsberg and Adjacent Area”.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin agreed.

Mr. Molotov went on to state that there were certain difficulties in the text. If his colleagues agreed to his language, there would no longer be any difficulty.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had read what Mr. Churchill had said³⁰ and this draft³¹ expressed Churchill’s thought clearly. He wanted to keep as close to the undertakings given by Churchill as possible. He suggested that Molotov agree to the British draft and then the Conference would be unanimous.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that he also had a good text.³²

Mr. Bevin then asked that the British draft be read and added that he thought it was all right. His interpreter read the draft.

Mr. Molotov stated that this was all right except for the word “provisionally”. The same paragraph said “pending final decision”. The idea had already been expressed. He proposed that the word “provisionally” be deleted in the first paragraph.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he agreed that the only reason he could see for this difference is that the question had been raised. There must be a meeting of minds. So long as we agree with “a transfer pending final determination”, he would not insist on this word. He again asked Mr. Molotov whether he agreed that there is no question but that this is a transfer pending final determination.

Mr. Molotov replied “Of course”.

Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin then agreed to strike out the word “provisionally”.

Mr. Molotov then suggested that the last part of the sentence reading “subject to expert examination” be deleted.

Mr. Bevin stated that this wording is vital to the British. Churchill, speaking for the British, had made it quite clear. The Soviet delegation had at that time made no objection to these experts. He thought that during all history boundaries had been determined in such a manner.

Mr. Molotov agreed that it could not be otherwise. There would be no authority until the boundary had been mapped.

Mr. Byrnes asked why in this case Mr. Molotov objected.

Mr. Molotov stated that he thought this not nice but if you are so anxious we agree.

Mr. Molotov then proposed a last amendment. He suggested that the words “in principle” be deleted from the last paragraph since they appear in the preceding paragraph. It was enough to mention this once.

Mr. Byrnes then suggested that the words “agreement of the conference” be inserted after the words “they will support”.

Mr. Molotov stated that this would be all right without the words “in principle”.

Mr. Bevin then suggested the words “conclusions of conference” instead of the word “agreement”. This would avoid misunderstanding.

Mr. Molotov then suggested the word “proposal”.

Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes agreed.

Austria

Mr. Byrnes stated that the next question concerned Austria. The Soviet representative maintained that the Protocol should record the agreement of the three governments that the authority of the Provisional Government should be extended to all zones. The U. S. and British Governments were prepared to state that this question would be examined after the entry of their forces into Vienna.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no objection to this. However, the last paragraph concerning Koniev had no bearing on the subject.³³

Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin agreed that it should go out.

Mr. Byrnes then stated that so far as he knew, the differences of the Protocol Committee had been settled. He suggested that the Conference agree to direct the Protocol Committee to include only important decisions of the Conference. The Protocol should certainly be limited to decisions. Any attempt to insert proposals would lead to difficulties and the insertion of other proposals.

Mr. Molotov agreed.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the Protocol Committee could then be asked to return to its work.

Mr. Bevin agreed and asked whether the decision regarding Rumania³⁴ should be put in.

Mr. Byrnes stated that only a factual statement should be inserted.

Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

Mr. Byrnes stated that the U. S. delegation had yesterday³⁵ asked for consideration today of a paper regarding revised Allied Control Commission Procedure for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.³⁶ He had the impression that there is no serious difficulty here and would like to dispose of the matter, if possible.

Mr. Molotov stated that he could accept this proposal but that the second sentence was not exact. He suggested the deletion of the second sentence.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that this sentence be read. Mr. Byrnes noted that our representatives in these countries had been saying that there had not been regular and frequent meetings of the Control Commission and that no information had been advanced before the issuance of directives.³⁷

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet proposals³⁸ contained these points.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the difficulty is that Mr. Molotov was asking to have deleted the assurance that is really important to our representatives there. Nothing would hearten them more than to know that there would be a change and that there would be frequent meetings. He was sure that the Soviet delegation would agree that this was the right thing. He asked to have the second sentence remain.

Mr. Molotov insisted that it was all in the Soviet proposal in detail and in accurate form. He pointed out that we had agreed to accept the Soviet proposal as a basis for discussion.³⁹

Mr. Byrnes remarked that if it was really meant that we intend to do what is in this sentence, he could not see why it was objected to.

