Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

Truman Papers

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m.

top secret

Mr. Bevin in the chair.

Mr. Bevin suggested that the following questions might be disposed of:

1. The invitation to the Governments of France and China to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

2. Notification to the French Government of the decision on political principles with respect to Germany.

3. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy.

4. Disposition of the German fleet and merchant navy.

5. Political principles in the first stage of the control period in Germany—additional points.

6. Yugoslavia.

7. War crimes.

Mr. Byrnes proposed that they consider the question of German external assets and submitted a paper on this question.¹ He pointed out that there were also several matters referred to sub-committees upon which reports had not yet been received.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had circulated a memorandum on German troops in Norway² which should be placed on the agenda today. The Soviet Delegation was circulating a memorandum on the question of fascist activities in Austria and Germany³ and another memorandum on the question of the Ruhr area.⁴ He also suggested that they discuss the agenda for the Big Three meeting.

1. Invitation to the Governments of France and China To Participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers

Mr. Bevin proposed that they today send a telegram to the French and Chinese Governments on this question.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that it was understood that the message would be delivered 48 hours before adjournment.⁵ He agreed to its being sent now.

Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan said that the sub-committee had agreed on a text but that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting had not considered it. In the final paragraph referring to the dissolution of the EAC he suggested the words “the three governments” rather than the words “the conference.”

This was agreed to as well as the despatch of the telegram to the Governments of France and China.⁶

2. Notification to the French Government of the Decision in Respect to Political Principles for Germany

It was agreed without discussion to notify the French Government of the decision taken on this matter.⁷

3. Reparations From Germany, Austria and Italy

Mr. Bevin said they should have a clear understanding of what they had decided on this matter.

Mr. Molotov said he had submitted a draft of the Soviet proposals.⁸

Mr. Byrnes said he would like to submit for consideration a proposal involving three matters:

(1) On the subject of reparations, he wished to read a proposal which he had made to the British and Soviet Delegations. (Mr. Byrnes then read the American paper on this subject⁹). He wished to add that they had discussed the question of Italian and Austrian reparations on several occasions. The position of the President had been made clear in the meetings of the Big Three¹⁰ and he thought it would not be helpful to discuss it further at the present meeting. The agreement which he now proposed on reparations was conditional upon agreement on two other proposals which he would read now because they must be considered together.

(2) The approval of the paper on the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the question of relations with the other satellite states. He proposed two amendments to the document on this question in an attempt to compromise the differences between the Soviet and British Delegations.¹¹

(3) Mr. Byrnes said that this concerned the question of the western frontier of Poland on which he had already presented a paper to the British and Soviet Delegations.¹² The proposal would permit the administration by the Poles of the area which they claimed pending the final determination of the disposition of this area. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this proposal represented a sacrifice of the views held and expressed by the United States Delegation on this question. It was made in a spirit of compromise and that if agreement could be reached on these three proposals he would be satisfied. If not, he was willing to report to the Big Three and they could decide whether to continue the discussion or refer the matter to some future conference. He pointed out that on the settlement of these questions rested the settlement of several other matters, such as that concerning the economic principles for Germany.

Mr. Cadogan said he had submitted a paper on the question of reparations to the Soviet and United States Delegations.¹³ (A translator read the document in Russian translation).

Mr. Bevin pointed out that this proposal was connected with the next document which he would present.¹⁴

Mr. Molotov pointed out that under the British proposal the Soviets would receive 10% from the western zone. Under the American proposal they would receive 25% against payment and 15% without payment.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that this was from the Ruhr, whereas the British 10% was from the whole western zone. They had not received the American paper when their proposals were made. He inquired which Mr. Molotov liked best.

Mr. Molotov observed that the American draft provided for 25% reparations to be taken in exchange for other goods.

