29. Letter from Seaborg to Bundy, August 101
Enclosed is a discussion paper on the question of test readiness. It is intended to provide a basis for our discussions with Pierre Salinger and Ed Murrow which you propose in your letter of August 8.
In brief, the paper: (1) describes the present limited state of readiness at NTS; and (2) identifies specific preparations which could be made prior to a decision to resume testing and ranks these activities in order of the degree of risk of public disclosure.
The main thrust of the paper is contained in the Summary, Table I thereto, and the section immediately following entitled “Increased Readiness Position”. However, the “Background” and the “Present Readiness Position” sections contain information helpful in fully appreciating the problem. I would suggest you glance over them as your time permits.
This paper is an essential companion piece to the AEC and DOD letters of July 19 and 28 to Secretary Rusk and Mr. McCloy, copies of which you have. Because our readiness studies afforded a second closer look at the time schedules indicated for a “short-term” test program, it now appears very doubtful that all—or even a substantial portion—of the 13 events identified for the short-term program could be completed within the time scale initially estimated. And, this situation won’t change appreciably unless specific preparations are undertaken at the test site: procurement and physical activity at the site itself and not device availability are the principal limiting factors. What has happened is this: The sensitivity of even talking about test readiness caused us to limit the discussions to a relatively few people in the Washington Headquarters. Now, as we have commenced to consult our field organization, the many details upon which a test series must finally be based are being uncovered. By analogy, the situation might be compared with the relative [Facsimile Page 2] simplicity of an architect’s conceptual drawing as distinguished from the problems which develop when detailed engineering design is commenced. This, it seems to me, is all the more reason for taking some concrete steps toward readiness at the earliest practical time. We must keep in mind that our experience in underground testing is limited and plans to confine testing to the under[Typeset Page 113]ground—while offering some operational and distinct international policy advantages—introduces a whole new dimension in pre-test preparations.
If the President could be assured that a meaningful test series could be conducted on relatively short notice, he could be provided a much greater degree of flexibility in dealing with the broader policy questions he must decide. He does not have that flexibility now with our present state of readiness.
I am prepared to sit down with you at any time and I would hope that this could be within the next day or two.
Cordially,
- Response to request for information on test readiness. Discussion paper not attached. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, 8/10/61–8/30/61.↩