Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

Truman Papers

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m.

top secret

Mr. Molotov read his reports of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers held on July 27 and July 25 (attachment no. I).³

The President inquired if the list of questions drawn up by the Foreign Ministers was agreed to.

There was no objection.

Stalin suggested that they add the question of the disposition of the German fleet. He inquired how much time they had at their disposal at the meeting and suggested that they meet for one hour.

This was agreed to.

Stalin went on to say that the Russian Delegation had received a new proposal from Japan. Although the Soviet Delegation had not been informed when the document was drawn up against Japan⁴ they, nevertheless, were informing the other countries of this approach.

The translator then read the communication from Ambassador Saito which was marked strictly confidential and which was to the following effect: At our last meeting on July 13 the Ambassador had had the honor to submit the proposal of the Japanese Government to send Prince Konoe to Moscow.⁵ He had received the reply of the Soviet Government which did not see the possibility of giving a definite reply to the approach because no definite proposal had been made.⁶ In order to make the matter more precise he was communicating the following. The mission of Prince Konoe was to ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the present war and to transmit the complete Japanese case in this respect. He would also be empowered to negotiate with respect to Soviet-Japanese relations during the war and after the war. Simultaneously, he wished to repeat that Prince Konoe was especially charged by His Majesty, the Emperor, to convey to the Soviet Government that it was exclusively the desire of His Majesty to avoid more bloodshed by the parties engaged in the war. In view of the foregoing he hoped that the Soviet Government would give favorable attention to his request and would give its consent to the arrival of the mission. He added that the Soviet Government was aware of the position which Prince Konoe occupied in Japan.⁷

Stalin said there was nothing new in this except that it was more definite than the previous approach and that it would receive a more definite answer than was the case the last time, and that the answer would be in the negative.⁸

The President thanked Marshal Stalin. The President added that he understood the Soviet Delegation had two questions to take up this evening.

Molotov said these were [the] questions of Italy and the satellite states and the question of reparations from Austria and Italy. He added that besides the questions covered in the report of the Foreign Ministers it would be desirable to discuss the disposition of the German fleet and the western boundaries of Poland.

The President stated that they could discuss any question and that he would be prepared to express his opinion on any matter raised.

Attlee expressed regret that domestic occurrences in Great Britain had interfered with the work of the Conference and said that he was prepared to stay as long as necessary to complete the work of the Conference.

1. Admission of Italy and the Satellite States Into the United Nations Organization

Molotov said that this question had already been discussed at a previous meeting of the Big Three. The Foreign Ministers had held different opinions as to the results of this discussion.⁹ His own impression was that the proposal¹⁰ had been agreed to by the Big Three with respect to Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, subject to an amendment substituting the word “for” for the word “with.” The proposal had then been referred to the Foreign Ministers meeting for the final draft. In the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, the British representatives had proposed a new amendment.¹¹

Stalin said that this amendment had been rejected at the Big Three meeting. The question was whether to describe those satellite governments as “responsible” or to “recognize” them. The opinion of the Soviet Delegation was that the word “responsible” would offend the governments of those countries. If they said “recognize” it would not offend them and each of the governments represented at this conference could recognize them when it thought they were responsible. This had been accepted in principle by the Big Three, then the Foreign Ministers had gone to a meeting and had rejected it. This was not right.

Mr. Byrnes said that at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers it was stated by Mr. Molotov that he was under the impression that the United States had agreed to the amendment offered by Marshal Stalin or offered by the Soviet Delegation and approved by Stalin. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated that this was correct. The President had agreed in principle with the amendment offered by the Soviet Delegation. The President did suggest that the question be examined by a drafting committee and he had had in mind changing one word, namely, the substitution of “examine” for “consider.”¹² Therefore, there was no disagreement between the Soviet Delegation and the United States Delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated to the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, that when the President had agreed, his recollection was that the Prime Minister did not agree. The Prime Minister had advised him at the conclusion of the meeting that he did not agree.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had advised the meeting of Foreign Ministers that the United States had offered its proposal¹³ originally in order to give some confidence to Italy. We had asked only for a declaration that the Three Powers support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. The British Delegation had asked that we include neutrals and we had agreed. Then the Soviet Delegation expressed opinions with regard to the Franco Government of Spain and in the hope of getting an agreement we had added to the declaration that we would not support the entry of the Franco Government into the United Nations Organization. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked for the inclusion of the paragraph concerning Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland and we had agreed to that. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked that the paragraph regarding Italy be modified to accord with the language used in reference to the other satellite states and we had agreed to that.¹⁴ Unfortunately, we had found that if we agreed with the Soviet Delegation, the British Delegation did not agree; if we agreed with the British Delegation, the Soviet Delegation disagreed. It was now up to the Soviet and British Delegations to see if they could get together. If not, we would withdraw our modest request for the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization.

