Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

J. C. S. Files

No. 1381
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill ¹

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Enclosure to C. C. S. 900/3

[ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945.]

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the “Terminal” Conference

1. The agreed summary of conclusions reached at the Terminal Conference is submitted herewith.

i. over-all objective

2. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

ii. over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required.

4. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria.

iii. basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war ²

5. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:—

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

6. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war.

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.

7. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:—

a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith.

b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan.

c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war in accordance with the over-all strategic concept. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan.

d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas.

iv. the war against japan

Strategic Direction of the War

8. We have discussed the strategic direction of the war against Japan and have agreed as follows:—

a. The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions.

c. The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy on the understanding that in the event of disagreement the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

d. In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements.

e. In the event the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned.

Operations in the Pacific

9. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in Appendix “A.”

10. We have considered the scope and nature of British participation in operations in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:—

a. The British Pacific Fleet will participate as at present planned.

b. A British very long range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 20 squadrons when more airfields become available, will participate. There is little prospect that airfield space for more than 10 squadrons of this force will become available before 1 December 1945 at the earliest.

c. We have agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational and other problems. In addition, some units of the British³ East Indies Fleet may also take part.

11. In connection with paragraph 10 c. above, we have agreed that the appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Operations in Southeast Asia Command

12. We have discussed the instructions that should be issued to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and have agreed upon the terms of the directive in Appendix “B.”

Reallocation of Areas and Command in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia Areas

13. We have agreed in principle that that part of the Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary described in Appendix “C” should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected.

14. We consider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatten control operations undertaken in southern Indo-China since these are more closely related to those of Southeast Asia Command than to those of the China Theater. We are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° north in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop.

We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ⁴ be made by our two governments to secure his agreement to this arrangement.

At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all or part of the remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the Southeast Asia Command.

French and Dutch Participation in the War

15. We have considered the arrangements which can be made for French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan and our conclusions are as follows:—

a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned.

b. The French/Netherlands representatives will be given timely information of our intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.

16. We have considered an offer by the French of a French corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war and have agreed on the following reply:—

• “a. Whether the corps will serve under U. S. or British command and the area in which it will operate will be determined later.
• “b. Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the government concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support.
• “c. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs.
• “d. The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to operations prior to the spring of 1946.”

Portuguese Participation in the War

17. We have examined a report by an Anglo-American Military Mission which discussed with the Portuguese military authorities Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may eventually be conducted to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. We have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office of our views, which are set out in Appendix “D.”

Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War

18. We have discussed the policy to be followed by the British and the United States Chiefs of Staff in passing to the Russians information and intelligence concerning the Japanese war and have agreed as follows:—

a. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theaters in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining.

b. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without their consent.

Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan

19. We recommend that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946 and that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

v. miscellaneous

Personnel Shipping

20. We have considered the employment of certain captured enemy ocean-going passenger shipping and have agreed that the total lift of the Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria, and Milwaukee should be allocated for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. We have taken note that the United States Chiefs of Staff will allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians.

21. We have directed the completion by 15 September 1945 of a study of the combined requirements and combined resources, including captured enemy trooplift, for the first half of 1946.

Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments

22. We have considered the best means of insuring the efficient coordination of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other than British and American military movements, and of providing a machinery for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already approved. We have forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board the memorandum contained in Appendix “E.”

Cargo Shipping ⁵

23. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas, and for essential programs of the Western Hemisphere.

Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.

[Appendix A]

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Plans and Operations in the Pacific

(See paragraph 9 of the Report)

1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific:—

a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

c. The decisive invasion of Honshu.⁶

2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of Kyushu⁷ is avoided.

3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed:—

a. The invasion of Kyushu.

b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective.

d. The seizure of Balikpapan. (This operation is now approaching successful completion.)

e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu are continuing on the basis of meeting the target date for the invasion of Honshu. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy’s armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments.

5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing at small cost⁸ upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater, without delaying the supreme operations.

6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:—

a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports.

b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender.

[Appendix B]

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia ( Mountbatten )

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Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia

(See paragraph 12 of the Report)

The following directive has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff will obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.