Mr. Bevin said the British had in mind the economic principles drawn up for Germany as a whole. They were prepared to treat the supply of goods in Germany separately. He was concerned that the exchange proposed might lead to disputes. It would be difficult to exchange potatoes for chemical machinery. He was hoping that they could get an agreement for supplies over the whole of Germany and treat reparations separately. The question as to how supplies would be paid for by exports was dealt with in a separate paper. The difference between the United States and British approach was one of method. In order that the question could be examined in the full knowledge of their ideas on the subject, he proposed to read his second paper¹⁵ which he pointed out was linked to the first. (The translator then read in Russian translation the British paper on the question of supplies in Germany).

Mr. Bevin pointed out that the paper on economic principles¹⁶ should also be considered in this connection. (The translator read in Russian the paper on this subject).

Mr. Molotov said he felt the proposals made by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin contained a number of elements that could be taken to formulate general principles, but they required amendment and some additions. He had only just read Mr. Bevin’s proposal and would have to study it. It seemed to contain a number of points on which agreement could be reached. Mr. Byrnes’ proposals appeared to raise these questions in a more simple manner. The substance of the views of the Soviet Government were the following. The Soviet Union was anxious to receive German equipment to replace destroyed factories. He felt that the proposals of Mr. Byrnes were closer to their wishes on this. The principal question of interest to the Soviet Delegation, however, remained obscure in both proposals. They both spoke of percentages but of an unknown figure. He proposed an amendment to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal to the effect that the 25% mentioned in the Byrnes draft should be not less than 800 million dollars or two million tons of equipment. The Soviet Delegation was anxious to know what minimum was contemplated. They would, of course, prefer to speak not only of the Ruhr but of the western zones. The question could be settled if they would accept the figures given.

Mr. Byrnes said as he had stated before he realized the Soviet desire for an estimate in dollars but it was impossible for us to make an estimate as we had no information as to the amount of equipment that would be available for the payment of reparations. The same applied to an estimate in tons. The amount available for reparations was dependent upon the amount necessary to maintain the economy. With respect to the dollar value it was also the question of what the value was today. The United States representatives on the Reparations Commission¹⁷ as well as other experts did not agree on an estimate of what was available either in dollars or in tons. Our Soviet friends must accept our statement that the economy would be maintained in accordance with the decision to maintain German economy on a uniform basis. The statement on percentages was all they should say now, if they were to avoid quarrels in the future. As an example, he asked whether the two million tons referred to the weight of the equipment or the capacity.

Mr. Molotov replied weight of equipment.

Mr. Byrnes asked if Mr. Molotov did not think that when our experts disagree his proposal would cause all kinds of misunderstandings. They were going to trust each other on matters of much greater importance than this. When we said 40% of the equipment over and above what was necessary to maintain the economy, he must take this on good faith. Our British friends did not agree on the percentage and he spoke only of his own proposal. He was not wedded to any particular plan but thought our proposal more specific and simpler and that it would avoid misunderstandings.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that in the British proposal the 10% referred to the plants that it would be agreed would be available.

Mr. Byrnes urged that [the] advantage to an agreement of this kind was that the determination of what was available in the Soviet zone would concern neither the British, French nor United States and they would not, therefore, be interfering in that determination.

Mr. Molotov said he felt Mr. Byrnes’ proposal was in the main acceptable but he would like some indication of the minimum amount. He repeated, however, it was better to speak of the western zone and not the Ruhr.

Mr. Byrnes added that when agreement was reached on the percentage of the equipment to come from the Ruhr, the United States would have to agree with their British friends on the amount of machinery necessary to come from the American zone so as fairly to compensate the British and to take care of the claims of France, Belgium and Holland. He confined his percentages to the Ruhr because it was simpler and in order to prevent a situation in which there would be competing claimants. We would have to settle this ourselves.

Mr. Bevin said he was not in a position to state a figure because he did not know what it could be. He did not suppose that Great Britain would receive very much.

Mr. Molotov inquired who would determine what equipment would be made available in the western zone.

Mr. Bevin said the zone commander.

Mr. Molotov suggested adding “and the Control Council.”

