Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

Truman Papers

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 5 p.m.

top secret

Bulgarian–Greek Frontier Incident

Mr. Churchill said he wished to refer to a point which Stalin had raised at the previous meeting concerning an incident on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier. He had made inquiries. The British Government had heard of no fighting. These people did not like each other very much and he did not doubt but that there had been some sniping. There was no Greek field division in northern Greece, however. The British knew this, as they had their own people there. There were seven thousand Greek guards on the Albanian and Yugoslav frontiers. They were there for purposes of internal order. On the other side of the frontier there were 30 thousand Albanian, 30 thousand Yugoslav and 24 thousand Bulgarian troops. He only mentioned this because this Conference of the Great Powers should make clear that there should be no marauding attacks and that frontier questions should be settled by the peace conference. It should be indicated that those who try to violate frontiers are likely to prejudice their own claims.

The President said he had never heard of this and that he did not hear it mentioned at the previous meeting. He agreed that frontier matters should be settled at the peace conference.

Stalin said there had been some misunderstanding. He had not raised this matter at the previous meeting but in a personal talk with Mr. Churchill.³ This did not affect the fact that this Conference could consider the matter and he might wish to raise the matter at a later date.

Churchill agreed that it was not raised at the meeting, although it had been brought up at this table. He agreed with Mr. Stalin that it could be raised at the Conference.

The President then proposed that Mr. Eden submit his report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers.⁴

Mr. Eden said that the United States Secretary of State said this morning that he wished to submit an amendment to the redraft of paragraph 3 of the document on the Council of Foreign Ministers.⁵ This had been referred to a drafting committee.

German Political Question

The second point examined at their meeting was the German political question. The Foreign Ministers had considered the economic and political principles that were to guide the Control Council of Germany. Preliminary consideration had been given to this matter by the Heads of Government at a previous meeting.⁶ The Foreign Ministers were now submitting a redraft of the political section of the document on this question.⁷ In addition to redrafting, they had added some new material. They suggested that when the economic part had been agreed upon, they would consider it and refer it to the meeting of the Heads of Government.

The political section of the document was approved as revised.

Poland

Mr. Eden said that the British had submitted a new draft⁸ to replace the paper submitted by the Soviet Delegation⁹ on the Polish question at the previous meeting. The Foreign Ministers had had a useful discussion on this subject and had submitted it to a drafting committee. They hoped to present it tomorrow.

Churchill observed that when the drafting committee had finished its work, they would discuss it.

The President and Stalin agreed.

Mr. Eden said that apart from the two subjects already mentioned, the Foreign Ministers proposed the following subjects as the agenda for the present meeting:

1. German Merchant and Naval Fleet.

2. Spain.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the Russians had submitted a memorandum on this subject.¹⁰

3. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Mr. Eden stated that the United States Delegation had circulated a memorandum on this subject.¹¹

4. Yugoslavia.

The United Kingdom had submitted a paper on this.¹²

5. Rumania.

Eden said that the British had prepared a memorandum on the removal of oil equipment as trophies.¹³

Eden commented that as the meeting of Heads of Government had finished their previous session at an early hour, a long list had been prepared for the present meeting.

Disposition of German Merchant and Naval Fleet

The President said that with respect to the first question, the disposition of the German fleet, the first thing to consider was, what is reparation and what is war booty. The merchant fleet was to be classified as reparations, as he thought it should; the matter would eventually have to be referred to the Reparations Commission. He said he was interested in the merchant fleet because the United States wanted it to operate under the present control in the Japanese war zone.

Stalin said that war material taken by armies in the course of a war is booty. Armies that laid down their arms and surrendered, turned in their arms and these arms were booty. The same thing applied to the navy. It was stipulated in the military proposals put forward by the Three Powers¹⁴ that the navy be surrendered. It was therefore, booty. It was possible, however, to discuss the question whether the merchant fleet was booty or reparations. Regarding the navy, there was no question about the matter. He recalled the case of Italy in which both naval and merchant fleets had been treated as booty and no question had been raised.

