740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1945

No. 747
The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)1


Subject: Work Sheet on Question of Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe (Annex 3 of United States Agenda2).

1. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the Yalta formula and the armistice control in the satellite states. In our view Yalta should not be invoked to change the armistice administration, which was set up by specific negotiation and which, much as it needs improvement, should be negotiated ad hoc. This distinction is important at the moment, because the Soviet Government may well try to sidestep the issue of implementing Yalta by referring to their new move to give better treatment to the United States and United Kingdom delegations in the armistice commissions.3

The British proposal for discussing the Rumanian petroleum question4 at this afternoon’s session suggests that they may expect the Yalta formula to help out in ameliorating United Kingdom and United States positions under the armistice regimes. We consider that the petroleum problem may indeed require negotiation above the level of the ACC, but that it is not germane to the Yalta Declaration.

2. The British paper on Yalta (their No. 8)5 favors concluding peace treaties as the first step toward the creation of conditions for the emergence of democratic government. We think that only after some change in the composition of the government in Rumania and Bulgaria should we proceed to normalizing relations. We need not make our demands so rigid as to shut off the means of dealing with an imperfect regime, if we can work out a substantial broadening of the base as a beginning.

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3. The “consultation” proposed in point 2 of our paper6 might be by our Ambassadors at Moscow, or our political representatives at Bucharest and Sofia, but preferably not by the Control Commissions, for the reasons mentioned above.

4. The British are proposing adding Yugoslavia to this topic. The Soviet Government would probably object to making a joint “statement” at the conclusion of the conference. Much of the desired effect could be achieved by a joint “message” (not made public) on the basis of which we could exert pressure at Belgrade at appropriate times.

C. W. Cannon
  1. Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.
  2. See document No. 214, printed in vol. i.
  3. See document No. 309, printed in vol. i, and documents Nos. 796 and 797, post.
  4. Document No. 837.
  5. Not found.
  6. Document No. 745.