Mr. Bevin agreed that the Control Council should be added.

Mr. Byrnes said that the thought of the United States Delegation was that the Control Council should determine the matter but subject to the final determination of the zone commander.

Mr. Molotov suggested that this should be included in the text proposed by Mr. Byrnes.

Mr. Bevin said that the question of the ascertainment of the material to be removed would be subject to investigation by the Control Council but that the zone commander should have the right of veto at the time of the decision.

Mr. Byrnes agreed that in case of dispute the commander of the zone would have to make the decision.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the Control Council should have final decision.

Mr. Byrnes disagreed, saying the commander in our zones and in the Soviet zone was the one who was charged with the maintaining of the economy and who had to have the final decision.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation could not conceive of a decision which did not contain minimum figures and he thought the matter should be referred to the Big Three. On the question of who was to determine the equipment available he suggested the Control Commission or the Reparations Commission so that the Russians could take part in the matter.

Mr. Byrnes repeated that he could not agree to take away the right of veto from the commander of the zone.

Mr. Molotov repeated who was to formulate the general program.

Mr. Bevin replied that it should be the Reparations Commission with the French added, which would work in association with the Control Council.

Mr. Molotov asked that this be placed in the record.

Mr. Byrnes replied that so long as the commander had the right of veto he thought he could agree.¹⁸

Mr. Molotov asked if they could accept as a basis for discussion the draft of Mr. Byrnes.

Mr. Bevin said he was sorry he could not, as he would have to defend at home the whole of this equipment being taken out of the British zone.

Mr. Molotov proposed that they take both zones as the basis.

Mr. Byrnes replied there was no objection if the percentage was changed. In each case the percentage mentioned would have to be halved; in place of 25% it would be 12½% and in place of 15% it would be 7½%.

Mr. Molotov said this would mean reducing the figure too much.

Mr. Bevin said he had been working on the British figure of 10% which he thought was very high.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviets were the ones most interested in receiving equipment. A large figure had been discussed at Yalta.

Mr. Byrnes said that if they could agree to designate the Ruhr and if we and the British could reach agreement, then the percentages in the American proposal were all right. If the Soviets now wanted to fix a percentage covering the two zones, it would mean simply cutting the figures in half. The Soviets would be getting 20% of the equipment in both zones. If that were done, it would be well to emphasize the Ruhr in the document because he understood that most of the equipment the Soviets wanted was there.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet proposal was 25% of reparations by way of exchange and 25% without payment. They had in mind chiefly the Ruhr[.]

Mr. Byrnes suggested that the United States and the British reach an agreement now to make an adjustment between them and added that this could be put into the protocol.

Mr. Bevin said he would rather say 12½% in exchange for other goods and 7½% without exchange. That would save him from political trouble and he added that he had the French and other claimants to think of.

Mr. Molotov said he was prepared to accept 20% with exchange and 25% without exchange from both zones and have it stated that they had in mind chiefly the Ruhr.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that Mr. Bevin’s proposal gave the Soviets the same amount as did his proposal. He referred again to the proposal with regard to the Polish frontier¹⁹ which involved a greater concession on our part than this one from the Soviets. The paper referring to the United Nations²⁰ involved a concession on the part of our British friends. He knew it was a concession for the Soviets to agree to percentages but if we made concessions, the Soviets should also.

Mr. Molotov said it was a concession to Poland and not to them.

Mr. Byrnes said he had heard his friend, Mr. Molotov, make a plea on this matter when the Poles were present and he had made a more eloquent plea than the Poles.²¹

Mr. Molotov said they had received territory from the Poles²² and were obliged to hold to their position with respect to the western frontier of Poland.

Mr. Bevin said the British had not agreed to the American proposal on this matter²³ and he thought it was a very good offer that was being made to the Soviets.