Mr. Churchill said he did not want to approach this matter from the juridical standpoint.

The President said he held the same view.

Churchill said he wanted to reach an agreement on this matter between the three powers as a part of their general agreement at the Conference. In saying this, he was speaking only of the German war fleet. He said that they had the whole of the German merchant fleet in their keeping at the present time. Should a general agreement be reached at this Conference and a friendly settlement of their problems be achieved, he would not be opposed to a division of the German fleet. He felt that the question of the Italian fleet could better be discussed in connection with the settlement with Italy. He went on to observe, however, that replacement of losses was relevant to this matter. The British had had immense naval losses in the war. Speaking from memory, they had lost about 10 capital ships and aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers and literally hundreds of destroyers, submarines and various kinds of small crafts. The question of U–Boats stood on a somewhat different footing. These U–Boats had a limited legal use. The Germans had used them in contravention of the international agreements on this subject.¹⁵ As many of them as possible should in his opinion be destroyed. The latest German U–Boats, however, might contain valuable information for the future and that should be reasonably shared by the three Powers. He did not look at the matter solely from a naval point of view. He was aware of the tremendous sacrifices which the Russians had made in the field. He suggested that there should be no final discussion today but he thought that the bulk of the U–Boats should be sunk and the remainder shared equally. With respect to the other naval vessels he thought that they should be divided equally, provided a general agreement was achieved at the Conference and that they parted amicably from this meeting. He had no objection to the Soviet proposal that the German naval fleet be divided. He did not feel that a nation as great and mighty as Russia should be denied this. It should have its flag welcomed. As it took so long to build new vessels, these vessels would be a means of developing a Russian navy and training personnel and would facilitate showing the Russian flag on the ocean.

With respect to the German merchant fleet Churchill said he felt that while the Japanese war continued, all captured ships should play their role to the full and contribute to the ending of that war. The limit of the conduct of the Japanese war was shipping. They had sufficient men, planes and naval ships but merchant ships were needed for the movement of men and materials. There was also the difficulty in feeding the British Isles and liberated Europe. Every ton was needed in this critical period. They had all placed all of their shipping in the shipping pool.¹⁶ He would be sorry if this German fleet was not used to conclude the war with Japan.

He pointed out that the Finns had had a merchant fleet of some 400 thousand tons which had passed into the hands of their Russian ally. Two Rumanian ships, from available troop ships, had also fallen into Russian hands. If the German fleet was to be divided by three, the Rumanian and Finnish fleet should also be divided.

Stalin interrupted to state that the Russians had not taken a single merchant ship from Finland and had taken only one ship from the Rumanians which was used for carrying wounded troops.

Churchill replied that he was speaking of the basis of the question. He went on to say that there were others besides the three at this meeting. The Norwegians had suffered terrible losses. Their oil tanker fleet had been very valuable and it had been made use of freely. Other Powers not at the meeting had suffered heavy losses. Perhaps the German fleet should be divided into four and the fourth part might be used for the other Powers not represented at this meeting. He only threw out these suggestions which he thought should be considered.

The President said he would be agreeable to a three-way division of the German merchant and naval fleets but he should like it to be done after the Japanese war. We needed these ships not only for the conduct of the war but also to haul food and supplies for rehabilitation of Europe, to our great ally, Russia, Greece, and others.

The President said that we will need every bomb and every ton of food.

Stalin said what about the navy?

The President said he was ready to dispose of them now. He added that when the Japanese war was over, the United States would have merchant and naval ships for sale but he did not want to upset our war against Japan now.

Stalin inquired, “Are not the Russians to wage war against Japan?”

The President replied that when Russia was ready to fight Japan, she would be taken in the shipping pool the same as the others. He added that we wanted them in the pool.

Stalin said he was interested in the question of Principle.

