Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

Truman Papers

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m.

Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin now head the British delegation.

Mr. Molotov reports on the last two meetings of the foreign secretaries.

At the July 26 [25] meeting of the foreign secretaries the following points were considered:

1. The Secretary of State Byrnes proposed that the question of inland waterways be discussed and that the matter be referred to a subcommittee. It was so agreed.

2. Secretary Byrnes brought up the question of the removal of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Cadogan suggested that a procedure for collaboration to secure their orderly transfer be worked out. A subcommittee was appointed to consider this.

3. Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan suggested that the subcommittees for the drafting of protocol and communiqué at the conclusion of the conference be appointed. It was agreed to set up two committees for this purpose.

In the meeting of the foreign secretaries on July 27 the following questions were considered:

1. The foreign secretaries made up a list of the pending questions on which final decision had not yet been made.

2. There was further discussion of the paper regarding the admission of Italy and the other satellites and Spain into the United Nations.¹ Secretary Byrnes stated that if the Soviets and British could not agree he would withdraw the paper from the agenda. Mr. Cadogan suggested an amendment to the effect that the conclusion of peace with responsible governments would make possible the resumption of diplomatic relations. Mr. Molotov stated the amendment was not acceptable. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three.

3. Reparations from Germany. Soviet delegation considered committee report unsatisfactory. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three. Molotov pointed out that Mr. Pauley had withdrawn the Crimea decision as a basis for discussion. Mr. Molotov asked Mr. Byrnes for an explanation of the American position. Mr. Byrnes explained that the Crimea figures were taken only as a basis for discussion and that the destruction wrought by the Allied armies as well as further study had indicated that that basis was impractical.

4. Reparations from Austria and Italy. Molotov stated the committee report was unsatisfactory. Byrnes stated reparations from Italy impossible except for removal of war equipment not usable for peace purposes. It was agreed to report the differences to the Big Three.

5. German economic principles. Secretary Byrnes suggested the discussion be postponed.

6. European oil supplies. Discussion was deferred because committee was waiting for further information.

7. Economic collaboration. In the solution of urgent economic problems (European), a report of subcommittee was approved for submission to the Big Three and was read.

Truman: The last document was agreed to by the foreign secretaries? It is satisfactory to me.

Attlee: To me also.

Truman: Shall we take up Poland?

Stalin: We have also the German fleet and Italy to discuss. How much time have we? An hour?

Truman: ’Til 12:00.

Stalin: I wish to make a statement. Last night the Russian delegation was given a copy of the Anglo-American declaration to the Japanese people. We think it our duty to keep each other informed. I inform the Allies of the message that I received from the Japanese Emperor through the Japanese ambassador. I sent a copy of my answer to this peace plea which was in the negative. I received another communication informing me more precisely of the desire of the Emperor to send a peace mission headed by Prince Konoye who was stated to have great influence in the Palace. It was indicated that it was the personal desire of the Emperor to avoid further bloodshed. In this document there is nothing new except the emphasis on the Japanese desire to collaborate with the Soviets. Our answer of course will be negative.

(The foregoing was the gist of the translator’s remarks, but they were not heard clearly and, consequently, they may be inaccurate as to detail).

Truman: I appreciate very much what the Marshal has said.

If Mr. Molotov will now bring up the questions that he wants answered, I will endeavor to give my answers.

Molotov: These are reparations, the admission of Italy, and the satellites, the German fleet and the western Polish boundary.

Truman: We may discuss any question you wish. I will give my opinion.

Attlee: I regret our domestic situation has caused delay in the Conference. We are willing to sit as long as necessary.

Stalin: First question is the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the other satellites. This was discussed by the Big Three. The foreign ministers had different impressions of what was agreed. I thought it was agreed as to satellites as well as to Italy. Mr. Churchill’s suggestion of substituting “for” in place of “with” was accepted. Then draft was submitted to foreign secretaries for final polishing. Then Cadogan suggested new amendment.² He suggested describing governments as “responsible”. “Responsible”—would suggest that these governments are now irresponsible. The Big Three have agreed on this question. It is not right for the foreign secretaries to change our decision.

Byrnes: At the meeting of foreign ministers, Molotov said he understood the United States had agreed to Soviet delegation amendment. In behalf of United States I said that was correct in that the President had agreed in principle. The President said he thought it should be submitted to drafting committee. He had in mind changing only a word. The word “examine” should be substituted for “consider” so there was no difference between the United States and the Soviet delegation. I stated that when the President agreed Mr. Churchill did not agree. I advised the foreign ministers that the United States had offered this proposal originally to give some comfort to Italy. We asked only for a declaration for the support of Italy’s admission into the United Nations on the conclusion of peace. The British ask that we include neutrals. We agreed. Soviet delegation asked express rejection of Franco’s admission. We agreed. Then Soviet asked inclusion of paragraph covering other satellites. We agreed. Then we were asked to modify language on Italy to conform to language on other satellites. We agreed. Unfortunately, we find when we agree with the Soviets the British disagree and when we agree with the British the Soviets disagree. If the British and Soviets can get together it is satisfactory to us. If they can’t agree we will withdraw our proposal. (Attlee asks Cadogan to state British position.)

