Subject: Political and Economic Conditions in
Northern Greece.
Mr. Cromie’s report, based
on first-hand observation and numerous, on-the-spot
conversations with representative persons of all factions and
classes as well as other reliable intelligence data available to
the Embassy, fails to support in any substantial degree the
allegations of Marshal
Tito and the Moscow and Balkan Soviet press
regarding anarchy and wholesale terror in Northern Greece. The
overall picture of conditions in that area resembles that of the
rest of the country, with the possible difference,
characteristic of the “New Greece” acquired after the Balkan and
first World Wars, of more pronounced republicanism in the cities
and a more kaleidoscopic pattern of political sentiment in the
countryside owing to the presence of some minority groups and of
large numbers of Greek refugees from Asia Minor.
Figures cited by Mr. Cromie on the prison population of various small
towns in Northern Greece and the high ratio of arrests to
convictions do bear witness to the deficiencies of present Greek
regional administrative and judicial procedure and the disregard
of local officials of royalist persuasion for the civil
liberties of leftists and Slavophones. Certain of the latter who
have identified themselves with the “Free Macedonian” movement
or who have relatives among the ELASites now in Yugoslavia have doubtless found it
expedient, as Marshal
Tito stated, to seek a more congenial political
clime across the border. A New York Times
Correspondent, Mr. Sam Brewer, told me
today that he interviewed last week in Monastir a score of such
persons who had recently come from Greece. They gave such
reasons for their move as “because we were suspected of being
Tito’s spies” or
“because we love Stalin”. Brewer was told by
Yugoslav authorities, who invited him to inspect frontier
registers, that about 1,000 refugees of this type have already
crossed the border at the Monastir Gap and 3,000 in the Lake
Dojran region. Granted the existence of some injustice, the
bitter legacy of Slavophone collaborationism during the war and of post-liberation civil
strife, it must also be borne in mind, as pointed out in the
attached reports, that a determined effort is being made by the
British to restore order and safeguard civil liberties with the
sincere support of many enlightened Greek officials acting in
accordance with the directives of their well-intentioned if
still weak central Government.
An objective understanding of the true situation in Northern
Greece
[Page 1050]
is essential
if the threat to this strategic and rich territory implied in
the current war of nerves
directed against Greece is to be averted. Captain McNeill’s report shows
that local British and Greek forces could scarcely block a
Soviet-sponsored military promenade to the Aegean disguised as a
“Free Macedonian” uprising. Firm diplomacy, therefore, backed by
informed public opinion in the Western Democracies, will be
needed to make it clear that, while the legitimate desire of the
Yugoslavs and Bulgarians for port and transit facilities may be
satisfied, the perpetration of a major crime against a loyal
member of the United Nations on the pretext of correcting
transient and relatively insignificant abuses cannot be
tolerated.
[Enclosure 1—Extracts]
Northern Greece
A Regional Survey of
Present Conditions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
summary
The spotlight of world attention is once again swinging back
to Macedonia and Western Thrace, granary of Greece and
outpost of British influence in the Balkans, in which the
struggle for rehabilitation is being carried on in an
atmosphere dangerously troubled by ideologic and ethnic
conflict and the clash of rival territorial ambitions, the
Greek claim to a more strategic northern boundary and the
quest of the Slavs and Bulgars for footholds on the
Aegean.
UNRRA food shipments and
the indestructible fertility of the soil have laid the
specter of actual starvation in Northern Greece despite a
fifty percent failure of this year’s grain crop. But a
serious lack of transport is impeding the distribution of
foodstuffs and the launching of the rehabilitation program
that is needed to dissipate internal discontent which breeds
disorder and on which international rivalries batten.
Internal conflicts in Northern Greece find their origin not
only in economic distress but also in the different
backgrounds of the various Greek and non-Hellenic population
groups. Rightist leanings prevail among native Greeks in
both rural and urban districts, while Greek refugees from
the Turkish cities and Transcaucasia and the
Slavo-Macedonian minority have mainly gravitated toward the
left. The result is a kaleidoscopic pattern of political
sentiment throughout the area.
