761.93/7–2045

No. 1215
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Russell) to the Secretary of State

Memorandum for Secretary Byrnes

I attach herewith two memoranda, one prepared by Mr. Vincent of the Chinese Division and the other by Mr. Harriman. Both memoranda deal with certain Chinese questions that both Mr. Vincent and Mr. Harriman feel Stalin will present for consideration at this Conference.

The concessions already made by us to the Russians at Yalta represent, to some extent at least, a compromise of the traditional American policy with reference to China. It was in the maintenance of that policy that our country became embroiled in the Japanese war. Any compromise beyond the Yalta agreement would seriously weaken the prestige of the President in the international field at the very beginning of his term.

If Russia does not bring the Chinese negotiations up, we should do so and emphasize our firm position. So far as possible, we should avoid any developments in China such as have occurred in Poland. Accordingly, we should, in advance of any entrance by Russia into the Japanese war, make clear what our position is and shall be with reference to the territorial integrity of China and the maintenance of our traditional “open-door” policy there, without special privileges to any nation.

[Page 1228]

You will note that these memoranda do not deal with Korea. You will find in Mr. Stimson’s memorandum1 [an] excellent discussion of the Korean situation.

Ambassador Harriman would like to discuss this matter with you at your earliest convenience.

D[onald] R[ussell]
[Attachment 1]

The Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dooman) and the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)2

top secret

Memorandum

Subject: Proposed Chinese-Soviet Agreements.

There are attached factual memoranda3 on the above subject together with comments thereon.

The memoranda express the following views: (1) the proposed agreements concern directly and may affect adversely our policies and objectives in regard to China; (2) those policies are based firmly on our national interest; (3) we are at war with Japan in defense of the principles underlying those policies; (4) avowals of respect for the sovereignty of China and for the interests of third parties notwithstanding, the Chinese-Soviet agreements as discussed prejudice Chinese sovereignty and give the Soviet Union a special position in Manchuria which can be inimical to our national interest; (5) the Yalta commitments regarding Manchuria and the Chinese-Soviet agreements that may follow therefrom should be regarded as expedients; (6) nevertheless, our undertaking at Yalta should be respected having in mind the objectives thereof; but (7) concessions beyond the Yalta commitments should not be made by China.

It is believed that the terms offered by Premier T. V. Soong in his conversations in Moscow fully meet the Yalta commitments. With that thought in mind, it is recommended specifically: (1) that no objection be raised to a grant by China of independence to Outer Mongolia; (2) that Russian and Chinese direction of the joint company set up to operate the specified railways in Manchuria be on a basis of equality; (3) that Dairen be a free port under Chinese administration with, if necessary, an international supervisory commission to deal with specific free port problems; (4) that the territorial bounds [Page 1229]of the Port Arthur lease be clearly limited to the peninsula southwest of and excluding Dairen; and (5) that a strong effort be made to reduce the time limit of the agreement from 30 to 15 years (reference Russian-Chinese treaty of 1924).4

It is believed urgent that an early opportunity be sought for discussions with Stalin and Molotov. Furthermore, if they are agreeable, Soong might be invited to come here (3 days flying time) toward the conclusion of the Conference to join in the discussions.

J[ohn] C[arter] V[incent]

[Subattachment 1]
top secret

Memorandum

Subject: Proposed Chinese-Soviet Agreements.

The character and scope of Premier T. V. Soong’s recent conversations in Moscow are of vital and immediate concern to us. They concern directly and may affect adversely our traditional and present policies and objectives with regard to China; e. g., observance of the “open door” and equality of opportunity; respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of China; and opposition to the growth of political and economic spheres of influence.

These policies are derived from and based firmly upon our national interest, more clearly now than at any time in the past. We are at war with Japan in defense of the principles underlying these policies.

