Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 10 a.m.

[Extracts]

top secret

1. Military Aspects of Unconditional Surrender Formula for Japan

(J. C. S. 1275/5²)

Admiral Leahy stated that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the memorandum which had been prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments,³ but suggested a change in the next to the last paragraph. He said that this matter had been considered on a political level and consideration had been given to the removal of the sentence in question. It was Admiral Leahy’s view that it was suitable for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment upon the paper from a military point of view and he asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the military features of the proposed draft.

General Marshall stated that from a purely military point of view he considered that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be that nothing should be done prior to the termination of hostilities that would indicate the removal of the Emperor of Japan, since his continuation in office might influence the cessation of hostilities in areas outside of Japan proper.

General Marshall proposed that paragraph 3 of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee be used as the basis for the draft of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President which would express the military implications and would include the proposed changes in the draft of the statement prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments. The memorandum to the President should also include the views he had previously expressed in regard to doing nothing to indicate that the Emperor might be removed from office upon unconditional surrender.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Directed the Secretary to prepare for consideration a suitable memorandum for the President in the light of the discussion.⁴

2. Retention of United States Forces in Italy

(J. C. S. 1411/1⁵)

Admiral Leahy asked what the President might do with the memorandum which it was proposed to send to him in regard to the retention of U. S. forces in Italy.

General Marshall said that since the Secretary of State had cautioned the President that this matter might be brought up by the Prime Minister,⁶ he believed that the President should give the memorandum to the Secretary of State.

General Marshall also said that the Prime Minister had approached him on this subject of the retention of U. S. forces in Italy in a conversation on the preceding night.^6a

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the memorandum for the President in the enclosure to J. C. S. 1411/1, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall.⁷

3. British Participation in the War Against Japan

(C. C. S. 889;⁸ J. C. S. 1424⁹)

Admiral Leahy explained the relationship of the two papers under consideration.

General Marshall referred to the comment of General MacArthur on the employment of Commonwealth forces in Coronet and furnished Admiral Leahy with a copy of the dispatch containing the comment referred to.¹⁰

General Arnold , in connection with this paper, asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the small contribution of aircraft by the British would add little to the effectiveness of air operations in the Pacific area and would complicate the problems of operation and support.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to J. C. S. 1424 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 889/1.¹¹)

4. Command and Control in the War Against Japan

(C. C. S. 890,¹² J. C. S. 1407/2 and J. C. S. 1407/3¹³)

General Marshall said that he desired to make clear the difference in viewpoint of the British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff in regard to command and control in the war against Japan. He said that our insistence on retaining the present command relationship in the Pacific area might induce the British to ask for the same authority over the Southeast Asia Theater. He said we should offer no objections to a British proposal of this nature.

Admiral Gardner pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control the coordination of effort in the U. S. and British areas particularly in regard to timing. In this connection, Admiral Leahy said we should not refuse to consider any suggestions by the British Chiefs of Staff in regard to the problems of coordination and timing.

The proposed draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and minor amendments were made thereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to J. C. S. 1407/3 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 890/1.¹⁴)

5. United States Policy Concerning the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal

(J. C. S. 1418/1¹⁵)

Admiral Leahy said that the President had not given any consideration to this matter as yet.

Admiral King read a digest of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, indicating the differences in points of view of the Army members and the Navy member.

Admiral Leahy said that the attitude of the State Department was to agree with the views of Admiral Willson to the effect that the Dardanelles should be a free waterway without defenses by either Turkey or Russia. He said that although there had not been much discussion of the Kiel Canal, the general view of the State Department was that it should be open to all nations.

Admiral Leahy asked if it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that free passage of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal would meet military requirements.

Admiral King pointed out that the Cattegat was in the same status as the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal, since it was a waterway through both Danish and Swedish territorial waters. He thought therefore that the free passage of the Cattegat should be taken up at the same time.

Admiral Leahy expressed the view that the fortifying of the Cattegat by the Danes or the Swedes on the ground of national defense could not be prevented. He said that the difficulty in regard to the Dardanelles would be that Russia would want to fortify it.

Admiral King expressed the view that there was a good argument for demilitarizing the Dardanelles, Kiel Canal and the Cattegat, to which Admiral Leahy replied that there was also a good argument for demilitarizing the Panama Canal.

General Marshall proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept Admiral Willson’s paper.

The draft of Admiral Willson’s paper was discussed and minor amendments made thereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the reply to the Secretary of State in Appendix “A” to Enclosure “B” of J. C. S. 1418/1, as amended during discussion.¹⁶

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Not printed.
3. See vol. i, document No. 592, enclosure 2.
4. See post, p. 64.
5. Not printed.
6. See vol. i, document No. 473.
7. Marshall had been Churchill’s dinner guest on the evening of July 16 (see London Times, July 18, 1945, p. 4). No record has been found of the conversation on this occasion other than this reference in the minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
7. For the memorandum as approved, see document No. 1108, post.
8. Document No. 615, printed in vol. i .
9. Not printed.
10. See document No. 1284, post.
11. Document No. 1283, post.
12. Document No. 604, printed in vol. i .
13. Neither printed.
14. Document No. 1267, post.
15. Not printed.
16. For the memorandum as approved, see documents Nos. 751 and 1363, post.