Mr. Molotov disagreed and said that they would be left with very little equipment as reparations in spite of the fact that the Germans had destroyed Soviet industries. They needed agricultural machinery and [means?] to rehabilitate their railroads. He asked if they could accept a suggestion of 25% from the Ruhr and 15% from the two zones, but added that what was important was the total figure.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this proposal was equivalent to 55% from the Ruhr instead of 40%. He inquired if Mr. Molotov was in a position to make a final disposition today of the three questions involved in his proposal.

Mr. Molotov thought it should be referred to the Big Three and that the main question was that of an absolute figure.

Mr. Bevin said that it should be quite plain that the British could not agree to an absolute figure. They would not know what would remain for their other allies.

Mr. Molotov replied that since the Soviets would receive only a percentage the balance would remain.

Mr. Bevin raised the question of imports being a fixed [first?] charge on exports.²⁴

Mr. Molotov thought that the sentence on this should be supplemented by the words “to the extent to which these exports will be approved by the Control Commission, and as regards the extent of these imports not agreed by the Control Commission, priority will be given to reparations,” or it might be more simple if stated “as regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs.”

Mr. Molotov repeated a previous example he had given with respect to coal.²⁵ If the Control Commission decided that 500,000 tons of coal should be exported, but one member proposed an additional 200,000, the 500,000 would have priority over reparations. With respect to the remaining 200,000 priority would be given to reparations.

Mr. Bevin inquired what would happen if his own Commander bought wheat and had to export coal to pay for it. Suppose in this case approval for the export of this coal was not given and he was faced with almost starvation in the zone. Would reparations take precedence in the face of a breakdown in the whole administration.

Mr. Molotov replied that it must be assumed that all parties were interested in a certain volume of exports. He wished to give another example. Suppose it were planned to arrange for the production of two million tons but only one and one-half million tons were produced. There was no certainty that production could be carried out and it was not possible definitely to fix a figure but 90 percent or 80 percent agreement could be reached. He had made another proposal which would cover such a case.²⁶ If there were a shortage of certain resources, exports and imports should be equally curtailed as well as internal consumption. If they produced 10 percent less coal, then they should plan to reduce by the same percentage imports, reparations, and internal consumption.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that in the early days of the Conference it became evident that it would be difficult for the Soviet delegation to reach agreement with the British and ourselves. One of the reasons he had proposed the plan discussed this afternoon was to avoid such situations and disputes arising. If the Soviets agreed to his plan they would have no interest in exports and imports from our zone. Any difficulty in regard to imports and exports would have to be settled between the British and ourselves. The Soviets would have no interest and they would get their percentage regardless of what happened to us.

Mr. Molotov said that if they could fix a definite figure for reparations this could be arranged.

Mr. Bevin said that so far as reparations were concerned the percentage they proposed would be delivered in any case and would not be affected by this proposal which related to the normal flow of goods. He suggested it was better to leave the question and to deal with Mr. Byrnes’ proposal on the Western frontier of Poland.

Mr. Byrnes replied that his proposal was a compromise proposal on three questions. He could not agree to the [separate] settlement of any one of them and suggested that they all be passed over. He could not agree to the other two if there were no agreement on reparations.

Mr. Molotov said it seemed that they could reach agreement on reparations but that they had left to the Big Three the one question of an overall figure. On the rest they could reach agreement.

Mr. Byrnes said that they might as well send the other two questions along to the Big Three for he could not agree to them unless there was an agreement on reparations.

4. Disposition of the German Merchant Fleet and Navy

Mr. Bevin said the British were submitting a paper making proposals to settle the differences that had arisen.²⁷ He proposed that it be submitted to a technical committee.

Mr. Molotov also wished to submit a Soviet draft on this matter.²⁸

A technical committee was appointed consisting of Admiral McCarthy and Mr. Weston for the British,²⁹ Admiral Cooke and Mr. Russell for the United States, and Admiral Kuznetsov and Mr. Sobolev for the Soviets.

5. German External Assets

Mr. Byrnes proposed that his paper on this question³⁰ be referred to the economic sub-committee.