We have, through our numerous missionary, social and cultural organizations, formed ties with China which are broad and deep. In the years just prior to the depression of 1929 Americans contributed about 60 million dollars annually to the support of missionary work in China. The attitude of these Americans, which is strongly “pro-Chinese”, must be accorded consideration in our thinking and planning with regard to China.

When we first established treaty relations with China over one hundred years ago, we assumed the lead in obtaining “most favored nation” treatment with a view to protecting our merchants from discrimination. Since then, we have insisted upon equality of commercial opportunity for American nationals, with success except in areas of special interest (Russia and Japan in Manchuria). Just prior to Sino-Japanese hostilities (1937) we held first place in China’s foreign trade.

Throughout this hundred year period, but more especially subsequent [Page 1230]to the Spanish-American War, we have been aware that China under foreign domination or divided into spheres of foreign influence would threaten not only our commercial interests but also our security in the Pacific. The underlying cause of our involvement in war with Japan was our refusal to accept Japanese domination in China.

There is inherent in the settlements discussed by Soong in Moscow a threat to our national interests in China and also to international cooperation to secure peace in the Pacific. This threat comes not from the actual language of the suggested settlements but from the potentialities of those settlements for future misapplication and friction.

Let us face the issue squarely with ourselves and with the Russians. The suggested settlements are in the main retrogressive. They are an expedient. They are not essential to general security in the Far East or to Russian security and they are not of a character to promote general participation in the economic development in China, including Manchuria. On the contrary they would lay the foundation for a sphere of political and economic interest. Irrespective of what disavowals may be made, they would constitute an infringement upon Chinese sovereignty and as such would be contrary to our policies and interests.

Let us face these facts. A bargain is being made on the basis of a bargain made at Yalta. We should live up to our commitments at Yalta. But we should stand firm and counsel China to stand firm against any concessions which go beyond the Yalta commitments.

It is recommended that we seek an opportunity toward the end of the Conference to discuss with Stalin his conversations with Soong and, if Stalin is agreeable, that Soong be invited to proceed here by plane (3 days) to participate in the discussions.

There are attached factual statements and specific comments with regard to Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang—the areas of China that have been the subject of special discussion by Soong at Moscow.

[Subattachment 2]
top secret

Memorandum

Subject: Manchuria.

Soong’s conversations in Moscow in regard to Manchuria dealt with three separate but closely related matters: trunk railways, the commercial port of Dairen, and Port Arthur as a naval base.

[Page 1231]

The railways discussed were those built by Russia as a result of agreements with China in 1896 and 1898.5 They extend across North Manchuria through Harbin to connect with Vladivostok, and southward from Harbin to Dairen and nearby Port Arthur. The agreements provided that these railways could be purchased by China at the end of 36 years and would be handed over to China without charge at the end of 80 years. Russia obtained policing rights in the “railway zone” with provision for stationing troops therein.

As a result of Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese war (1904–5), Japan took over the southern portion of the railway from Changchun (central Manchuria) to Dairen and Port Arthur under the same terms as granted to Russia by China. The northern portion of the system continued under Russian control as the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese portion, together with a connecting line constructed by Japan from Mukden to Antung on the Korean border, was called the South Manchuria Railway. (Inasmuch as Stalin has limited his interest to the main lines, it is improbable that he has in mind the Mukden–Antung branch of the S. M. R., but it would be well to obtain clarification on this point.[)]

On May 31, 1924, China and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway.6 This agreement established the principle of joint operation (Chinese-Russian). A more specific agreement was entered upon by the Soviet Union and the Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of China (Manchuria) on September 20, 1924.7 By this treaty the two parties agreed inter alia: (1) that the railway “is a purely commercial enterprise”; (2) that the Board of Directors should be composed of 5 Chinese and 5 Russians with a Chinese Director General and a Russian Assistant Director General; (3) that there should be a Board of Auditors, 2 Chinese and 3 Russians; (4) that the railway should have a Russian manager and 2 assistant managers, one Chinese and one Russian; (5) that China might redeem the railway (presumably at any time) with Chinese capital at a fair cost to be fixed; (6) “that the concession period of 80 years shall be reduced to 60 years upon the expiration of which the railway shall pass free of charge to the Chinese Government.”

