[Enclosure]
top secret
Control and Command in the War Against
Japan
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of
Staff
1. In considering the proposals made by the United States
Chiefs of Staff on the transfer of command in the Southwest
Pacific Area,2 we have reviewed the whole question of
command and control in the war against Japan under the following
headings:—
I. Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) and Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)
- (a)
- Boundaries of command
- (b)
- Chain of command
- (c)
- Date of transfer
II. Higher Strategic Control of the War against Japan
[Page 922]
i. southeast asia command and southwest
pacific area
2. We agree with the United States Chiefs of Staff that there
should shortly be some alteration in the responsibility for
SWPA. In our view, the
transfer of this responsibility will involve alterations in
the boundaries of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast
Asia’s (SACSEA)
command.3 We make the following
proposals:—
Boundaries of Command
3. SACSEA’s boundaries
should be extended as follows:—
Beginning at the junction of the Sino-Burmese
frontier and the Sino-Indo-China frontier, along the
frontier between Indo-China and China to the coast;
thence down the coast of Indo-China to a point 15
degrees N; thence through the Balabac Strait along
the 1939 boundary line between the Philippines and
Borneo to latitude 05 degrees N; thence eastward to
05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence southwestward to
02 degrees S, 123 degrees E; thence southeastward to
08 degrees S, 125 degrees E; thence southwestward to
18 degrees S, 110 degrees E.
The main difference from the proposal so far made to us by
the United States Chiefs of Staff is the inclusion of
Indo-China, as well as Siam, in SEAC. This we consider important so that there
may be unity of control of the major operations in this area
when they develop and of previous subversive and
paramilitary operations.
This line of demarcation would add Borneo, Java, and the
Celebes to SEAC.
4. Boundaries of Australian command should now be defined as
follows:—
05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence to 05 degrees N,
130 degrees E; thence south to the Equator; thence
to the International Date Line.
The main difference between this line of demarcation and that
proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff is that all
Australian mandated territories are now included in the
area. This is naturally the desire of the Australian
Government, with which we are in sympathy. It would, of
course, be possible for United States forces to make use of
the facilities in Manus and Guadalcanal.
Chain of Command
5. We propose that the chain of command and responsibility
should then be as follows:—
-
a.
-
SEAC—no
change.
-
b.
- Australian command—in this area there should be an
Australian commander under the Australian Chiefs of
Staff. The British Chiefs
[Page 923]
of Staff should be the link
between the Australian and Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
Date of Transfer
6. In our view SACSEA may
not be ready to assume his additional responsibilities until
after the recapture of Singapore. We, therefore, propose
that, subject to further examination with the United States
Chiefs of Staff, the transfer of command should take place
shortly after that time. This need not preclude the gradual
turnover in the meantime of bases, ports, or airfields by
agreement between the Australians and General MacArthur.
ii. higher strategic control in the war
against japan
7. The present arrangements for the higher strategic control
in the war against Japan are:—
-
a.
-
SEAC (C. C. S. 319/54):
- Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the
British Chiefs of Staff acting as their
agents.
-
b.
- Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas:
- In these areas the Combined Chiefs of Staff
exercise jurisdiction over grand strategic policy
and over the allocation of forces and war materials
but the United States Chiefs of Staff are
responsible for all matters appertaining to
operational strategy.
8. We feel that the time has now come when we should take
upon ourselves a greater share of the burden of strategic
decisions which will be required before Japan is defeated. Although
our contribution in the Pacific must always remain small in
comparison with that of the United States, it is natural
that our interest and concern should grow as more of our
forces begin to be deployed in the Pacific area. Moreover,
when the Straits of Malacca have been opened, there will no
longer be the same natural geographical division between
SEAC and the Pacific.
All operations in the war against the Japanese would then
form one strategic concept.
9. We therefore propose for consideration that the control of
the different theatres in the war against Japan should now be organised
as follows:—
-
a.
- The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general
jurisdiction over strategic policy and the proper
coordination of the Allied efforts in all theatres
engaged against the Japanese.
-
b.
- The United States Chiefs of Staff acting as agents
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to
operations in the Pacific Ocean area and
China.
-
c.
- The British Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to
operations in SEAC
and SWPA.
-
d.
- The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise
jurisdiction over allocation of forces and war
materials as between all theatres engaged against
the Japanese.
