J. C. S. Files

No. 604
Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff
top secret
C. C. S. 890

Control and Command in the War Against Japan

1.
We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum on command and control in the war against Japan which the British Chiefs of Staff have prepared for discussion at the next conference.
2.
The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on the proposals formulated have been requested but have not yet been received.1
[Enclosure]
top secret

Control and Command in the War Against Japan

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. In considering the proposals made by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area,2 we have reviewed the whole question of command and control in the war against Japan under the following headings:—

I. Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) and Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)

(a)
Boundaries of command
(b)
Chain of command
(c)
Date of transfer

II. Higher Strategic Control of the War against Japan

[Page 922]

i. southeast asia command and southwest pacific area

2. We agree with the United States Chiefs of Staff that there should shortly be some alteration in the responsibility for SWPA. In our view, the transfer of this responsibility will involve alterations in the boundaries of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia’s (SACSEA) command.3 We make the following proposals:—

Boundaries of Command

3. SACSEA’s boundaries should be extended as follows:—

Beginning at the junction of the Sino-Burmese frontier and the Sino-Indo-China frontier, along the frontier between Indo-China and China to the coast; thence down the coast of Indo-China to a point 15 degrees N; thence through the Balabac Strait along the 1939 boundary line between the Philippines and Borneo to latitude 05 degrees N; thence eastward to 05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence southwestward to 02 degrees S, 123 degrees E; thence southeastward to 08 degrees S, 125 degrees E; thence southwestward to 18 degrees S, 110 degrees E.

The main difference from the proposal so far made to us by the United States Chiefs of Staff is the inclusion of Indo-China, as well as Siam, in SEAC. This we consider important so that there may be unity of control of the major operations in this area when they develop and of previous subversive and paramilitary operations.

This line of demarcation would add Borneo, Java, and the Celebes to SEAC.

4. Boundaries of Australian command should now be defined as follows:—

05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence to 05 degrees N, 130 degrees E; thence south to the Equator; thence to the International Date Line.

The main difference between this line of demarcation and that proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff is that all Australian mandated territories are now included in the area. This is naturally the desire of the Australian Government, with which we are in sympathy. It would, of course, be possible for United States forces to make use of the facilities in Manus and Guadalcanal.

Chain of Command

5. We propose that the chain of command and responsibility should then be as follows:—

a.
SEAC—no change.
b.
Australian command—in this area there should be an Australian commander under the Australian Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs [Page 923] of Staff should be the link between the Australian and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Date of Transfer

6. In our view SACSEA may not be ready to assume his additional responsibilities until after the recapture of Singapore. We, therefore, propose that, subject to further examination with the United States Chiefs of Staff, the transfer of command should take place shortly after that time. This need not preclude the gradual turnover in the meantime of bases, ports, or airfields by agreement between the Australians and General MacArthur.

ii. higher strategic control in the war against japan

7. The present arrangements for the higher strategic control in the war against Japan are:—

a.
SEAC (C. C. S. 319/54):
Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff acting as their agents.
b.
Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas:
In these areas the Combined Chiefs of Staff exercise jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over the allocation of forces and war materials but the United States Chiefs of Staff are responsible for all matters appertaining to operational strategy.

8. We feel that the time has now come when we should take upon ourselves a greater share of the burden of strategic decisions which will be required before Japan is defeated. Although our contribution in the Pacific must always remain small in comparison with that of the United States, it is natural that our interest and concern should grow as more of our forces begin to be deployed in the Pacific area. Moreover, when the Straits of Malacca have been opened, there will no longer be the same natural geographical division between SEAC and the Pacific. All operations in the war against the Japanese would then form one strategic concept.

9. We therefore propose for consideration that the control of the different theatres in the war against Japan should now be organised as follows:—

a.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over strategic policy and the proper coordination of the Allied efforts in all theatres engaged against the Japanese.
b.
The United States Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations in the Pacific Ocean area and China.
c.
The British Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations in SEAC and SWPA.
d.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over allocation of forces and war materials as between all theatres engaged against the Japanese.

  1. Concerning the Australian views on the enclosed memorandum and on document No. 615, see John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. vi (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), p. 268. The New Zealand views were not received prior to the conclusion of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held in connection with the Berlin Conference. See ibid., p. 269.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.
  4. Not printed.