In 1929 the Chinese seized the Chinese Eastern Railway and arrested the Russian director and Russian personnel. After a show of [Page 1232]force by the Russians the Chinese entered into a preliminary agreement in December 1929 restoring the status quo ante.8

In 1935 the Soviet Union sold the railway to “Manehukuo” for 140,000,000 yen. The Japanese Government guaranteed payment. The final payment was made in 1940. The Chinese Government protested the sale of the railway. The Soviet Government is reported to have replied that when China recovered Manchuria the railway would be included and the Soviet Union would not retain a share in it. (We have no documentary evidence of this reply).

Russia obtained a 25-year lease from China in 18989 to the Liaotung peninsula in which are located the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. Russia was granted full jurisdiction in the leased area. Dairen was made a free port under Russian administration and Port Arthur a Russian naval base.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905)10 concluding the Russo-Japanese war Japan fell heir to all Russian rights in the leased territory. In 1915 Japan obtained from China an extension of the period of the lease to 99 years11 (this was one of the “21 Demands” the validity of which we have never recognized).

At Moscow Soong was asked to agree to operation of the railway by a “joint company” with a majority of Russians on the board of directors. He was also asked to agree to the “internationalization” of Dairen as a free port under a joint Chinese-Soviet administration in which the Russians would predominate, and to the lease of a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur. Additionally, Stalin desired to have a Soviet military zone to include not only Port Arthur but also Dairen in an area of which there would be located another or subsidiary naval base or station. Agreements regarding railways and ports were to run for 30 years.

The Yalta commitments provide for a “joint company” to operate the railway, for the internationalization of Dairen as a free port, and for a Russian naval base at Port Arthur. The objectives of these commitments seem to have been to provide the Soviet Union with an ice-free port, rail connections therewith through Manchuria, and protection thereof by a naval base at Port Arthur. The first two objectives could be reached satisfactorily by making Dairen a free port under Chinese administration and by according Russians international transit rights on the railways. It is debatable whether Soviet interests or international security require a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur.

[Page 1233]

Three main points of difference regarding the Manchurian settlements now require solution. They concern: (1) the composition of the board of directors of the railway; (2) the composition and character of the administration of Dairen as an international port; and (3) the territorial extent of the lease on Port Arthur as a naval base.

On point one, it is recommended that we stand firmly for Soong’s suggestion of a directorship composed of Russians and Chinese in equal number, which is in accord with the Yalta commitments, and against the Soviet suggestion of a seven man board composed of 3 Chinese and 4 Russians. The 1924 treaty provides for equal representation. Differences not susceptible of settlement by the railway board should be referred to the two governments for agreement or by the two governments to a board of arbitration.

On point two, it is also felt that Soong’s offer to establish a free port under Chinese administration is in accord with the Yalta commitments. If concession is necessary to satisfy the Russians, an international administration composed of a Chinese, Russian, Englishman and an American might be established.

On point three, the area of the Port Arthur lease should be restricted to that essential to the operation and administration of the naval base. Soong is understood to be agreeable to an area up to but not including Dairen. The Yalta commitment should not be construed as warranting a larger area. Under no circumstance should the lease include territory in or surrounding Dairen. Integration of the Port Arthur lease into an international security arrangement would be advantageous, if possible.

With regard to the period of the agreements (30 years accepted tentatively by Soong), a reduction would be desirable. According to the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1924 (cited above), the original 80 year period, at the end of which China was to receive the railways without charge, was reduced to 60 years. This means that China should be given the railways sometime between 1960 and 1964, depending on the date on which the various lines were completed. There are no apparent grounds for denying the validity of this treaty provision. If operation of the settlement regarding the railway could be shortened to 15 or 20 years, it is probable that the life of the port settlements might be similarly reduced.

