30. Letter from Gilpatric to McCloy, August 101
Since the Principals’ meeting on August 3, the Defense Department has reviewed the unresolved items in the July 28 disarmament proposal. There were, as I recall, four of them:
1. Force levels. The Defense Department is willing to agree to the following force-level subparagraph in paragraph C of Stage 1:
“(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant stages. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.”
At the present time, as you know, the United States is at a substantial disadvantage on the conventional side. Any substantial cuts in United States force levels will seriously affect our presence throughout the world. For this reason, it is important (a) that this provision in the document be construed to require verification of actual force levels very early in the process, and (b) that the words “equitable” and “proportionate” be construed to mean small United States reductions as [Typeset Page 114] compared with large Soviet reductions as the 2.1 million levels are approached.
2. Linkage. The linkage problems appear in paragraphs D and E of Stage 1.
a. With respect to paragraph D, the Defense Department agrees to the elimination of the bracketed language (which called specifically for reduction of conventional arms prior to a production cut-off or transfers to non-weapons purposes). In this connection, however, I should like to emphasize our concerns about the cut-off provision. I fully agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to three matters: (1) The United States advantage in fissionable materials is not as pronounced as the figures may imply. This is so mainly because of greater United States requirements for ASW and tactical weapons and because of the United States need to consume relatively larger amounts of material to achieve smaller warheads. The United States advantage could be eliminated in a relatively short time if the Soviets were to continue to produce while we abstained. [Facsimile Page 2] Adequate verification of the cut-off, therefore, is essential. (2) The Soviet Union, by testing, can be expected both to develop a full spectrum of nuclear weapons which require very little fissionable material and to improve their weight-yield ratios. There must be assurance, therefore, that the Soviets are not testing. (3) Our stockpile depends on a continuous supply of tritium. The production of tritium must not be cut off.
It is our understanding, incidentally, that the phrase “agreed initial quantities” will appear in subparagraph (b) of paragraph D to ensure that the transfers of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes are small. Anything more than this would require stripping existing weapons, an effect which we assume is not intended before Stage II.
b. In paragraph E a link of some kind is required, however. There should be language there emphasizing that reductions in delivery vehicles—for practical purposes an irreversible step—should not proceed in the absence of real progress in the area of quickly reversible reductions in conventional forces. We do not insist that the “link” be that the conventional cuts must have been completed (which is the purport of the present bracketed language), but we do believe that there must be language explicitly ruling out reductions on the nuclear side before reductions on the conventional side. The general language at the beginning of the document, referring to “balance” and the like, is not sufficient, in our opinion, to ensure that the United States will have a right to retain an adequate nuclear “equalizer” for superior Sino-Soviet conventional forces. We therefore propose that the subparagraphs of paragraph E be introduced by the following language:
“The following measures shall proceed concurrently with those in paragraph C above relating to force levels and armaments:”
3. AICBM. We agree to the following change in the first sentence of paragraph E (a):
“Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. . . .”
We agree to the same change elsewhere in the document where reduction in strategic weapons delivery vehicles is mentioned.
[Facsimile Page 3]4. No first use. On the question of no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons in Stage II, the Defense Department wants this provision removed from the paper. The no-first-use-of-any-weapons provision in Stage I conveys the thought in so far as the thought is acceptable. There should be no suggestion, especially at this time, that nuclear weapons cannot be used in defense against a conventional attack. In so far as CBR weapons are concerned, the Defense Department is willing to have CBRs referred to (along with “nuclear” and “conventional” armed force) in the no-first-use-of-any-weapons provision in Stage I. Paragraph G (a) might read:
“States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force—including nuclear, conventional or CBR—contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.”
5. Test ban. We have been told informally that there may be a fifth issue—that the test ban may be introduced into the document. This point was not raised before the Principals and it obviously is a major change. Since we have not had the opportunity to explore its implications (for example, mere inclusion of the provision could seriously affect United States’ freedom of action with respect to resumption of testing), we will not comment on it here. We assume that neither this nor any other substantive changes will be introduced into the document without further consultation.
Sincerely,
- Disarmament proposal: DOD review of unresolved items on force levels, linkage, AICBM, first use, and test ban. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament.↩