This was agreed to.

6. Political Principles for Germany

Mr. Bevin said he had submitted a paper on this.³¹

Mr. Molotov proposed that the sentence in paragraph 1 regarding treatment of the population should read, “in so far as it is practicable the treatment of the German population should be the same throughout Germany.” He thought that the last sentence of the British draft which referred to the principle of free communications between zones was not in their competence, that they were not familiar with the details. He suggested that the British could raise this on the Control Council.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that while the Control Council would have the final determination this was only a declaration of principles to guide them.

Mr. Molotov thought it should have more study.

Mr. Byrnes proposed adding the words “subject to normal regulation by the Control Council”. He agreed that the Control Council must be charged with the regulation of these questions.

Mr. Bevin proposed accepting the paper without the paragraph on this question and that this paragraph could be sent to the Control Council for examination and it could then be discussed at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers later in the year.

Mr. Molotov thought it would suffice for the British to bring it before the Control Commission; otherwise they would have to set up a special committee to go fully into the matter.

Mr. Bevin inquired if they agreed to the rest of the document and pointed out that the decision in paragraph (a) would have to be included in the message to the French.

Mr. Molotov read a proposal for an addition to paragraph 8, sub-paragraph 4, of the document on political principles.³² This related to the question of a central German administration to deal with economic questions. There were hints regarding this in the document but he thought that it should be stated explicitly and that it was necessary to create such an administration subject to certain limitations.

Mr. Byrnes said he saw no objection to accepting Mr. Molotov’s proposal.

Mr. Bevin wondered if this were wise unless the proposal could be shortened and confined to a statement of principles instead of a detailed proposal. He suggested that the Control Commission be asked to advise them in regard to the steps to be taken to establish a central German administration, its constitution and its functions. They were here establishing a central administration without consultation with the Control Commission.

Mr. Byrnes said the Big Three had been adopting directives to the Control Commission; if they thought a central administration was necessary he saw no objection to saying so. The British thought the outlining of its functions should be done by the Control Commission. He proposed that they agree to the first paragraph and to the first two lines of the second paragraph stopping with the word “Council”.³³

Mr. Bevin said he accepted the idea but wanted the British delegation to have a look at it that evening.

7. Yugoslavia

Mr. Bevin said they had circulated a paper on this question³⁴ and added that the British were interested in stopping all private wars.

Mr. Molotov said he would also want to circulate a document on Yugoslavia.³⁵

(The translator read a Russian translation of the British paper.)

Mr. Molotov commented that it was difficult for a reader to understand what was implied as different things were combined in one statement. If they should summon representatives of Yugoslavia to the Conference they could ascertain what could be done.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that an understanding had been reached that until peace was established, the status quo should be maintained and that frontiers should not be altered by force.

Mr. Molotov said that the paper did not mention any country by name. He would need more time to examine the draft.

Mr. Bevin said he must have more time to study the Soviet draft.

8. War Criminals

Mr. Molotov submitted the Soviet draft proposal³⁶ which he said had already been handed to the American delegation.³⁷ He pointed out that many people would expect the Berlin Conference to say a word on this question. The Soviet proposal was that the first ten war criminals who were in the hands of the Allies and who were well known be dealt with.

Mr. Byrnes said that the United States representative on the War Crimes Commission,³⁸ Justice Jackson, had discussed with him the situation in regard to German war criminals.³⁹ The Commission had not reached agreement but hoped to do so in the immediate future as to the definition of war crimes. So long as they had a Commission of prominent representatives dealing with this matter they might communicate the proposal to them before taking action and see if they had any recommendation with regard to the language. He agreed that it might be well if the Conference made a statement on this matter, but he would like to first telephone Justice Jackson to ascertain the status of the Commission’s negotiations.

Mr. Molotov then suggested that they discuss the matter the next day. He had information to the effect that the disagreements in the War Crimes Commission had been disposed of with two exceptions which would be easy to settle. There had been a disagreement as to the place where the tribunal should sit—whether in Berlin or in Nuremberg. He said the Soviets would agree to either place.