1. Your primary task is the opening of the Straits of Malacca at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British Commonwealth land forces should take part in the main operations against Japan which have been agreed as the supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the Outer Zone to the extent that forces and resources permit.

2. The eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include Borneo, Java, and the Celebes.

Full details of this extension are contained in the Annex hereto.

3. Further information will be sent to you regarding Indo-China.

4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as practicable after 15 August 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility.

5. Prom that date, such Dominion and Dutch forces as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on Australia.

6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an Australian command under the British Chiefs of Staff.

7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from three to five divisions, and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the main operations against Japan in the spring of 1946. Units of the British⁹ East Indies Fleet may also take part. Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination.

8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the assault lift for two divisions. The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur, and the British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against Japan must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below.

10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations designed to:—

a. Complete the liberation of Malaya.

b. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the Burma–Siam frontier.

c. Capture the key areas of Siam.

d. Establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course.

11. You will submit a program of operations to the British Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so.

12. You will develop Singapore and such other bases as you may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese.

[Annex]

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Eastern Boundary of Southeast Asia Command

(See paragraph 2 of Appendix “B”)

Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence southwestward to 02° south 123° east; thence southeastward to 08° south 125° east; thence southwestward to 18° south 110° east.

[Appendix C]

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Boundary Between the British and U. S. Areas of Command in the Southwest Pacific

(See paragraph 13 of the Report)

Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence east to 05° north 130° east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140° east; thence generally southeast to 02°20´ south 146° east; thence east to 02°20´ south 159° east; thence south.

[Appendix D]

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(See paragraph 17 of the Report)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have communicated to the Department of State and the Foreign Office the following views on Portuguese participation in the war against Japan:—

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of Portuguese forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon.

b. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.

c. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics, and radio specialists.

d. There is no objection from the military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level.

e. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area.

f. Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the assembly, shipment, training, and equipping of the Portuguese force will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time.

They have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office that they have no objection to the disclosure of any of the above information to the Portuguese if the Department of State or Foreign Office deem it necessary in diplomatic conversations.…

[Appendix E]

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board

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Memorandum for the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board

(See paragraph 22 of the Report)

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for the provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as can be made available without adversely affecting military operations.

2. The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944,¹⁰ contained in the United Maritime Authority’s report, October, 1944, the following procedure in respect of the submission of demands should be adopted by all the Allied nations:—

a. The current procedure for handling the United States and United Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments.

b. All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a shortor long-term basis, should be submitted to the United Maritime Authority in terms of the shipping space required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. When a satisfactory arrangement in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be made under a. and b. above, the matter may be referred to the appropriate authorities of the United Kingdom and United States, to decide whether passenger vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of the military effort. Ships, if so allocated, would operate under the control of the United Maritime Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” but would be retained in the common pool and assigned for particular voyage employment as might be decided from time to time.

4. Vital demands for shipping should, therefore, be submitted to the United Maritime Authority for consideration.

5. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit the foregoing policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in Washington and London.

1. Text as approved by Truman and Churchill on July 24. See ante, p. 344.

2. In the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister circulated on July 23 as the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2, the following language constitutes the complete text under this heading: “(The respective views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff are set out in parallel columns in Appendix ‘A’.)” For the text of appendix A to C. C. S. 900/2, see document No. 1266.

   With the resolution of the differences of view set forth in appendix A to C. C. S. 900/2 (see ante, pp. 340–343), the subject matter of this appendix was dealt with in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the body of the final report. This necessitated the relettering of the other appendices. Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 became appendix A to C. C. S. 900/3, et cetera.

3. The word “British” does not appear at this point in C. C. S. 900/2.
4. C. C. S. 900/2 reads: “an approach to the Generalissimo”.
5. This heading and paragraph 23 do not appear in the body of the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2, Cf. document No. 1266.
6. In appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2, subparagraph c reads as follows: “The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.”
7. Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 reads “southern Kyushu”.
8. Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 has the phrase “without delaying the supreme operations” at this point rather than at the end of the sentence.
9. The word “British” does not appear at this point in appendix C to C. C. S. 900/2.
10. Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784.