800.24/8–745
No. 1182
Prime Minister Churchill to
President Truman1
top
secret
[Babelsberg,] 24th July,
1945.
My Dear Mr. President, I thank you for
your memorandum of 17th July.2 I am
pleased that you say the Agreement made in Washington last
autumn stands. We have never, of course, regarded the munitions
schedules as absolutely rigid. Indeed I am told that our
munitions requirements have already been scaled down from the
2.8 billion dollars agreed last autumn for the first year of
Stage II to 1.8 billion, and that all these items are within the
terms then arranged. Unfortunately the Departments in Washington
have recently been insisting that nothing can be delivered save
what is needed for direct use against Japan, and interpreting
this in the narrowest possible sense; this has reduced munitions
supplies almost to [the] vanishing point, and has put us in a
very difficult position.
Much as I dislike troubling you with technical questions of this
kind at the present time, it is urgently necessary for us to
find a solution. I attach a note on the position by the Chiefs
of Staff, and very much hope that you will find it possible to
let me know whether their reading of your intentions, as
expressed in paragraph 1 of the note, is correct. If so, I
earnestly hope you will be able to see your way to issue the
necessary directive to your agencies.
The important financial questions mentioned in your last
paragraph are, of course, of a somewhat technical character, and
I should hesitate to enter into them deeply at this stage. But I
am told that our present gold and dollar balances (1.8 billion
dollars) do not exceed what was agreed as reasonable last autumn
in Washington by the United States Administration; on the other
hand our external liabilities, owing to the prolongation of the
war, have increased to 13
billion dollars.
The Chancellor [of the Exchequer]3 asks me to add that, both in
the matter of sales of surplus in the Middle East and elsewhere
and in the
[Page 1181]
matter of
relief to Europe, he has, in an earnest endeavor to meet your
wishes, already authorised proposals to the State Department
which go a long way beyond what he could have justified on any
other ground. In particular we have told the State Department
that we are willing to continue relief during the military
period in Italy until UNRRA
takes over relief there in the early autumn, and to make a
further contribution to the general work of UNRRA for the next year. Both of
these proposals are at present under discussion with the State
Department, though the Chancellor has not yet any Parliamentary
authority for this further relief expenditure.
All these questions, of course, are linked up closely with the
general post-war economic arrangements which will have to be
worked out before the War ends.
For this purpose, I should be very glad if you would agree to
our sending a special delegation to Washington as soon as
convenient—say in September. It will, I am sure, be in our
common interest to achieve as soon as possible agreement on
these vital post-war issues, so that we can view the economic
picture as a whole.
Yours very sincerely,
[Attachment]
The British Chiefs of
Staff to Prime Minister Churchill
top
secret
Lend-Lease
Memorandum to the Prime
Minister by British Chiefs of Staff
- 1.
- The Chiefs of Staff have seen President Truman’s minute of 17th
July about Lend-Lease. We note that the President
intends to furnish us with Lend-Lease for the
prosecution of the war
against Japan. We earnestly hope that it is also his
intention:
- (a)
- That troops of occupation and other British
forces carrying out essential tasks, who now hold
American equipment, will continue to receive such
equipment and maintenance as they
require:[.]
- (b)
- That American components needed for equipment
manufactured in the U. K. and Canada will continue
to be made available.
- (c)
- That these U. S. items on which, under the
agreement reached at Quebec last autumn,4 we are
counting to supplement our own manufacturing
programme of the same articles, will be supplied
to us.
- 2.
- For (a) above our case is as
follows:
- By agreement between the two Governments, British
forces throughout the world are equipped with certain
items of American equipment for which there is no
British counterpart, and no possibility of maintenance
[Page 1182]
from
British sources. Consequently in the absence of American
spares and replacements, such equipment is a wasting
asset with the resultant loss of efficiency. Take for
example the Jeep. There is no British counterpart, and
therefore we maintain our Jeeps in Europe and the Middle
East, but also to recondition those which are required
to be sent from Europe to South-East Asia Command to
take part in the war
against Japan [sic]. At present,
numbers of these are held up here because spare parts to
refit them cannot be shipped from America owing to the
freezing of Lend-Lease equipment. As regards the Royal
Air Force, the Dakota is a good example. We ourselves do
not produce any transport aircraft comparable to this
machine; and therefore 15 squadrons, in Europe and the
Mediterranean, which are, or are planned to be, equipped
with this type of aircraft would be grad-dually
demobilized or, alternatively, forced to use obsolescent
Halifaxes. It
is only by the use of transport aircraft that we can to
some extent make good the acute shortage of our manpower
in relation to our world-wide military commitments.
After the war with
Japan, we will be perfectly prepared to return to the
Americans any U. S. type transport aircraft which it
could be established by agreement were surplus to our
military needs as one of the Occupying Powers. The Navy
are not greatly affected since so much of the Fleet is,
or will be, operating against Japan. But here again, the
lack of maintenance stores for ships and equipment of U.
S. type, which are now being used for minesweeping and
other duties around Europe, would hit us hard.
- 3.
- The case for (b) is perhaps
best illustrated by the Royal Air Force. For example the
Sunderland IV is equipped with American turrets. The
necessity for the continuance of the supply of these and
similar components require no emphasis.
- 4.
- We now turn to (c). In
accordance with the agreement reached at Quebec last
Autumn, our plans have been based on the assumption that
we could count on the supply from America of certain
articles of equipment, such as clothing, telephone
cables, etc., etc. to supplement the flow of similar
articles manufactured by ourselves. Unless the Quebec
Agreement, as we read it, is implemented in this
respect, we are informed that all the above plans will
have to be entirely recast.
- 5.
- We beg of you to take up these matters with the
President as a matter of urgency. The mere fact that
some American equipment has been or is being issued to
us, should not limit our ordinary freedom in regard to
the use and disposal of British equipment in order to
give us more latitude in the disposal of British
equipment.
- A.F. Brooke
- C. Portal
- Andrew
Cunningham