Mr. Molotov stated that if it was thought necessary to keep the second sentence, it should be drafted more accurately. He had no objection. However, he thought that since the Soviet proposal had been accepted as a basis for discussion, the second sentence was not necessary.

Mr. Byrnes asked what proposal.

Mr. Molotov went on to state that regular meetings were all right but not too frequent. He suggested the deletion of the word “frequent”.

Mr. Byrnes asked why they should not have frequent meetings.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was not opposed to frequent meetings but that the words might mean they would have to meet every day. The Soviet proposals had contained specific language regarding frequency.

Mr. Byrnes suggested regular meetings weekly and added that we do not want regular to mean three times a year.

Mr. Molotov then suggested regular meetings two or three times a month.

Mr. Byrnes replied that this was better than two or three times a year. He pointed out that in the proposed directive for Rumania⁴⁰ it was drafted that there should be meetings every 10 days.

Mr. Molotov stated that they would perhaps be more frequent.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that it should be stated that they would meet at least once in 10 days.

Mr. Molotov reiterated that perhaps the meetings would be even more frequent. He added that it was not a question for decision at Berlin.

Mr. Byrnes replied that we had not been able to fix this matter otherwise.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet delegation had made a written proposal which had been accepted.

Mr. Byrnes stated that it had not been accepted as to details.

Mr. Molotov admitted that it had been accepted as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Byrnes agreed and stated that he would now accept Mr. Molotov’s provision for meetings at least once in ten days.

Mr. Molotov said all right and inquired about the language concerning the importance of facilities for American and British representatives. It was not clear what was implied. The Soviet draft had contained specific proposals. Were these accepted or not.

Mr. Byrnes asked for a moment to read.

Mr. Bevin asked whether Mr. Molotov referred to the document relating to Rumania as his specific proposal.

Mr. Molotov stated that the proposals concerned Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. He pointed out that the Conference had settled the question of the meeting at least once in ten days or of tener, if required.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that his wording “at least” would permit meetings every day, if necessary. He submitted that the language in the U. S. draft regarding the importance of facilities is the wisest suggestion. The Soviet proposal concerned two question[s]. Mr. Byrnes considered that it would be better to have general language. If the British have a copy of the Soviet proposal and will accept the language contained in their paper dated July 12 referring to Hungary,⁴¹ he considered the language in 3, 4 and 5 to be entirely satisfactory. It could apply to all countries and might do good and remove the source of irritation.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would accept the draft on Hungary as applicable to all countries.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he would so instruct the drafting committee.

Mr. Molotov asked that Mr. Bevin’s proposal to extend the Hungarian proposal to Bulgaria and Rumania be accepted.

Mr. Byrnes suggested reference to a drafting committee.

Mr. Molotov asked why it should go to a drafting committee.

Mr. Byrnes replied that this would be done only to insert 3, 4 and 5 in the paper instead of the language Mr. Molotov wished to have deleted.

Mr. Byrnes named Mr. Russell and Mr. Cannon.

Mr. Bevin suggested reference to the Protocol Committee.

Mr. Molotov thought that it should be a special committee. He named Mr. Novikov and Mr.———.⁴²

Mr. Bevin named Mr. [Hoyer] Millar.

Mr. Byrnes then stated that the sentence to which Mr. Molotov had objected would be eliminated and the three paragraphs proposed by him would be inserted instead.

Freedom of the Press

Mr. Byrnes pointed out in the papers concerning Poland and Rumania and Bulgaria reference had been made to freedom of the press. On the paper regarding Admission to United Nations Organization and on the Polish paper where the words “freedom of the press” were used, he had been informed that radio was not necessarily governed.⁴³ He therefore suggested the addition of the words “and radio.”

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the press and radio were not the same thing.

Mr. Byrnes agreed although in some places they were construed to mean the same thing and in others not. He assumed that Mr. Molotov would not desire to discriminate against radio.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that in some cases radio was run by the government unlike the press. The American rules hardly apply in these cases. He hardly thought it was possible to find a common rule.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the only result of the present wording is to give representatives of the Allied press full freedom to report to the world. He was sure that the Soviet Delegation would not feel that representatives of Allied radio should not be permitted to report. There was no essential difference between a newspaperman reporting to his paper and a radioman reporting over the radio.