Cadogan observed that the paper related to the entry of Italy and the other states into the United Nations Organization. There were two doubtful points. Otherwise, they were agreed. Marshal Stalin had referred to one in regard to which he thought there was no difficulty. The original text had said “responsible” governments and the Soviet Delegation proposed substituting the word “recognized.” Cadogan thought that several days ago they had been prepared to agree to that. A more formidable difficulty was the proposal of the Soviet Government for an addition to paragraph three. Mr. Churchill had explained that while he was prepared to agree to consider the recognition of these governments, to put this in a declaration might be misleading, because the British could not in fact re-establish diplomatic relations with countries with which they were technically still at war. Cadogan said he had suggested a compromise but that this had not been satisfactory to the Soviet Delegation.¹⁵

Stalin said he understood Cadogan’s remarks to mean that he agreed to substitute the word “recognized” in place of the word “responsible.” Cadogan replied in the affirmative.

The President said that this was satisfactory to us.

Stalin then continued that there was no difference in the position toward the arrangements for Italy on the one hand and the other satellite states on the other, because none of these countries had democratic governments except Finland because they had held no elections. Mr. Churchill had referred to the fact that Great Britain had recognized Italy 90%.¹⁶ Stalin pointed out that the proposal did not provide for the establishment of full diplomatic relations but only that they consider the question. He did not understand the distinction made between Italy and the other satellites.

Bevin suggested that the difference was that they knew about the Italian Government but that they did not know anything about the other governments.

Stalin said it was not proposed that they recognize them; until such time as they did recognize them they could obtain information. Bevin inquired why they were being asked to commit themselves first.

Stalin rejoined that the Russians had also known little about the Italian Government when they had established diplomatic relations with them, perhaps even less than the British knew about the other satellites. He pointed out that with respect to Italy the first step was the resumption of diplomatic relations, which occurred six to eight months after their surrender. The proposal to admit Italy into the United Nations Organization was a second step. The task now was to give the other satellite governments the hope that eleven months after capitulation relations with them would be resumed. If they agreed to ease the situation of Italy, something should be done for the other satellites.

Attlee repeated that it was impossible for them to enter into diplomatic relations with countries with which they were not at peace and the proposed statement would give the impression that they would do what was impossible. The proposed British amendment stated what was possible.

Stalin then suggested that they might favor “to consider each separately the question of establishing of a complete or partial diplomatic relation.” He was willing to accept the American proposal to substitute “examine” for “consider”.

Attlee replied that the change of words did not alter the substance of the matter. One question in Parliament would bring out the real difficulty.

Stalin said that in any event the British would study the matter. He thought that the British Delegation could accept the proposal and lose nothing.

Bevin said that Parliament would ask what they meant by what they had done and he wanted to be perfectly straight with the British people. If he were going to recognize these governments, he would recognize them and he did not want to clothe things with words. He would rather take the latest American view and leave the whole question to a later date.

Stalin said he agreed.

2. Italian Reparations

The President said that as he had stated on the first day that this question had been discussed¹⁷ that we had found it necessary with the Government of Great Britain to contribute 500 million dollars for the feeding and rehabilitation of Italy. We recognized that probably that much more would be needed to keep Italy from starving to death. As he had made it plain at this conference, the United States did not intend to provide money for the payment of reparations. If there were war plants that the Soviet Government needed, we agreed that they should take them, but contributions made to support Italy should be a first claim on exports.

