J. C. S. Files

No. 1283
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff1
top secret
C. C. S. 889/1

British Participation in the War Against Japan

1.
The United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous agreement to the proposals in subparagraphs 3 a. and b. of C. C. S. 889.2 [Page 1335]In connection with the latter proposal it should be noted that there is little prospect that airfield space for more than ten squadrons of a British very long range (VLR) bomber force will become available at least before 1 December 1945.
2.
As to paragraph 3 c, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle to the participation in the final phase of the war against Japan of a British Commonwealth land force, subject to satisfactory resolution of operational problems by Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific,3 and Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,4 and to the clarification of certain factors which the United States Chiefs of Staff believe will be controlling. Their views on some of these factors follow:—
a.
It is essential that a firm commitment be received as to dates of availability and composition of forces in order to plan for their participation in the final effort and to effect adjustments of the United States redeployment program. It is not practicable to plan on using forces whose availability is contingent upon their release following the conclusion of a separate major operation. Hence it appears these forces cannot at present be planned for use earlier than the build-up phase of Coronet.
b.
The difficulties incident to the employment of Indian troops (language complications and the necessity for prior acclimatization) make it doubtful that the Indian division can be effectively employed.
c.
Arrangements have already been made with the Canadian Government to organize and equip along United States lines one Canadian division, to operate as a part of a United States corps.
d.
It is noted that agreement of the Dominions concerned has not yet been obtained.
e.
A solution must be found to the complicated logistical problems involved.
f.
The forces should be concentrated in the Pacific or in the United States well in advance of the date scheduled for their participation in the campaign.
g.
The question of the provision of assault lift requires clarification.
h.
It is considered impracticable to superimpose upon the already adequate U. S. tactical air forces a small British tactical air force, since this would overload prospective airfields and introduce complications resulting from additional aircraft types.
i.
The effect of the proposals upon continued operations in the Southeast Asia Command requires further examination.
  1. Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 194th Meeting, July 17 See ante, p. 48.
  2. Document No. 615, printed in vol. i .
  3. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
  4. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.