Mr. Molotov suggested that they conform to the decision already adopted.

Mr. Bevin asked whether it was meant that correspondents and radio representatives would be allowed to repeat [report?] on the same basis.

Mr. Byrnes replied that the insertion after the word “press” of the word “radio” would mean this. If this word were not included, newspapermen would be all right but radiomen would not.

Mr. Bevin asked whether Mr. Molotov objected to radiomen being able to report.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation would not be able to deal with this question at this moment since different things were involved. He suggested that the question not be raised at all at this time. There should be neither permission nor prohibition.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that every morning at eight he listened to a correspondent reporting the news from Moscow.

Mr. Molotov rejoined that the Soviet Government would not permit a Hearst correspondent to talk over its radio. It all depended on the situation.

Mr. Bevin stated that he did not want Mr. Molotov to put British socialized institutions like the BBC at a disadvantage as compared to private press.

Mr. Molotov doubted that the Conference had time to examine this question.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that it be passed and that the Big Three be advised.

Chinese Acceptance of Invitation to Join Council of Foreign Ministers

Mr. Byrnes announced that he had just received word that the Chinese Government has accepted with pleasure the invitation sent to them to join the Council of Foreign Ministers.⁴⁴

German Fleet

Mr. Byrnes stated that according to the naval subcommittee the unresolved questions on this subject are__________

Mr. Molotov interrupted to ask for a ten-minute adjournment.

Mr. Byrnes agreed.

Mr. Byrnes after the adjournment again raised the question of the German fleet and merchant marine. He stated that the first unresolved question is that of distribution. The British Delegation had asked that the French share in the distribution of certain ships.⁴⁵

Mr. Molotov pointed out that it had already been decided by the Big Three that the fleet would be divided equally among the three powers.⁴⁶

Mr. Byrnes asked for British comment.

Mr. Bevin asked whether they were now dealing purely with the fleet since he had reservations regarding merchant vessels. After receiving an affirmative answer, he agreed to the one-third division.

Mr. Byrnes then passed to the question of the merchant marine.

Mr. Bevin interrupted to mention the question of submarines. There were some differences here. The question is how many submarines should be saved and how many should be destroyed and how should they be divided. Churchill had laid down the British position on this subject to the effect that only token submarines should remain. The British were very sensitive on this point. The British and American Delegations had agreed that thirty submarines should be saved and the rest destroyed.⁴⁷

Mr. Molotov remarked that the Soviet Union would like to save more.

Mr. Bevin replied that he knew this. However, if the Russians asked for a big submarine fleet after what the British had suffered, no statesman would survive. Mr. Molotov must go along with him on this. It was a tender point with the British Navy. U–boat warfare had cost the lives of 30,000 British seamen carrying supplies. The main thing, therefore, is that submarines be saved for experimental purposes only. The number suggested by the American and British Delegations would be adequate for this purpose. He hoped that the Soviet Delegation would agree.

Mr. Molotov after asking whether any addition could be made agreed to saving thirty submarines.

Mr. Bevin thanked him.

Mr. Byrnes then reverted to the subject of the merchant marine.

Mr. Bevin stated that the British were anxious to see a reasonable amount of shipping left to care for the German economy. He was willing to have the Allied Control Commission examine the problem very carefully in order to determine the number and type of ships suitable for Baltic and other uses. When the Control Commission had determined the amount of tonnage and type, there would be a balance left. He would then agree to a division provided that the Soviet Delegation out of their one-third would take care of Poland proportionately as the British and Americans would take care of others.

Mr. Molotov proposed that the British-American Delegation draft⁴⁸ be accepted. This does not mention specific countries.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that Holland may make claims, and Norway also. As he understood Mr. Bevin he had agreed that after the German economy had been taken care of there would be a division, provided that the Soviet Union took care of Poland and we of the others.

Mr. Molotov again referred to the necessity for determining the ships necessary for the German economy.

Mr. Byrnes stated his understanding that the British Foreign Minister had covered this point and had said that thereafter there would be a one-third division but that the Soviet Union would take care of Poland and we would provide for the reasonable claims of others.

Mr. Bevin interjected to state that he wished to limit distribution of the British and American portions to Norway, France, the Dutch and possibly Belgium.