Mr. Bevin said he was glad of this because the British delegation preferred Nuremberg. He asked if the British proposal⁴⁰ could not be accepted. He pointed out that he did not mention neutrals nor particular names. The British also had a list of names but it was not necessary to state them.

Mr. Molotov replied that names were of interest to all.

Mr. Byrnes thought it wiser not to mention persons. The men they had selected to prepare these cases had ideas as to which criminals should be tried first. He pointed out that the list which Molotov had given him earlier today⁴¹ differed from the list he was now submitting. The British also had a list of names.

Mr. Molotov suggested that they take only the names concerning which there was no doubt.

Mr. Byrnes said the fact that there were two lists showed that the question was disputable. It would be better to leave the order of the names to those they had chosen to represent them.

(The translator read a Russian translation of the British proposal.)

Mr. Byrnes said he thought the British proposal would be a wiser statement than the Soviet proposal and he added that we each had our pet German war criminals.

Mr. Molotov thought the British proposal was not enough. What was said in 1943 was not enough in 1945. He asked for time to think about it and said it was not bad but should be improved.

9. Fascist Activities in Germany and Austria

Mr. Molotov said information had reached them to the effect that certain Fascist agents were operating in the American and British zones in Austria and Germany.⁴² These were persons who had been in the employ of Hitler. The Soviet delegation felt that they should not be allowed to continue to agitate among the Soviet nationals remaining in the U.S. and British zones. He would be satisfied to receive a short statement from the United States and British to the effect that inquiries would be made in such cases and that an end would be put to these hostile activities.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had asked for a report from the Army Commander and hoped to receive it the next day.⁴³ When he did so he would see what steps could be taken to meet the views of Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Bevin said the British had also asked for information but it was not sure whether they would receive it the next day. If not they would take the matter up with the Soviet Government through official channels.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviets hoped for a statement at the Conference.

Mr. Bevin said that he could not be asked to take action before the facts were received and he was not going to allow any government to make him do so.

Mr. Molotov said they would wait.

Mr. Molotov said the next question he wished to raise was that concerning the information which the Soviets had received that many Germans [in Norway?] had not been disarmed.⁴⁴

Mr. Bevin replied that the British were sending him a complete reply in writing.⁴⁵

Mr. Molotov inquired if they should send the questions of reparations from Italy and Austria to a sub-committee.

Mr. Bevin said he thought Mr. Byrnes had withdrawn this until the main question was settled.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that he had said that this question had already been considered by them and referred to the Big Three. He understood that Marshal Stalin did not insist upon reparations from Austria but did insist upon reparations from Italy.⁴⁶

Mr. Molotov said he was only referring to Italy.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Big Three had discussed the question at great length and could not reach agreement. If his colleagues wished they could tell the Big Three that they had not finished their work and put it on their agenda again, but he saw no purpose in doing so.

Mr. Molotov said he did not regard the question as finished.

Mr. Byrnes said he agreed that they could ask the Big Three to decide it but he wanted the report to state that this was being done on the proposal of Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Molotov said he agreed.

Ruhr ⁴⁷

Mr. Molotov said he had presented Mr. Byrnes a paper on the Ruhr⁴⁸ and he was now submitting it to Mr. Bevin. He did not propose that it be discussed now.

Mr. Bevin said it was impossible for them to discuss this without the French.

Mr. Molotov observed that they had discussed other important questions without the French.

Mr. Bevin said he was willing to study the paper but he was not willing to decide a matter as serious as this without the French.

Mr. Molotov said he wished to submit a paper in regard to certain misunderstandings which the Soviet delegation wished to bring to the attention of the British and American delegations in regard to nationals of the Ukraine, White Russia, etc.⁴⁹

10. Agenda for the Big Three Meeting

On the proposal of Mr. Bevin it was agreed that the agenda be arranged by consultation.