Churchill suggested that the vessels could be earmarked, if they had any ears when the Japanese war was over; if any were damaged they could be made good from our general resources. He said he must avow himself as a supporter of the request of Marshal Stalin that the Russians receive a share of these war and merchant vessels. The only alternative was the sinking of the naval vessels. This would be a harsh procedure, when one of our trusty allies has a desire for them.

The President observed that they were not apart on this question.

Stalin inquired what sort of ships were meant. Was it merchant ships?

Churchill replied that he referred to merchant ships.

Stalin said that of course it was not possible to depict the Russians as having the intention to interfere with the war against Japan and the matter could not be put in a way to imply that they were to receive a gift from the Allies. They were not after a gift.

Churchill interrupted to state that he did not mention that.

The President said that he had not either.

Stalin continued that he should like for the matter to be cleared up as to whether Russia was to have the right to claim one third of the German merchant and naval fleet and that what they would receive they would receive by their right; if his colleagues thought otherwise, they should say so.

The President said he did not think otherwise.

Stalin said that if the principle were recognized, the Russians would be satisfied. With regard to the use to which the merchant fleet would be put, including the one third to be handed over to Russia, of course they would raise no obstacles to the use of their third in the war against Japan.

The President said he had no objection to this proposal.

Stalin said then he agreed that this matter be settled at the end of the Conference as suggested by Mr. Churchill. There was one thing he should like to see accomplished, however. His people were not allowed to see the German fleet. The Russians had set up a Commission to deal with this question but they were not allowed to see the fleet nor were they even given a list of the vessels. Was it not possible to list them and to allow this Commission to inspect the ships and to find out what ones were there?

Churchill replied that it was quite possible but the British would want reciprocal facilities to be given them to see German installations in the Baltic. He believed that the Russians had obtained 45 German U–Boats in Danzig. They could arrange an exchange.

Stalin observed that these submarines were out of use but said that they could agree to Mr. Churchill’s request that the exchange of facilities be mutual.

Churchill said that all they were asking for was fair play and equality.

The President said that so far as the United States zone was concerned, the Russians were at liberty to see anything they wanted, only we would expect that this would be reciprocal.

Churchill said he had made a distinction between U–Boats and other ships. He knew that Marshal Stalin would appreciate the sensitiveness of an island power which grows only two-thirds or less of its own food. They had suffered much from the U–Boats and the submarine was not consequently a popular form of naval vessel in Great Britain. He strongly suggested that the bulk of them be sunk. Great Britain had very nearly perished from them twice. Those who live with a large population on a small island do not welcome any nations of the world extending their construction of submarines. His consent was conditioned on further discussion of how many are divided and how many are sunk, but he agreed that they be divided equally. In this war, German submarines had damaged them severely and had eaten up a large part of their war making capacity.

Stalin stated he was also in favor of sinking a large proportion of the U–Boats.

The President then said he thought that was sufficient discussion on this subject.

The Spanish Question

Mr. Eden said that the next question on the agenda was that of Spain.

Stalin said the Soviet proposals¹⁷ had already been submitted and he had nothing to add.

Churchill said that his Government had a strong distaste for General Franco and the government of his country. He had been misrepresented as having been friendly to this gentleman. All he had said was that there was more to Spanish policy than drawing rude cartoons of Franco. The taking out of jail prisoners who had been in jail for years and shooting them for what had happened long before indicated that Spain was not a democracy in accordance with British ideas on that subject. Therefore, when Franco had written him a letter proposing that he and Churchill organize the western states against that terrible country, Russia, he had, with the approval of the British Cabinet, sent him a chilly reply. Mr. Molotov would remember that he had sent him a copy of this reply and a reply [copy?] had also been sent to the President.¹⁸ British feeling was against the Franco regime.

Stalin stated that they had received the copy of the British reply.