Mr. Byrnes inquired about Greece.

Mr. Bevin agreed that Greece should be included.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the question be decided in accordance with the agreement by the American and British Delegations, namely that subparagraph (d) states that part of the German [merchant] fleet shall be held for the German economy.

Mr. Bevin pointed out now that this had been accepted.

Mr. Molotov went on to state that the rest of the merchant fleet should be divided into three parts.

Mr. Byrnes stated that this was correct and in accord with the committee report⁴⁹ but the British Delegation wished to make clear which countries should not look to the Soviet Union for part of their share.

Mr. Molotov stated that he understood but added that it had been provided in the [text on?] reparations that the Soviet Union will meet Polish claims and the other Allies other claims.⁵⁰

Mr. Bevin stated that this must be clarified. This concerns the distribution of booty, not reparations. He wished to know who has a claim to booty. The British lost 48 percent of their merchant fleet, the U. S. A. 15 percent, Norway 10½ percent, France 7 percent, the Dutch 5½ percent. He interrupted himself at this point to state that he had been quoting wrongly and that the figures mentioned by him applied to the percentage of total loss. After recapitulating he stated that the U. S. S. R. had suffered one percent of the losses and that he had no figures for the Poles.

Mr. Molotov asked where he had gotten the Soviet figure, which was not correct.

Mr. Bevin replied that he had a figure of 240,000 tons lost. His position is that in the distribution of booty he could not admit legal claims on the British in accordance with the Churchill statement but will give a fair interpretation to what Churchill had stated in this connection.⁵¹ Therefore he was willing, together with the U. S. to meet the claims of the other Allies, but he asked for a definite understanding that Poland should out of this booty have their proportionate share out of the Soviet one-third. He undertook with American approval to deal with the Norwegians, the French, the Dutch and the Greeks.

Mr. Molotov inquired about the Yugoslavs.

Mr. Bevin said “No. Why?”

Mr. Molotov stated that he thought their opinion should be sought. Otherwise, they would be offended.

Mr. Bevin replied that he would leave the Yugoslavs to the Soviet Union out of their generosity.

Mr. Molotov asked why.

Mr. Bevin stated that he did not think that Great Britain after their tremendous losses should satisfy the claims of every other Ally. This is asking too much.

Mr. Molotov inquired about the United States position.

Mr. Byrnes stated that in consideration of this question heretofore it had been recognized that ships, even merchant marine, was war booty in British possession, Churchill had agreed at this table to a division subject to the condition that ships under the Combined Maritime Authority would be used in the war against Japan.⁵¹ He wondered whether it was wise to enumerate the countries whose claims are to be considered. He thought that it might induce them to file claims. He thought some South American countries had lost ships and would like to file claims. If agreement was reached that the Soviet Government would out of its one-third care for the Polish claim and in addition look after Yugoslavia, it would make it easy.

Mr. Molotov stated that the question is whether there would be any ships left after their use by Russian allies against Japan.

Mr. Byrnes replied that there would be [an] ample number of ships left if the Soviet Union looked after Poland only.

Mr. Molotov again asked if there would be any left after the Far Eastern war.

Mr. Byrnes replied that no one could say but he believed that we were not losing many merchant ships at this time. He again repeated his belief that to enumerate ships would be to invite others to make claims. He wondered whether it was necessary.

Mr. Bevin stated that he only mentioned it as an example.

Mr. Byrnes restated his understanding that the ships were in the possession of the British and when division had been made other claims would be determined. We did not want to commit ourselves. It would be for British and American Governments to decide whether Yugoslavia would be allowed any ships.

Mr. Bevin stated that if the Soviet Union would agree that Poland would receive the same percentage of losses as America and Great Britain gave the other Allies, then he would undertake with the United States to take care of Yugoslavia. He wanted to get this point settled.

Mr. Molotov reserved his views on this matter.

Mr. Bevin referred to the proposed public announcement regarding ships and submarines.

Mr. Molotov replied that there is a draft announcement for publication,⁵² which seems to be proper.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that this question be submitted to the Big Three unless Mr. Molotov wished to let us know his view later.

Mr. Molotov thought it should be submitted to the Big Three.

Mr. Bevin asked what was to be submitted.