1. Document No. 1000, post.
2. Document No. 1056, post.
3. Documents Nos. 790 and 1055, post.
4. Document No. 1027, post.
5. See ante, pp. 287, 292.
6. The Subcommittee’s draft has not been found. Cf. document No. 714, post. For the invitation to France as delivered by the American Ambassador at Paris, see document No. 1395, post. Concerning the invitation to China, see documents Nos. 715 and 717, post.
7. See document No. 1396, post.
8. The Soviet draft on reparations from Austria and Italy is document No. 1104, post. The draft on reparations from Germany has not been positively identified (cf. document No. 953, post, and ante, p. 482).
9. Document No. 961, post. Cf. document No. 962, post.
10. See ante, pp. 174, 464.
11. Document No. 731, post, includes the amendments referred to (cf. ante, p. 480).
12. Document No. 1152, post.
13. Document No. 960, post.
14. Document No. 1051, post.
15. Document No. 1051, post.

16. Presumably the attachment to document No. 863, post, or possibly a later version thereof. There is a later British version (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045) with paragraphs renumbered as in the final text, but since a text with the old numbering was still under discussion on July 31 (see post, pp. 520–521), it can hardly be the paper read here. This later British version is identical in substance with document No. 1383, post, section ii, paragraphs 11–19, except that it contains the following three paragraphs in lieu of paragraph 19 as printed in document No. 1383:

    • “19. Payment of reparations should leave sufficient resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance.
    • “20. Payment for imports into Germany approved by the Control Council shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods.
    • “21. The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of the Reparations Agreement.”

17. Edwin W. Pauley and Isador Lubin.
18. See document No. 962, post.
19. Document No. 1152, post.
20. See document No. 731, post.
21. See ante, pp. 331–332.
22. See document No. 1417, post, section vi.
23. It appears from the Mikołajczyk Papers (a) that Attlee and Bevin had met with Bierut and other members of the Polish Delegation at 3 p.m. on July 29 and again at 11:30 a.m. on July 30 and had been dissatisfied with Bierut’s exposition at the latter meeting (see Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy, p. 410) of the Polish position on holding elections in conformity with the Yalta agreement on Poland; (b) that on the morning of July 31 Bevin submitted to the Polish Delegation, through Mikołajczyk, a series of written questions to which the British Delegation wanted satisfactory answers before it would take a position on the western frontiers of Poland; and (c) that Bevin discussed these matters further with Beirut and other members of the Polish Delegation at 2:45 p.m. on July 31 and, on the basis of oral assurances obtained from the Poles at that time, indicated that the British Delegation would support the line of the Oder and the Western Neisse at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting later in the afternoon. See post, p. 518, for the report of the Polish assurances which Bevin gave to the three Heads of Government.
24. For the text of Bevin’s proposal, see the Rapporteur’s report, post, p. 501. Cf. document No. 888, post.
25. See ante, p. 281.
26. See ante, pp. 279–280.
27. Document No. 1014, post.
28. Document No. 1013, post.
29. According to the Rapporteur’s report (post, p. 502), Ward was also appointed a British member of this committee.
30. Document No. 1000, post.
31. Document No. 879, post.
32. Document No. 886, post.
33. See documents Nos. 886 and 887, post.
34. Document No. 1083, post. Cf. document No. 1202, post.
35. Document No. 1211, post.
36. Presumably document No. 1017, post.
37. See ante, p. 482. Cf. document No. 1016, post.
38. i. e., the International Conference on Military Trials meeting at London.
39. See ante, p. 421.
40. Document No. 1018, post.
41. Document No. 1016, post.
42. See documents Nos. 790 and 1055, post.
43. No such report has been found.
44. See document No. 1056, post.
45. Enclosure 1 to document No. 1058, post.
46. See ante, pp. 464–465.
47. This is an unnumbered manuscript heading appearing at this point in the margin.
48. Document No. 1027, post.
49. Document No. 1167, post.