[Page 1051]
Political passions and ethnic differences, exacerbated by the
war and civil strife,
inevitably breed a certain amount of injustice and violence.
Scant respect is shown for the civil liberties of leftists,
and members of the Slavophone minority, as a consequence of
their alleged pro-Bulgar attitude, are deprived of cultural
rights and subjected to petty persecution by their Greek
neighbors and local police authorities. The British, with
one division and some armored units in the area, stand as
arbiters in the midst of turmoil under a group of able and
impartial officers, but their task is complicated by the
disorganized state of Greek judicial and administrative
machinery and the complacency of royalist officials.
It should not be assumed, however, that a state of anarchy
exists in Northern Greece, where the average citizen, thanks
to the presence of the British and the moderate policy of
the Athens Government, probably enjoys a greater measure of
personal security and freedom than in any other country of
the Balkans. Tito’s
flight of “thousands and thousands of refugees from the
terror of Greek reactionaries”5 is largely a flight of
fancy.
Difficulties which do exist would solve themselves in the
absence of outside pressure. In particular, it is most
likely that the few Slavic remnants left in Northern Greece
would become painlessly Hellenized within one or two
generations were it not for the possibility of the Soviet
Balkan bloc’s using the “Free Macedonia” movement as a key
to conquest. In this connection, the exact import of the
present war of nerves and of
the armies now poised at the strategic gateways to Greece,
to which no effective, immediate resistance could be
offered, warrants most careful consideration by the Western
Powers. For loss of her Northern Provinces would not only be a
mortal blow to Greece and a shocking violation of the
principles of the United Nations, but an event of major
geopolitical importance in the Mediterranean.
i—introduction
Northern Greece is the breadbasket and the powder keg of the
Hellenic Nation. Before the war, the Provinces of Macedonia and Western
Thrace, with about one quarter of the population of Greece,
accounted for forty to fifty percent of Greek agricultural
production. In Greece’s present straitened circumstances,
the economic resources of the area should be invaluable.
They would also be useful to covetous neighbors. The
traditional political importance of the region, deriving
from its wealth, its strategic location and the mottled
ethnic composition of its population, is enhanced today by
its position on a key frontier between the zones of Russian
and British influence in Europe, a frontier which the Greeks
would like to push
[Page 1052]
northward and which the Soviet Balkan bloc, according to
many indications, would like to push into the sea.
The picture of Northern Greece today is a study in contrasts.
On the one hand, the litter of war: twisted rails and
hundreds upon hundreds of wrecked cars and locomotives in
the railroad yards of Salonika; the Port of Salonika a
shambles of sunken ships and broken cranes; the burned
village of Lekhovon, one among many, stark but still
picturesque on the mountainside; destroyed bridges and
railroad spans, testimonials to the ruthless efficiency of
German sappers. On the other hand, scenes of normality and
peace: the Germans spread destruction no farther east than
the Strymon River. Beyond, the Bulgars were careful to leave
undamaged “their” Provinces of Eastern Macedonia and Western
Thrace to which they hope to return. Bridges are intact,
highways have actually been improved, reforestation projects
dot the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains, and the
housing problem is relieved in some areas by hundreds of
neat, concrete village bungalows erected for Bulgarian
settlers. The railroads from Serres to Alexandroupolis and
from the latter Port to Adrianople are running, although on
a reduced schedule owing to lack of rolling stock. In the
whole of Northern Greece, the peasants are busy at their
usual seasonal pursuits, but their attitude is by no means
uniform. Whereas broad smiles and the brave thumbs-up
gesture universally greet the jeep traveller in the Greek
villages and districts, the Slavophone peasants,
particularly in the northwest frontier regions, are morose
and sullen. In Salonika and the large towns, life appears
quite normal on the surface with no suggestion of a “reign
of terror”, but the building next to the Prefecture in
Fiorina has been converted into a detention barracks and the
barred windows are crowded with political prisoners.