The foregoing comments and suggestions are prompted by a grave concern that, with the best of intentions and good faith, the reentry of the Soviet Union into Manchuria as envisaged has in it the seeds of future international friction.

The Russians are asking for a special position in Manchuria to the detriment of Chinese sovereignty and political unity, avowals to the contrary notwithstanding. We are committed, with good reason, [Page 1234]to the respect of Chinese sovereignty and to the promotion of Chinese political unity. A foreign power established in China, or in portions of China, on a preferential military and economic basis, is inimical to our interests and security.

We should adhere to the Yalta commitments regarding Manchuria. We should not go beyond them. In frankness, and for the sake of mutual understanding and respect, we should make it clear to the Russians that we consider the Yalta commitments and the Chinese-Soviet agreements growing therefrom as expedients, having no basis in principle or permanency, to be liquidated as soon as possible in the interests of a sovereign and united China and of Soviet-American cooperation for international peace.

[Subattachment 3]
top secret

Memorandum

Subject: Outer Mongolia.

During the Manchu dynasty (1644–1911) Mongolia was under Chinese (Manchu) Government control. Early in this century that portion of Mongolia lying farthest from China and least subject to Chinese control came to be known as Outer Mongolia, and the area adjacent to China was spoken of as Inner Mongolia.

In 1911 the Mongolians at Urga (Ulan Bator) in Outer Mongolia set up an autonomous regime and in 1912 obtained a pledge of support from Russia. In 1915, China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia signed a tri-partite agreement,13 confirming an earlier Russo-Chinese agreement (1913),14 whereby China recognized Outer Mongolian autonomy and Russia recognized Chinese sovereignty over the area.

During the period of the Russian revolution, China endeavored to reassert control over Outer Mongolia but in 1921 the Chinese were again ejected from the area and the Soviet Union entered into an agreement establishing relations with the Mongolian Peoples’ Government.15 In 1924 the Soviet Union signed a treaty with China, reiterating its recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia.16

In 1936 the Soviet Union signed a protocol of Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian Peoples’ Republic.17 China protested and received [Page 1235]assurances that the protocol was not viewed by the Soviet Union as a violation of Chinese sovereignty.

In 1941 the Soviet and Japanese Governments issued a declaration whereby the Soviet Union pledged itself “to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo” and Japan made an identical pledge with respect to the Mongolian Peoples’ Republic.18

At Moscow Soong was informed that the Soviet Union desired Chinese recognition of Outer Mongolian independence after the war and Soong is understood to have assented.

There are virtually no Chinese in Outer Mongolia. Any attempt by China to assert control over the area would be strongly resisted by the Mongolians irrespective of Russian support. The Mongolian Government, although under Russian influence, is of itself a “going concern” which has the support of the Mongolian people and governs in their interest.

The United States Government considers Outer Mongolia an integral part of China. We have never accorded recognition to the Soviet Union’s special relations with the area. However, the area has no direct significance to us, commercial or otherwise. Therefore, should the Chinese Government decide to grant independence to Outer Mongolia, we should interpose no objection. Although a preponderance of Soviet influence in the area is to be expected for some time to come, it would be well to obtain an agreement on the part of the Soviet Union to respect the independence of Outer Mongolia and to place no obstacle in the way of other nations establishing political and commercial relations with the area.

In order to avoid future border difficulties, a clear delineation of the presently ill-defined boundary between Outer Mongolia and China (Manchuria, Inner Mongolia now divided into several provinces, and Sinkiang, in all of which there are sizeable Mongolian minorities) should accompany a recognition of Outer Mongolian independence.

[Subattachment 4]
top secret

Memorandum

Subject: Sinkiang.

