J. C. S. Files
No. 615
Memorandum by the
Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff1
top secret
C. C. S. 889
[Washington,] 6 July
1945.
British Contribution to the Final Phase of
the War Against Japan
| References: |
CCS 452 Series |
|
CCS 619 Series |
|
CCS 691 Series |
- 1.
- We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum
on the British contribution to the final phase of the war
against Japan, which
the British Chiefs of Staff have prepared for discussion at
the next conference.
- 2.
- The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on
the proposals formulated have been requested but have not
yet been received.2
[Enclosure]
British Contribution to the Final Phase
of the War Against Japan
top secret
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of
Staff
- 1.
- It has been agreed that the over-all objective for the
war against Japan
is to force the unconditional surrender of the Japanese
by:—
-
a.
- Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist
by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting
intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese
naval and air strength.
-
b.
- Invading and seizing objectives in the
industrial heart of Japan.
- 2.
- It is agreed that the invasion of Japan is the supreme
operation of the war. The prospect of the recapture of
Singapore in November 1945, together with the opening of
the Malacca Straits, enables us to offer, in addition to
the British Pacific Fleet and the very long range
(VLR,) bomber force,
a British, Dominion, and Indian land force to take part
in this invasion. Owing to limitations of shipping,
however, such a project will only absorb a part of the
forces at present deployed in Southeast Asia Command. We
have therefore planned that British forces should
continue operations in the Outer Zone as far as
limitations of other resources allow.
- 3.
- We propose, therefore, that British participation in
the final phase of the war against Japan should take the
following form:—
-
a.
- The British Pacific Fleet as at present
planned.
-
b.
- A VLR bomber
force of 10 squadrons increasing to 20 squadrons
at a later date when more airfields become
available.
-
c.
- A British Commonwealth force to participate in
Coronet
under American command, of three to five
divisions, all to be carried in British shipping
and provided with the necessary assault lift. This
force would be supported by the East Indies Fleet,
augmented by the British Pacific Fleet as
necessary, and by a tactical air component of some
15 squadrons. The exact size, composition, and
role of this force can only be determined by
consultation between British and United States
staffs in the light of United States operational
plans, the target date of
Coronet
, and its relation to the date of the
capture of Singapore. Our preliminary
investigations show that it might take one of the
following forms:—
- (i)
- A force of one or possibly two divisions in
the assault together with two or three divisions
in the build-up, administratively largely
self-supporting.
- (ii)
- A force of three divisions in the assault
and immediate follow-up and one or possibly two
divisions in the build-up, relying, to a
considerable degree, on American administrative
assistance.
- (iii)
- A force of up to five divisions in the
build-up administratively largely self-supporting.
We should naturally prefer a course which allowed
us to take part in the assault.
-
d.
- Operations in the Outer Zone to maintain
pressure against the Japanese across the
Burma–Siam frontier. In addition, plans for
operations against Siam, for the establishment of
bridgeheads in Java or Sumatra, and for the
recapture of Hong Kong will be studied. A decision
will be made at a later date as to whether, and if
so when, any of these operations will be
undertaken.
- 4.
- We therefore propose that the Combined Chiefs of Staff
should approve the British contribution to the final
phase of the war against Japan, as set out in this
memorandum.