Such are the highlights of the general picture of Northern
Greece in June 1945. Because the spotlight of world
attention may shortly be focused on this area, it may be of
interest to fill in some of the details.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iii—the political
imbroglio
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rival Territorial
Ambitions
The economic and political problems of the 1,700,000
inhabitants of Northern Greece would be of scant interest to
the outside world were it not for international factors
which not only complicate the solution of local problems but
threaten to compromise the political future of the region as
an integral part of Greece and consequently the present
balance of power in the Mediterranean and around the
[Page 1053]
Dardanelles.
These factors have already been mentioned and are well
known: on the one hand, agitation in Greece for territorial
expansion northward; on the other hand, the old Russian
drive for a window on the Aegean, currently masquerading as
a “Free Macedonia Movement”.
With regard to Greek expansionism, it need only be said that
the naturally receptive state of mind of the public is being
exploited and stimulated to the utmost by public leaders and
editors as a tactic of internal politics. In this, the
situation resembles the pattern of the whole country. The
particular claim to Turkish Thrace recently featured by the
Communists arouses little interest. The usual response to
questions on this matter was: “It would be very nice, of
course, to have Eastern Thrace, but we do not want to
complicate our relations with Turkey.”*
In view of the present unequal balance of forces in
southeastern Europe, Greek expansionism is of immediate
interest only insofar as it might conceivably provide a
pretext for “precautionary” troop concentrations on the
opposite side of the frontier or even for positive
“preventive action” by Greece’s neighbors backed by the
Soviet Union.
Minorities—Turks,
Kutzo-Vlachs and Armenians
It is much more likely, however, that minority grievances
would be invoked as justification for Soviet intervention in
Northern Greece, and it will therefore be of interest to
follow closely the post-war development of Greek policy
towards the minorities, the attitudes and problems of the
different minorities, and their susceptibility to foreign
propaganda and influence.
Of the four principal minorities in Northern Greece, Turks,
Kutzo-Vlachs, Armenians and Slavo-Macedonians, now as before
the war, the most contented
and best treated are certainly the Turks. The Greeks
generally credit the Turks in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace
with having observed a correctly non-cooperative attitude
towards the Bulgarian forces of occupation and have
accordingly permitted them to reopen their schools, practise
their religion, and enjoy a large measure of cultural
freedom. Their lot is not quite perfect, according to the
Turkish Consul at Komotiní. Like minorities everywhere, they
suffer some persecution from neighbors of the dominant
ethnic group, and local officials are not over-zealous in
protecting their rights and interests. It is this situation,
the Consul said, which led to the emigration of considerable
numbers of Turks from Western to
[Page 1054]
Eastern Thrace earlier this year
(despatch No. 965 of May 1, 1945,6 page 17). Some
difficulty, too, was caused by recent action of the Greek
authorities in ordering the summary expulsion of some 2,000
Pommacks (Bulgarian subjects of Turkish descent) from
Western Thrace. Upon the refusal of the Bulgars and Turks to
permit these people to cross the border, the British
intervened to have the order suspended and there the matter
now rests. Apart from these observations, the Consul
formulated no general grievances against Greek Government
policy.
The Kutzo-Vlachs are a lesser minority, partially Hellenized,
mostly scattered in small villages in Western Macedonia.
Moreover, the Rumanian motherland is conveniently remote.
Though occasionally troublesome, this minority does not
appear to arouse serious Greek animosity or apprehensions.
The Inspector General of Rumanian Schools at Salonika (an
official of the former Rumanian Government whose present
status is dubious) stated that some of the Rumanian
elementary schools have already been reopened. The secondary
schools have not.†
As for the Armenians, their trading instinct apparently got
the better of their neo-Hellenism during the Bulgarian
occupation, with the result that they find themselves in a
very difficult situation today. Andreas Kondoianopoulos, Prefect of the Nome
of Rhodope, spoke very bitterly of their collaborationist
activities during the war,
and a family of five Armenians was brutally murdered at
Xánthi in early June for their alleged pro-Bulgar
attitude.