Sinkiang is China’s northwestern-most province, bounded on the north by Outer Mongolia and on the west by Soviet central Asia. [Page 1236]Chinese comprise less than ten per cent of the estimated population of 3,700,000. The area is peopled by Uighurs (largest group), Kazaks, Mongolians, Tungans, etc. The majority of the people are Mohammedans of central Asian origin who speak a Turki dialect.

In 1871 Russia occupied the westernmost area of Sinkiang (Kuldja or Ili) during a period of civil war in China but withdrew in 1881.

In 1931 the Soviet Union entered into an agreement with the provincial government of Sinkiang which, although largely commercial in character, gave the Russians a position of considerable political influence with the local authorities. In 1942, the Russians closed most of their commercial establishments in the province and withdrew Soviet troops which had been invited into the province by the Chinese Governor. A strengthening of Sinkiang’s political ties with the Chinese Nationalist Government resulted.

In early 1944 fighting between Chinese and Mongolian troops occurred along the ill-defined Sinkiang–Outer Mongolian border. The causes remain obscure. The Chinese accused the Russians of aiding the Mongolians. The Soviet Union without admitting the Chinese charge, cited its Mutual Assistance Pact of 193619 with Outer Mongolia as a warning to China. The border disturbances subsided soon thereafter.

Later in 1944, Sinkiang natives revolted against the Chinese rule in western Sinkiang and soon established control of the Kuldja or Ili area where they have maintained themselves to the present. Minor conflicts are still occurring in the area. Chinese maladministration is cited as the cause of the insurrection but local Chinese authorities are openly suspicious that assistance is coming to the native Kazaks from the adjoining Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. There are probably elements of truth in both accusations.

The commerce of Sinkiang has for over a generation been almost entirely with Soviet central Asia. There is no commercial outlet toward China comparable to the nearby Turk-Sib railway in central Asia and none is in prospect.

Commercial ties with the Soviets are natural and will continue. Kinship of the natives to the peoples of bordering Soviet republics will exercise a strong influence. Soviet non-interference in the internal affairs of the province, as promised Soong at Moscow, would be an important negative factor favoring Chinese control but not the determining factor. Whether China will be able to continue to exercise a tenuous sovereignty over Sinkiang, or whether the area will gradually go the way of Outer Mongolia depends almost wholly on [Page 1237]the intelligence with which China organizes an administration for and in cooperation with the native population.

[Attachment 220]
top secret

Yalta Agreement Affecting China

The recent conferences in Moscow between Dr. T. V. Soong and Generalissimo Stalin have resulted in agreement on the following points:

I. China raises no objection and accepts the return to Russia of the southern part of the Sakhalin Island and the accession of the Kurile Islands.

II. Chiang Kai Shek agrees that “the status quo for Outer Mongolia shall be preserved” and, in addition, that the Chinese National Government will, after the war is terminated with Japan, recognize the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic, assuming that a plebiscite will be held which re-affirms the desire of the people of Outer Mongolia for independence.

(It should be noted that this latter goes beyond the strict interpretation of the Yalta agreement. On the other band, it is not considered that the interests of the United States are adversely affected by this concession to the demands of the Soviet Government).

III. The Soviet Government has offered to the Chinese National Government a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Post-war Cooperation as agreed to at Yalta. The terms of this agreement are satisfactory to the Chinese and in general follow similar treaties concluded by the Soviet Government with European countries.

In this connection, Stalin has indicated the Soviet Government’s desire for a strong and unified China and has agreed to support Chiang Kai Shek’s government in the unification of China under his government and to withhold moral and material support from the Chinese Communist Party and the insurgents in Sinkiang.

In this connection, the Soviet Government also agreed to conclude a civil affairs agreement (along the lines of the Czech agreement21) which provides for political representatives of the Chinese National Government accompanying the Red Army, when it enters Chinese territory, in order to organize Chinese administration liberated by the Red Army therein. Stalin agreed that if the Chinese Government so [Page 1238]requests, the Soviet Government will withdraw Soviet troops from Chinese territory within three months after the termination of hostilities against Japan.