Churchill said that he saw some difficulty in Stalin’s proposal, particularly in the first paragraph concerning the breaking off of all relations with Franco Spain. It seemed to him that taking such a step in regard to a nation having a character like that of Spain, which was proud and touchy, might rally around Franco those elements now deserting him and making his position more precarious. The breaking of relations was not a satisfactory process. It would be a pleasure to do so but after that they would have no contact. Ambassadors were needed most of all in times of difficulty. If they took such action as this it would be a shock.

The result might strengthen Franco’s position. He has an army although it was not very good. If this action resulted in strengthening him, it would be necessary to consider whether to take a rebuff or to intervene with force. He was against the use of force. He was against interfering with countries which had a different regime unless we are molested by them. In the countries which we control, we have, of course, set up democratic governments. Insofar as the liberated areas are concerned, we cannot allow a Fascist regime to be set up. With respect to the countries which have not taken part in this war, however, there should be no exchange of cannon fire. His Majesty’s Government would have to give prolonged consideration to Stalin’s proposals to break relations with Spain. He was prepared to take every measure by all proper diplomatic means to speed the departing guest.

The breaking of relations with a state because of its internal conduct of affairs was a dangerous principle. He added that he would greatly deplore anything which would lead Spain to civil war. Spain had suffered terribly from its civil war in which two million people had been killed. The British would be sorry to intervene as a government in an active manner in the Spanish affair at this juncture. Forces there were working for a change for the better.

He pointed out that the World Organization which had just been agreed upon at San Francisco had a provision against interference in domestic affairs.¹⁹ While they were preparing to ratify the charter drawn up at San Francisco, it would be inconsistent to resort to action which would be prohibited under it.

The President said that he had no love for Franco. He had no desire to have any part in starting another civil war in Spain. There had been enough wars in Europe. He would be happy to recognize another government in Spain but he thought that Spain itself must settle that question.

Stalin observed that this meant that everything would be unchanged in Spain. In his opinion, the regime of Franco was gaining strength. It was feeding semi-fascist regimes in other countries. Reference had been made to internal affairs. This was not an internal affair. The Spanish regime had been imposed on the Spanish people by Hitler and Mussolini whose regimes they were in the process of destroying. He believed that his colleagues had no love for Franco but this should be proved in deeds. He was not proposing military intervention nor that civil war be let loose, but he wished the Spanish people to know that the three Governments had taken a stand on the side of the democratic forces among the Spanish people and that the Spanish people should have ground to believe that they were against Franco. There was a diplomatic means of showing that they were against Franco and that they were for the democratic Spanish people. He said that suppose they assumed that the means of breaking relations was too severe. Was there not a more flexible means of letting the Spanish people know that the three Governments are in sympathy with the Spanish people and not with Franco. It was dangerous to let the Spanish regime remain as it was now. Public opinion in Europe and in America was not in sympathy with Franco and if the three Governments were to pass by in silence this cancer in Europe, it might be considered that they sanctioned Franco. That would be a grave charge.

Churchill observed that the Soviet Union had no relations with Spain now.

Stalin replied that he had the right to raise and settle this question. Why should they be silent. People presumed that the Big Three could settle such a question and he was one of them just as Mr. Churchill was. Must they keep silent about what was going on in Spain, as well as to refrain from action against Spain which was giving shelter to Fascists? They could not shut their eyes to the grave danger of Franco Spain.

Churchill said that individuals were not enjoined by governments from expressing opinions. Also the press, to which Marshal Stalin had referred, spoke very freely on this matter in the Soviet Union as did the British and sometimes the American press. His Majesty’s Government had spoken very frequently to Franco and to his Ambassador.²⁰ They did not like, however, to break relations.

Churchill referred also to the valuable trade relations which Britain maintained with Spain. Spain sent them many useful products and received British manufactured goods in return. This was an old and well established trade. Unless he were convinced that it would bring about the desired result, he did not want this trade stopped. He fully understood the feeling of Marshal Stalin. Franco had had the audacity to send a Spanish Blue Division to Russia. Russia was in a different position, having been molested. Insofar as the British were concerned in this war, they^20a had refrained from taking action against the British at a time when such intervention could have been disastrous.