The
Slavo-Macedonians
Most troublesome and largest minority in Northern Greece are,
of course, the Slavo-Macedonians. It was they, for example,
who undoubtedly inspired the Yugoslav Minister of
State’s7
ominous reference in Politika
(Belgrade) of June 21 to “current outrages in Aegean
Macedonia”, which “is Yugoslav just like all the other
Yugoslav federal units”.‡ (According to
this same statement, the minority numbers 260,000 persons,
which would be about fifteen percent of the total population
of Northern Greece. Greek sources usually give a total of
80,000 Macedonians, 70,000 in Western Macedonia and 10,000
in Western Thrace. They also tend to play down the distinct
ethnic character of the minority, pointing out that
virtually all the Slavophones know how to speak Greek and
asserting that fifty percent are Greek in sentiment
anyhow.
[Page 1055]
The present situation of the Slavophones is the outgrowth of
Greek policy towards them in the past and their own behavior
during the recent years of Bulgarian and German occupation.
It may be recalled that Venizelos attempted to woo with kindness and
preferential treatment the Slav remnants left in Greece
after the population exchange of 1924. Metaxas abruptly reversed
this policy and even forbade the use of the Macedonian
language. As a consequence, the Slavophones generally
welcomed the Germans and Bulgars as liberators and
collaborated with them whole-heartedly. In return, Slavic
villages were usually untouched by the conquerors while many
Greek villages were razed, and the Slavic peasants were
allowed to enrich themselves at the expense of their unhappy
Greek neighbors. Later, with the changing tide of war, Macedonian autonomist
leaders such as Gotsi§ began to see
the wisdom of collaborating with EAM/ELAS with
a view to the realization of their objectives through the
medium of Soviet federalism. Their cooperation was welcomed
at first by the Greek Andartes, but the Macedonian guerilla
chiefs soon demonstrated by their attitude and indiscipline
that they were more interested in promoting Macedonian
autonomy than in fighting against the Germans or for a
socialist Greece.
The opportunism of the Slavophones and their autonomist
activities have embarrassed their traditional friends, the
Greek left, and aroused the active animosity of Greek
nationalists. EAM leaders,
whatever their Marxist convictions regarding the
insignificance of national frontiers, are good enough
political realists to be unwilling to offend the patriotic
sentiments of the Greek electorate, including rank-and-file
leftists, in order to win the support of a minority or even
to please the comrades abroad. Accordingly, present EAM policy would allow the
Slavophones their own schools and church services in
Macedonian, but would insist that higher studies be pursued
in Greek at Greek universities. On the other hand, a typical
Greek nationalist such as the Bishop of Fiorina8 favors the Metaxist
policy of forbidding entirely the use of the Macedonian
tongue.
In this, as in connection with policy towards Greek leftists,
the Greek Government authorities seem to be following a
middle-of-the-road course and sinning more by omission than
by commission. There is no positive reign of terror directed
against the Slavophones as such, and they are secure in
their lives and in the essential right of land tenure. Those
who have fled to Yugoslavia have apparently done so because
they feared arrest as political leftists or autonomist
agitators. A promise of improved conditions may be seen in
the visit to Fiorina
[Page 1056]
on June 27 and 28 of Governor General
Merenditis of
Northern Greece, whose fair attitude has already been
demonstrated by his refusal to permit discrimination in the
distribution of UNRRA
foodstuffs as between Greek and Slavophone villages.║ According to an OSS source,¶ Governor
General Merenditis
hopes to reenforce security by bringing a National Guard
battalion to Fiorina for border patrol duties and 1,200
Gendarmes to Fiorina, Kastoria and Kozani. He has, moreover,
ordered that arbitrary arrests must cease, that all cases
involving charges of autonomist activities must be cleared
up within two months, and that the Slavo-Macedonians are to
be assured their full rights as Greek citizens including the
right to speak their own language.
The future of the Slavophones of Northern Greece will be
determined by the further evolution of relations between the
Balkan Soviet bloc and Greece and the Soviet Union and the
Western Powers. Left to themselves, they would, in all
probability, become painlessly Hellenized within one or two
generations—a normal solution for the problem of a minority
which is too small and too scattered geographically to
warrant indefinite, special protection and perpetuation as a
distinct ethnic unit.