Agreement was not fully reached between Soong and Stalin on the question of the ports and railroads referred to in the Yalta agreement.

1. Railroads:

It has been agreed that the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad shall be equally owned by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. Neither government shall have the right to transfer its share of ownership to a third party. Joint ownership shall be for a period of thirty years at the termination of which all interests shall revert to the Chinese Government. The arrangements relate only to the main lines from Dairen to Harbin and from Harbin to Manchuli and Pogranichnaya.

The Soviet Government has agreed that it should not have the privilege of stationing troops in Manchuria or to have Soviet guards on the railroads or to move troops through Manchuria except in time of war or in the event of a threat of war.

The Soviet Government has demanded that there be seven directors of the railroad companies; four Russian and three Chinese, and that the managers of each of the railroads be Russian and the assistant managers Chinese.

On the other hand, Dr. Soong has proposed that there should be eight directors, four Chinese and four Russian; that the chairman of the board (a titular position without administrative authority) as a courtesy should be Chinese; the manager of the Chinese Eastern to be Russian and the assistant manager Chinese; the manager of the South Manchurian Railroad Chinese and the assistant manager Russian. Dr. Soong is prepared to agree that the interests of the Soviet Government in its transit traffic shall be fully provided for.

2. Ports:

(a) Port Arthur:

Agreement has been reached regarding the use of Port Arthur by the Soviet Government as a naval base for a period of thirty years; the port and the adjacent area to be under Soviet military control. As a matter of form, the Chinese will also have the right to use the port.

(b) Dairen:

The Soviet Government has demanded that the military zone under Soviet control shall extend to and include not only the area of Port Arthur but also the entire area of the original Russian lease of the Kwangtung Peninsula which includes Dairen; that one of the bays of Dairen shall be set aside as an additional naval base for Soviet use; that the management of the port be under a mixed Russian-Chinese [Page 1239]commission, that the manager be Russian, and that although the Chinese are permitted to deal with civilian matters, the civil government be under the orders of the Soviet military authorities, including the secret police.

On the other hand, Dr. Soong for the Chinese Government has offered the establishment of Dairen as a free port under Chinese administration, giving the Soviet Government a commercial lease on certain docks and storage yards within the port for exclusive Soviet use. The military zone under Soviet control should not include the port of Dairen or the connecting railway and Dairen should not be used as a Soviet naval base.

Dr. Soong has requested that I lay before the President the points of difference regarding the arrangements for the port of Dairen and the railroads. He further requests that the President inform Chiang Kai Shek of his interpretation of the Yalta agreement in these respects.

He hopes that the President can during the present conference reach an agreement with Generalissimo Stalin along the lines of his (Soong’s) proposals. If this is done, Soong is prepared to return to Moscow immediately after this conference in order to conclude the agreements covering all questions discussed. He would prefer, however, to have the opportunity to discuss these matters personally with the President and Generalissimo Stalin in Berlin during the last days of the conference.

discussion and recommendations

I believe that Dr. Soong’s final proposals as described above adequately fulfill the Yalta agreement. In the discussion leading up to the Yalta agreement, Stalin first asked the President’s support for a lease of the railroads and the ports to the Soviet Government. President Roosevelt resisted this demand and proposed that the operation of the railroads and ports be placed under an international trusteeship. He finally agreed, however, to Stalin’s counter proposal that the operation of the railroads should be by a “joint Soviet-Chinese Company.”22 It should be pointed out that although the Yalta agreement regarding the railroads states that “the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded” it mentions that “the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provide an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated.” I feel sure that President Roosevelt had in mind that the “preeminent interests” of the Soviet Government related to transit traffic and not to any general Soviet interests in Manchuria. There appears, therefore, no reason why Russia should have complete domination of the [Page 1240]railroads in which the interests of the Chinese and other nations are also involved.

