J. C. S. Files
Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister
Enclosure to C. C. S. 900/3
Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the “Terminal” Conference
1. The agreed summary of conclusions reached at the Terminal Conference is submitted herewith.
i. over-all objective
2. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
ii. over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required.
4. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria.[Page 1463]
iii. basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war2
5. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:—
- Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.
- Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.
- Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.
6. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war.
The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.
7. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:—
- Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith.
- Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan.
- Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war in accordance with the over-all strategic concept. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan.
- In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas.
iv. the war against japan
Strategic Direction of the War
8. We have discussed the strategic direction of the war against Japan and have agreed as follows:—
- The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff.
- The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions.
- The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy on the understanding that in the event of disagreement the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.
- In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements.
- In the event the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned.
Operations in the Pacific
9. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in Appendix “A.”
10. We have considered the scope and nature of British participation in operations in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:—
- The British Pacific Fleet will participate as at present planned.
- A British very long range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 20 squadrons when more airfields become available, will participate. There is little prospect that airfield space for more than 10 squadrons of this force will become available before 1 December 1945 at the earliest.
- We have agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational and other problems. In addition, some units of the British3 East Indies Fleet may also take part.
11. In connection with paragraph 10 c. above, we have agreed that the appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.[Page 1465]
Operations in Southeast Asia Command
12. We have discussed the instructions that should be issued to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and have agreed upon the terms of the directive in Appendix “B.”
Reallocation of Areas and Command in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia Areas
13. We have agreed in principle that that part of the Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary described in Appendix “C” should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected.
14. We consider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatten control operations undertaken in southern Indo-China since these are more closely related to those of Southeast Asia Command than to those of the China Theater. We are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° north in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop.
We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek4 be made by our two governments to secure his agreement to this arrangement.
At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all or part of the remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the Southeast Asia Command.
French and Dutch Participation in the War
15. We have considered the arrangements which can be made for French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan and our conclusions are as follows:—
- While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned.
- The French/Netherlands representatives will be given timely information of our intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.
16. We have considered an offer by the French of a French corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war and have agreed on the following reply:—
- “a. Whether the corps will serve under U. S. or British command and the area in which it will operate will be determined later.
- “b. Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the government concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support.
- “c. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs.
- “d. The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to operations prior to the spring of 1946.”
Portuguese Participation in the War
17. We have examined a report by an Anglo-American Military Mission which discussed with the Portuguese military authorities Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may eventually be conducted to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. We have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office of our views, which are set out in Appendix “D.”
Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War
18. We have discussed the policy to be followed by the British and the United States Chiefs of Staff in passing to the Russians information and intelligence concerning the Japanese war and have agreed as follows:—
- The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theaters in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining.
- The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without their consent.
Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan
19. We recommend that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946 and that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
20. We have considered the employment of certain captured enemy ocean-going passenger shipping and have agreed that the total lift of the Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria, and Milwaukee should be allocated for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. We have taken note that the United States Chiefs of Staff will allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians.
21. We have directed the completion by 15 September 1945 of a study of the combined requirements and combined resources, including captured enemy trooplift, for the first half of 1946.
Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments
22. We have considered the best means of insuring the efficient coordination of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other than British and American military movements, and of providing a machinery for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already approved. We have forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board the memorandum contained in Appendix “E.”
23. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas, and for essential programs of the Western Hemisphere.
Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.[Page 1468]
- Text as approved by Truman and Churchill on July 24. See ante, p. 344.↩
In the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister circulated on July 23 as the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2, the following language constitutes the complete text under this heading: “(The respective views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff are set out in parallel columns in Appendix ‘A’.)” For the text of appendix A to C. C. S. 900/2, see document No. 1266.
With the resolution of the differences of view set forth in appendix A to C. C. S. 900/2 (see ante, pp. 340– 343), the subject matter of this appendix was dealt with in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the body of the final report. This necessitated the relettering of the other appendices. Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 became appendix A to C. C. S. 900/3, et cetera.↩
- The word “British” does not appear at this point in C. C. S. 900/2.↩
- C. C. S. 900/2 reads: “an approach to the Generalissimo”.↩
- This heading and paragraph 23 do not appear in the body of the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2, Cf. document No. 1266.↩
- In appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2, subparagraph c reads as follows: “The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.”↩
- Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 reads “southern Kyushu”.↩
- Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 has the phrase “without delaying the supreme operations” at this point rather than at the end of the sentence.↩
- The word “British” does not appear at this point in appendix C to C. C. S. 900/2.↩
- Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784.↩