Attitude of the Balkan
Soviet Bloc
It appears, unfortunately, that the Slavophone minority is
too convenient a peg on which to hang Balkan-Soviet
territorial ambitions to be allowed to die a natural and
peaceful death, for a mounting weight of evidence indicates
that this bloc intends to make such capital as it can out of
the Macedonian imbroglio.
Acquisition of all or a substantial part of Northern Greece
would give the Russians one outlet on the Aegean and result
in the strategic investment of the coveted Dardanelles.
Moreover, this oblique movement would appear to have the
advantage over a frontal attack on Turkey in that it could
be carried out by non-Russian forces against a relatively
undefended territory under the guise of assisting a
“spontaneous uprising of oppressed peoples”. British
commanding officers in Northern Greece are inclined to
discount, on political grounds, the likelihood of an
immediate attack from the north, but they are fully alive to
the strategic implications of the potentially hostile forces
now massed near each of the gateways to Greece, the Monastir
Gap, the Strymon Valley, and the Roupel Pass. Defense of the
area in the event of attack being out of the question in
view of the relative weakness of the British (one division
and units of an armored brigade), these are now engaged in
maneuvers and a study of troop dispositions
[Page 1057]
for a covering action to
permit orderly withdrawal from Salonika in a few days’
time.
British diplomacy is presumably equally aware of the possible
implications behind the present war of nerves directed against Greece, but it
can scarcely afford to adopt a similar policy of retreat.
Appeasement on the issue of Northern Greece would involve
the surrender of an important bastion of security in the
Mediterranean, the betrayal of a loyal ally and the
overwhelmingly Greek population of the affected area, and
abandonment of the principles embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations,9 tantamount to hoisting the white flag over
that newly-erected citadel of peace.
[Enclosure 2]
secret
No. R 121–45
[Undated.]
Revised British
Plans:
1. Contingent upon what the Government’s policy will be
following the elections in Great Britain, it has been
recently decided to keep the two British divisions which now
garrison Greece in the Country through the coming winter. At
the same time, top priority for supply to the Greek Forces
has been assigned to the Gendarmerie,
in the hope that the gendarmes will be sufficiently well
organized and able (1) to enforce law and order in Greece
during the coming year; and (2) to supervise the elections
and/or the plebiscite which the British hope to see held in
November. (The elections are for members to the Chamber of
Deputies; the plebiscite will decide upon the return of the
King, or the formation of a Republic.) To achieve this, the
National Guard battalions have been seriously weakened by
the withdrawal of volunteers for the Gendarmerie; and the effort to rebuild the Greek
Army has come to a standstill after the formation of a
single division.
Background:
2. The British troops which were originally despatched to
Greece included a small force designed to harass the
retreating Germans, and a larger number of service troops
who were expected to administer the civilian relief program.
After ELAS attempted to
carry through a revolution in December 1944, three
additional British divisions were sent to Greece. This force
succeeded in driving ELAS
from Athens, and later superintended the disarmament and
disbandment of ELAS, and
then occupied all the principal centers of Greece.
[Page 1058]
One division was
withdrawn in April, leaving the present garrison behind.
3. During March and April 1945, the British planned to create
a Greek National Army of three divisions by November; and,
as soon as these divisions were ready, to withdraw the
British force. Meanwhile, as a stop gap, National Guard
battalions were organized to perform police work in the
areas taken over from the control of ELAS. In fact, however,
supplies have not been delivered in sufficient quantity to
equip three Greek divisions; and the National Guard has made
a rather bad name for itself by sporadic illegality and
violence directed against persons known or suspected of
being Leftists. It is in view of these conditions that
British authorities in London have tentatively decided to
retain British troops in Greece over the winter, and to
endeavor to establsh a Gendarmerie
that may perform its police duties more impartially and with
less violence than does the National Guard.
Role of British Troops in
Greece:
4. It is a general policy of the British army to leave as
much of the policing of Greece to Greeks as is possible. In
Southern Greece, where there are relatively few supporters
of EAM/ELAS, British troops are
concentrated in battalion or larger units, and very seldom
intervene either to support or to restrain the Greek
authorities. In Central and Northern Greece, however, where
a large percentage of popular sentiment is antagonistic to
the present government of Greece and opposes the Gendarmerie and National Guard,
British troops are dispersed in company and platoon
detachments; and normally, whenever something unusual is in
the wind, mixed Greek and British patrols are organized to
investigate. In general, British efforts are directed more
toward restraining the illegal and violent methods favored
by some members of the National Guard, than toward
supporting the National Guard against bandits or other
opponents.