Mr. Molotov stated the proposal regarding the fleet and merchant marine.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that certain items had been agreed upon and that if they were not referred it would save time.

Mr. Molotov agreed that what had been agreed upon was all right, but he reserved his views on other sections. He referred to the last subparagraph of the British proposal.⁵³

Mr. Bevin stated that this had been withdrawn.

Mr. Molotov then referred to the agenda for the Big Three.

Mr. Byrnes replied that the Big Three agenda had been made up as we went along.

External Assets of Germany

Mr. Byrnes stated that a report had been received from the Economic Subcommittee regarding external German assets.⁵⁴

Mr. Molotov stated that this question must go to the Big Three.

Mr. Byrnes said that it would be placed on the agenda.

Article 19—Economic Principles

Mr. Byrnes reported that the Economic Subcommittee had failed to agree on Article 19 of Economic Principles.⁵⁵

Mr. Bevin asked whether agreement could be reached now.

Mr. Molotov suggested adjournment until three.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Big Three would meet at three—the meeting adjourned.

1. See ante, pp. 520, 522.
2. Document No. 1015, post.
3. See ante pp. 525–527.
4. Document No. 1018, post.
5. Cf. ante, p. 526.
6. Document No. 842, post.
7. Document No. 926, post.
8. Document No. 842, post.
9. Blank in the original.
10. Document No. 1000, post.
11. Document No. 1320, post.
12. Document No. 841, post.
13. Document No. 843, post.
14. i. e., the first British paper on this subject (document No. 837, post).
15. See ante, p. 130.
16. Documents Nos. 790 and 1055, post.
17. Not found. Cf. document No. 792, post.
18. The reference is to the Anglo-Soviet agreement which paralleled the Soviet-American agreement concerning liberated prisoners of war and civilians signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945, by Major General John R. Deane and Lieutenant General Anatoly Alexeyevich Gryzlov. Cf. the following passage in article 2 of the Soviet-American agreement: “Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.” Text of the Soviet-American agreement is printed in Executive Agreement Series No. 505; 59 Stat. (2) 1874; Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 985–987.
19. Document No. 1167, post.
20. Document No. 1168, post.
21. See document No. 1426, post.
22. Document No. 733, post.
23. See ante, pp. 282–283, 300–301.
24. Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031.
25. See chapter xii of the Charter.
26. Neither the British proposal nor Molotov’s amendment has been found. For the language agreed upon see document No. 1383, post, section xi (x).
27. For the Soviet draft referred to, see document No. 1433, post. The British draft referred to (not printed as a separate document) is identical with section xvii (xvi) of the Protocol (document No. 1383, post).
28. See, for example, p. 384, ante.
29. The unqualified word “transfer” appears in two variant texts submitted by the Soviet Delegation (documents Nos. 1430 and 1431, post). The British text on this subject (document No. 1429, post) used the phrase “ultimate transfer”.
30. See ante, pp. 305–306.
31. Document No. 1429, post.
32. Document No. 1430 or 1431, post.
33. See document No. 1427, post. For a Soviet text on the same subject, see document No. 1428, post.
34. This presumably refers to the decision reached earlier in the meeting (see pp. 547–548) to establish bilateral commissions to investigate the matter of oil equipment in Rumania. See document No. 1383, post, section xiv (xiii).
35. See ante, p. 525.
36. Document No. 828, post.
37. See, for example, document No. 317, printed in vol. i, and document No. 797, post.
38. See document No. 309, printed in vol. i, and documents Nos. 796 and 797, post.
39. See ante, p. 418.
40. Enclosure to document No. 797, post.
41. Document No. 796, post.
42. Blank in the original.
43. See document No. 1383, post, sections ix (viii) and x (ix).
44. See document No. 721, post.
45. See document No. 1014, post.
46. See ante, pp. 118–122.
47. See document No. 1015, post, enclosure A.
48. i. e., subparagraph (d) of enclosure B to document No. 1015, post.
49. Enclosure B to document No. 1015, post.
50. See the attachment to document No. 972, post.
51. See ante, pp. 118–120.
51. See ante, pp. 118–120.
52. i. e., the final paragraph of document No. 1015, post.
53. i. e., subparagraph (f) of enclosure B to document No. 1015, post.
54. Attachment to document No. 1002, post.
55. See the attachment to document No. 891, post.