Stalin said that it was possible to agree not to exact reparations from Austria, as this could be understood but the Soviet people would not understand if this were the case with Italy. Italy had sent armies to the Volga. Austria did not have her own armed forces, whereas Italy did have.

The President said that if any reparations could be obtained from Italy he was perfectly willing, but the United States could not spend money to rehabilitate Italy just to enable Italy to pay reparations to other countries.

Stalin said he quite understood this. He referred to the moral right of the Soviet Union to reparations as being based on the fact that for three and one-half years its territory had been occupied and much devastation caused. The President had said that if there were some equipment available in Italy it could be used for reparations. He did not want to ask too much. It was necessary to find out what sum this would constitute. In the cases of Rumania, Hungary and Finland it had been 300 million dollars. He inquired what sum Italy could pay. Perhaps the President was not ready to answer. He repeated he wanted to know what sum this would amount to.

The President said he was not able to answer now.

Stalin said that the answer could be postponed.

Bevin inquired if this were on the assumption that the supplies furnished by the United States and Great Britain would be protected.

Stalin said that he did not wish to ignore the interests of America.

Attlee said he agreed with the President and said that they had full sympathy for the Russian people in the suffering they had undergone. He pointed out that Britain had also suffered from attacks by Italy. Britain also had ravaged lands and they could imagine the feelings of the British people if Italy had to pay reparations which actually came from Britain and America. The fact was that Italy had to receive help in order to live. If military equipment, there was no objection.

Stalin said he agreed to take reparations in the form of equipment.

Bevin asked “military equipment?”¹⁸

Stalin replied “yes, military equipment.”

Attlee inquired if this would be once-and-for-all removals and not levies on war production.

Stalin replied: “Yes, once-for-all removals.”

Bevin inquired if this meant military equipment having no peace time value.

Stalin replied that military factories could be used for any purpose. It was the same as equipment taken from Germany.

Attlee said it should be equipment having no peace time usefulness.

Stalin replied that all equipment could be adjusted for peace time production. The Soviet Union was adjusting theirs now. There was no such equipment which would have no peace time use.

Bevin observed that it was so difficult to tell what the Russians would take away.

Stalin said of course they could not say now. He wanted only a decision in principle.

The President said he thought that Marshal Stalin wanted a decision in principle that Italy would pay reparations.

Stalin observed that the sum of reparations asked could be reduced.

The President said he thought they were not far apart on the principle. He only wanted to protect the help we were giving.

Stalin said he agreed and that the Russians did not want to touch the advances the United States was making to Italy.

Bevin inquired if it were not then a question of priorities. The first priority should be given to what Great Britain and the United States had supplied, reparations would be next.

Stalin said he wanted to give no bonus to aggressors without their paying a small part of the damage they had caused.

The President said he agreed to this.

Stalin remarked to Attlee that he should not forget what Italy had done to Britain.

Attlee replied that they would not forget.

It was agreed to meet the next day at 4:00 p.m.

The meeting adjourned.¹⁹

3. Ante, pp. 445 and 400, respectively.
4. Document No. 1382, post.
5. See vol. i, documents Nos. 582 and 586.
6. See document No. 1226, post.
7. There is no indication that the actual text of Sato’s communication was circulated at the Conference. See document No. 1234, post.
8. See document No. 1261, post, and footnote 3 to that document.
9. See ante, pp. 357–364, 426–428.
10. Not found. See document No. 1424, post, footnote 1.
11. The Cohen notes (post, pp. 467–468) attribute these statements to Stalin.
12. In the Soviet amendment quoted ante, p. 363. Cf. the third paragraph of document No. 731, post.
13. Document No. 727, post.
14. See ante, pp. 53, 124–126, 146–147, 324–328, 360–364.
15. See ante, pp. 363–364, 426–427, 437.
16. See ante, p. 361.
17. See ante, p. 174.
18. This question is attributed to Attlee in the Cohen notes, post, p. 470.
19. At 12:05 a.m., July 29. See Log, ante, p. 22.