5. When winter comes, with its attendant difficulties of
transportation (the roads of Western Macedonia are snowbound
for about three months), British troops will perforce be
concentrated in the principal communications centers of
Northern Greece, and policing of the smaller towns and
villages will be left exclusively in the hands of Greek
forces. General
Boucher plans to station his troops in
battalion camps for the winter, located in the following
towns: Komotiní, Kavalla, Drama; Serres, Salonika, Kilkís;
Verroia, Edessa, Kozáni. It is not even sure whether the
road to Kozáni can be kept open through the winter, since
snow plow equipment will be necessary, and is not yet on
hand.
[Page 1059]
Future of the National
Guard:
6. As soon as the Gendarmerie is up to
strength, and no longer needs National Guard assistance to
police the country, the British expect to convert the
National Guard battalions into a Frontier Force, totalling
9–12 battalions. Surplus personnel will be transferred to
the regular army, or else demobilized. According to present
hopes and plans, the transfer of all police responsibility
from the National Guard will be completed before
November.
7. For the present, the National Guard is being starved of
equipment and milked of men for the benefit of the Gendarmerie. Plans for raising new
National Guard battalions have been dropped, with the result
that some districts of Greece are policed by locally
recruited National Guardsmen, while others are under the
“Athens battalions” which were originally raised during
December to fight against ELAS in Athens and Piraeus. The nominal
strength of a National Guard battalion is 530, all ranks;
but actually many battalions in Northern Greece can muster
no more than 200 men at the present time, owing largely to
transfers to the Gendarmerie.
The Gendarmerie:
8. The Gendarmerie is expected to
control Greece with half the number of men used by the
National Guard (30,000 as against 60,000). It is a
volunteer, career service; and at the present time, its
ranks are being recruited largely from among former
Gendarmes and present day National Guardsmen. British
officers believe that the Gendarmerie
will establish a better reputation for itself than has the
National Guard; that it will meet with less hostility among
the population; and that, consequently, it will be able to
establish smaller detachments, and man smaller, more
numerous posts. The British apparently rely on an election
to clear the political air in Greece, hoping that it will
stabilize the government, and thus facilitate the task of
the Gendarmerie.
9. Up to the present, only a more or less skeleton Gendarme
organization has been established throughout Greece. Actual
day to day policing has been taken over by the Gendarmes in
all the principal provincial towns, and in a few of the
villages small detachments have been set up. As more men
come from Athens, more and more of these village detachments
will be sent to their stations, until there will be one
Gendarme post for every three or four villages in
Greece.
The National
Army:
10. Since it has been decided to keep British troops in
Greece for an additional six months or more, the urgency of
the need for a Greek National Army has lessened; and, due to
an acute shortage of almost
[Page 1060]
every sort of military equipment,
plans for the establishment of two more divisions (in
Salonika and Thessaly) have been indefinitely postponed.
Comment:
11. This revision of British plans is made inevitable by
their failure to deliver supplies sufficient to equip the
proposed Greek army. It is made advisable by the fact that
it is quite improbable that any Greek
force would be able to maintain peace and order inside the
country were it not supported (and restrained) by foreign
troops; and a turbulent Greece might easily inflame world
relations by entangling Russian with British interests.
12. At the same time, it appears doubtful whether the Gendarmerie will prove much less
partisan than the National Guard in its administration of
the law. Its members are all recruited from the Right; and
many of them have served as Gendarmes under both Metaxas and the Germans.
Furthermore, given the volatile Greek temperament, it is a
question whether an early election will not rather
exacerbate than calm political passions in this country.
William H. McNeill
,
Captain, C. A. C.,
Asst. Military Attaché.
Approved and forwarded:
Sterling L. Larrabee
,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C., Military
Attaché.