Churchill continued that during the Torch operation merely opening fire on the ships and Air Corps concentrated in the area of Gibraltar would have done them great harm.

Stalin interrupted to say that the Spaniards were afraid. They would have been doomed if they had dared to take such action.

Churchill continued that they had not been specifically injured by the Spaniards. No one doubted that Marshal Stalin had no love for the Franco regime and he had no doubt that the majority of the English people shared this view. Churchill said he only intended to emphasize that the Russians had been injured in a way in which others had not.

Stalin said he thought that Great Britain had also suffered from Spain, which had provided bases on its shores for German submarines. He considered that all Allied Powers had suffered in this way. He did not wish, however, to look at the question from this point of view. What was important was the danger to Europe. This should be remembered. Some steps should be taken even if the breaking of diplomatic relations was too severe. They should say that they thought that the aspirations of the Spanish people were just. They had only to say this and nothing would be left of Franco. He considered that the Foreign Ministers should consider whether a milder statement could not be agreed upon.

The President stated that he agreed.

Churchill said he was opposed. The matter must be settled at the meeting of the Heads of Government.

Stalin pointed out that it would be settled by them. The Foreign Ministers would only give it preliminary study.

Churchill said he did not think this was advisable. It was a question of principle. To interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries was very dangerous. He might not like some things in the United States, but he did not consider it wise to attempt to intervene.

Stalin said that this was not a question of a domestic affair. The regime of Franco was of external origin.

Churchill rejoined to state that anyone could say this about any country.

Stalin replied that no other country in Europe had such a regime.

Churchill observed that Portugal might be accused of being under a dictatorship.

Stalin replied that it was not the dictatorship that mattered. The regime in Portugal resulted from internal developments, whereas the regime of Franco resulted from intervention by Hitler and Mussolini. Franco’s behavior was provocative. He gave shelter to Nazis.

Churchill said he was not prepared that any government in which he participated should interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This has always been their policy. Moreover, to push things might make matters worse. He would be very glad, although he knew this idea would not be received with enthusiasm, if the regime were overthrown and replaced by a constitutional monarchy with free democratic principles, elections, etc. If, however, he or any British Government pushed this proposal, all would turn against it in Spain. No country likes to be told how it is to be run. There was intervention on both sides in the Spanish civil war. The Soviet Union intervened on one side and then Hitler and Mussolini came in on the other. But that was already long ago. Action taken at this meeting was more likely to rivet Franco in his place. The British Government did not give the slightest support to Franco Spain other than trade, which they have always carried on.

The President stated that he would be happy to have the matter sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if agreement could not be reached.

Stalin said he also fully appreciated the British difficulties, but felt that this matter could be facilitated by action here. He proposed that they prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including observations made by Mr. Churchill on the trend of developments in Spain. This would be one of the items in the declaration to be made on Europe. He assumed that they would have some sort of declaration on the results of their work. This statement on Spain should be included in them. It would not be binding on the British Government. It would be a short statement on the situation in Spain which would make clear to public opinion that their sympathies were with the Spanish people. This was a most mild form—milder than the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia²¹ and Greece.²² He suggested that they let the Foreign Ministers consider what form this declaration could take.

Churchill replied that he had not agreed to any declaration on Spain and he gathered that the President had also not agreed.

Stalin said it was not a question of a declaration on Spain alone, but on all countries.

Churchill said that the line he had taken was that in all countries involved in this war that they should not interfere in their domestic affairs. This was a question of principle. There were many things in regard to Yugoslavia and Rumania which he did not like. They were involved in the war which gave us greater freedom there. He repeated that there was great danger in the intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. If there were to be a declaration of the principles on which democratic governments were founded—he personally had always liked the statement in the American Constitution—and a statement on what governments had not fulfilled these principles, he could consider it, but he pointed out that many governments in Europe now do not fulfill these principles. He did not know what the Spanish people thought. There were many shades of opinion in Spain. Most of them would doubtless like to get rid of Franco without interference from outsiders.