As to the disagreement over the port of Dairen, it is inconceivable that there can be any real free port in a Soviet controlled military zone. We have ample experience that Soviet military security considerations would make free commercial operations impossible under such controls. The language of the Yalta agreement states that “the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded …”23 Soviet military control of the port would run completely counter to the whole spirit of what President Roosevelt had in mind. I believe President Roosevelt looked upon the lease of Port Arthur for a naval base as an arrangement similar to privileges which the United States has negotiated with other countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations.

It should be noted that when Stalin requested a lease for the port of Dairen President Roosevelt refused to agree to it,24 indicating that it was against American Chinese policy. There is no reason, from the discussions leading up to the Yalta agreement, to presume that the safeguarding of the “preeminent interests of the Soviet Union” should go beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports and imports to and from the Soviet Union. Dr. Soong’s offer of a commercial lease to the Soviet Government of an area of the port for its exclusive use would appear adequately to safeguard this interest.

Stalin, in his talks with President Roosevelt, at no time asked for the right to use Dairen as a naval base.

Stalin was fully familiar with President Roosevelt’s attitude toward foreign concessions in China and I am quite satisfied that President Roosevelt never intended or never would have agreed to special privileges to the Soviet Union which would adversely affect our long standing policy towards China. President Roosevelt did, however, feel that the Soviet Union was entitled to free access to a warm water port for its exports and imports.

If there is to be a compromise as to the management of the port, it might be proposed that the American Government participate therein with the Soviet and Chinese Governments. This would appear to come within the meaning of “internationalization.” Dr. Soong told me that he would welcome such participation as a compromise if the United States Government wished to propose it.

Our experience with the control which the Soviet Government exercises over all matters under its direction, convinces me that there would be interference with the development of commerce and trade of the United States and other nations in Manchuria_if_the [Page 1241]port of Dairen and the railroads are under Soviet domination. An agreement at this time to grant to the Soviet Government such control would violate the established policy and principles which the United States has held for a long period of time.

Stalin has agreed on a number of occasions to support America’s open door policy for China and to respect the sovereignty of China in Manchuria.

I, therefore, recommend that we stand firm on the interpretation of the Yalta agreement as indicated above.

[W. A. Harriman]
  1. Document No. 732.
  2. The heading of this memorandum indicates that it was from Dooman and Vincent jointly, but the ribbon copy bears only Vincent’s initials.
  3. Drafted by Vincent.
  4. Text in Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, p. 133.
  5. For the texts of the agreements referred to, see John V. A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894–1919 (New York, 1921), vol. i, pp. 81, 119.
  6. Text in Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, p. 133.
  7. Text printed ibid., p. 148.
  8. Text in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1929 (London, 1930), p. 280.
  9. Text in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements, vol. i, p. 119.
  10. Signed September 5, 1905. Text in Foreign Relations, 1905. p. 824.
  11. Text in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements, vol. ii, p. 1220.
  12. So dated, although referred to in the memorandum above of July 17.
  13. Text in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements, vol. ii, p. 1243.
  14. Text printed ibid., p. 1066.
  15. Text in Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929, p. 53.
  16. Text printed ibid., p. 133.
  17. Text in Heald and Wheeler-Bennett, eds., Documents on International Affairs, 1936, p. 472.
  18. Text in S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1940–June 1941 (Boston, 1941), p. 292, and in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 840.
  19. Text in Heald and Wheeler-Bennett, eds., Documents on International Affairs, 1936, p. 472.
  20. Not attached. Printed from an unsigned ribbon copy (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1845) which has been identified as the attachment in question by comparison with a copy supplied by Harriman.
  21. Signed at London, May 8, 1944. Text in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1948–June 1944 (Boston, 1945), p. 644.
  22. See Foreign Relations. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 768 770, 894 897.
  23. Ellipsis in the original.
  24. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 768 769, 894 896.