Cadogan: So far as I understand it, the text would be agreed except for two doubtful points. The Marshal refers to one. Stalin proposes “recognize” instead of “responsible”, governments. We agreed. The more formidable objection in the proposal is that we consider in the near future the establishment of diplomatic relations with satellites. Mr. Churchill explained we could agree to consider that but it would be misleading because we can not constitutionally establish diplomatic relations with countries with which we are still at war. I suggested compromise. It is not satisfactory. I suggested a further compromise and it is not satisfactory to the Marshal.

Stalin: There is no difference between Italy and the other satellites. In none of the countries but Finland has there been an election. Italy was recognized by the Soviets, the United States and Great Britain, at least 90 percent. I can not understand this difference.

Bevin: We know about the Italian government, but we don’t know about the others.

Stalin: We are not asking an undertaking to recognize, only asking you to consider. We knew very little about Italy. We first recognized Italy. Now we propose to consider her admission to the United Nations. We should at least start with the first phase with the other satellites. That is recognition, when we are considering the second stage with Italy.

Attlee: The Soviets’ suggestion was not constitutionally possible for us.

Stalin: Say, then, that you will consider the establishment of complete or partial relations.

Attlee: I don’t think that the suggestion will meet the case.

Stalin: Take the American proposal. Say “examine” instead of “consider.” You will help yourselves with the satellite countries.

Bevin: But I must be perfectly straight with the House of Commons. I do not quote things in words of doubtful meaning. I will take the last suggestion of the American delegation and leave the whole matter to later consideration.

Truman: We now pass to Italian reparations. I stated that we found it necessary to go with the British government to contribute five hundred million dollars to the feeding of Italy. It will probably require that much more to get them through the winter. The United States does not intend to contribute money to pay reparations. War equipment may be transferred but we want it understood that our contribution to feed Italy is the first lien on her supportable surplus. That is all I have to say.

Stalin: We can agree not to exact reparations from Austria which had no separate army, but Italy sent her army to devastate our country.

Truman: We don’t object to reparations, but we are not going to send the money to pay them.

Stalin: I understand the point of view of the President but I want him to understand mine. What gives the Soviet the moral right to reparations is the occupation and devastation of her land by Italy.

Truman: I am in entire sympathy with the Russian point of view.

Stalin: The President says war equipment may be used for reparations. I do not ask much. It will be necessary to find what sum this equipment would come to. Hungary or [and?] Finland, [and?] Rumania agreed to pay 300 million dollars. I want to know the sum the Italian equipment represents.

Bevin: This would not come out of what the American and British people have delivered to Italy.

Stalin: I don’t want to ignore the interest of America.

Attlee: I agree with the President. I have sympathy with Russia’s suffering. We have also suffered from Italy. You can imagine how our people would feel if having suffered at the hands of them, they felt they had to assist Italy to pay reparations.

Stalin: We quite agree to accept equipment as reparations.

Attlee: That would be once and for all, removal of war plants but not levy on the product.

May I ask is this equipment military equipment, not peacetime?³

Stalin: Have you in view the equipment of military nature which could be used for any purpose?

Attlee: I was suggesting machinery that has no peacetime utility.

Stalin: War equipment can be adjusted for peacetime production. There is no equipment which has no peacetime utility. Ammunition plants are producing motor cars, etc.

Bevin: It is so difficult to define what you can take away without affecting the economic life of a nation.

Stalin: We want recognition of the principle.

Truman: I think I understand that the Marshal wants the recognition of the principle.

Stalin: I agree that the amount should be reduced.

Truman: We are concerned about our advances to keep Italy going.

Bevin: Does that not resolve itself into the question of priorities? First claim is for advances, then reparations.

Stalin: We can’t let the aggressors inflict damage without holding them responsible for some compensation.

Truman: I agree with that.

Stalin: England should not forget that they fared very badly at the hands of Italy.

Attlee: I do not understand whether [when?] we should meet in plenary session.

Truman: Since foreign secretaries are not meeting tomorrow let us meet at 4:00 p.m.

Adjourned.

1. For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra, and to the minutes of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers on July 25 and 27, ante, pp. 397–399 and 425–435, respectively.
2. The foregoing remarks are attributed to Molotov in the Thompson minutes, ante, p. 461.
3. This question is attributed to Bevin in the Thompson minutes, ante, p. 465.