The President said there appeared to be no chance for agreement at the moment. He suggested that they pass on to something else upon which they could reach a decision and that they come back to the Spanish question at a later session.

Stalin suggested that it be referred to the Foreign Ministers to consider.

Churchill said that this was the point on which they were not in agreement. He did not suggest an adverse decision but merely that they leave it for the moment.

The President said that they could return to it at any time.

Stalin said that he agreed.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The President said that the document on this matter had been submitted at the first session.²³

Stalin suggested that discussion of this question be put off as the Soviet Delegation had another document on this question which they wished to submit.²⁴

This was agreed to.

Yugoslavia

Eden pointed out that the British Delegation had submitted a document on this question.²⁵

Stalin said that he thought they could not discuss this question without having the Yugoslavs present—at any rate they would be unable to achieve any results without them.

Eden pointed out that they had agreed upon a declaration at Yalta²⁶ although no Yugoslavs were present.

Stalin replied that Yugoslavia was an Allied country and that it was not possible to settle this matter without the Yugoslavs. When they had met at Yalta there had been two Yugoslav governments which could not reach agreement. Now there was one legitimate government and he proposed that the representatives of that government be called in.

Churchill inquired if he meant Tito or Šubašić.

Stalin said they could call in anyone.

Churchill said, however, that the Yugoslavs were in extreme disagreement.

Stalin said this was the first time he had heard of it. He proposed that they verify this and let the Yugoslavs tell them all about it.

The President inquired whether the Prime Minister’s information was serious enough to warrant sending for the Yugoslav representatives.

Churchill replied that it was a very serious matter and pointed out that at Yalta they had reached an agreement on this subject which had not been carried out; there had been no elections; the assembly (AVNOJ) has not been re-organized; juridical procedure has not been restored; Tito has imposed a strict party organization with police control and with the press almost as strictly controlled as in fascist countries. Yugoslavia has not in any way borne out the hope we had entertained at Yalta. We gave arms and support to Tito. We could not give much as we were heavily engaged but we gave all we could. He was very disappointed at the way things had turned out at the present time. The British proposal was a very modest one to restate what had been set at Yalta.

Stalin said that Mr. Churchill had passed to a discussion of the substance of the question but he had not answered whether he considered it worthwhile discussing the matter. If the President desired, he could make a statement on the substance of the question.

The President asked him to do so.

Stalin said that the information given by Mr. Churchill in regard to the infringement of the Crimean decisions was unknown to us and does not agree with our information. Perhaps he is right; perhaps not, but he, Stalin, thought it would be useful to give the Yugoslavs a chance to reply to this accusation.

Churchill pointed out that he had not made an accusation, but a complaint.

Stalin said I can agree to a discussion of the subject, but it is not possible to try the Yugoslav state without hearing its representatives.

Churchill then stated that he had had time to think the matter over and that perhaps it would be useful to hear both sides—Tito and the other side separately. Perhaps they would be able to settle their difficulties. He inquired if Stalin thought they would be willing to come.

Stalin said he did not know but they could inquire of the Yugoslavs.

The President said that he was here as a representative of the United States to discuss world affairs. He did not wish to sit here as a court to settle matters which will eventually be settled by the United Nations Organization. If we do that, we shall become involved in trying to settle every political difficulty and will have to listen to a succession of representatives, de Gaulle, Franco, and others. He did not wish to waste time listening to complaints but wished to deal with the problems which the three Heads of Government had come here to settle. If they could not do that their time was wasted.

Stalin said that this was a correct observation.

Churchill said he wished to observe with great respect that the United States was very interested in the carrying out of the Yalta agreement. Great allowances had to be made for Tito, in view of the recent end of the war and the great disturbances in that country. The British memorandum merely expressed the wish that there be carried out the decisions which were made at the Crimean Conference. The President’s predecessor²⁷ had attached importance to this matter and, if I recall correctly, much of the drafting of this declaration had been done by the Americans.

The President said he desired to see the Yalta declaration carried out. “Insofar as the United States is concerned, I intend to carry it out to the letter.”

Stalin said that according to their information the Yalta agreement was being carried out.

The President observed that complaints had also been received by his government. He thought that they could be passed on without the Yugoslavs.

Churchill said that as the British paper had not met with support, he was prepared to withdraw it.

The President suggested that it be postponed for a session or two.

Churchill said that he wished to thank Stalin for his patience. If they could not settle their affairs here, where could they settle them?

Stalin replied that they could be settled here but that they should hear those who were concerned.

Churchill said he was agreed but the President was opposed.

Stalin said that the matter must then be dropped for the time being.

British and American Oil Equipment in Rumania

Churchill said that the British had submitted a paper on this subject²⁸ which they thought the Foreign Ministers could discuss and perhaps reach agreement. They would, in any event, benefit from the discussion between the Foreign Ministers. He observed that it was a rather detailed question.

Stalin said he thought this was a trifling matter which could be settled through diplomatic channels without raising it at this conference. Since it had been brought up, however, he wished to rectify one misstatement. No British property had been taken by the Soviet Union in Rumania. The property of some of these oil companies had been obtained in Germany. The Germans had captured it and had used it against the Allies. We removed some quantity of this type because the Germans destroyed our oil industry. He had no objection to the question being referred to the Foreign Ministers, but it would be better to handle it through the usual diplomatic channels in order not to trouble the conference.

Churchill stated that this was not a trifling matter. It was true that the Germans had stolen their pipe, which they had obtained from Germany, but they had paid for it. The British view was that if this pipe which was taken by the Soviet Union was considered as reparations, Rumania should reimburse the British for it. He inquired whether it would be agreeable if the Soviet and British representatives here got together to settle the matter.

The President observed that the United States was also interested. There was a similar situation with regard to the Standard Oil Company and the Shell Company. Why would it not be possible to let the Foreign Ministers discuss the matter.

This was agreed to.

Meeting adjourned.²⁹

3. See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 635.
4. Ante, p. 108.
5. See ante, pp. 101–102, 108. Cf. documents Nos. 712 and 713, post.
6. Ante, pp. 89–91.
7. See document No. 856, post.
8. Document No. 1121, post.
9. Document No. 1120, post.
10. Document No. 1177, post.
11. Document No. 745, post.
12. Document No. 1202, post.
13. Document No. 837, post.
14. This presumably refers to the terms of article 2 of the Declaration of June 5, 1945 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649).
15. The only international agreement governing the conduct of submarines in wartime to which Germany was a party and which was in effect at the outbreak of World War II was the Treaty on Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London, April 22, 1930 (Treaty Series No. 830; 46 Stat. (2) 2858).
16. Allied shipping was “pooled” and controlled through the operations of the United Maritime Authority and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards.
17. Document No. 1177, post.
18. For a summary of the correspondence referred to, see Stalin’s Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–45 (New York, 1958), vol. i, p. 395, note 80. This work is a reissue (including the original title pages and with the original pagination but bound in one volume) of the two volumes of Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the Presidents of the U. S. A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1944–1945 (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957; Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication). For a citation to the Russian-language edition of this work, see ante, p. xxix.
19. i. e., article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031).
20. The Duke of Alba.
21. i. e., Spain.
21. See document No. 1417, post, section vii.
22. There was no Yalta declaration on Greece, except insofar as that country was included within the terms of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. See document No. 1417, post, section v.
23. Document No. 745, post.
24. Documents Nos. 804 and 1064, post.
25. Document No. 1202, post.
26. See document No. 1417, post, section vii.
27. Franklin D. Roosevelt.
28. Document No. 837, post.
29. At 4:55 p.m. See Log, ante, p.15.