Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

28. Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to McNamara, August 9¹

August 9, 1961

SUBJECT

• Joint Declaration on Disarmament (U)

1. At the meeting of the Committee of Principals on 3 August 1961, the proposed “Joint Declaration on Disarmament”, dated 28 July 1961, was considered. After the meeting, there remained 4 major unresolved issues.

2. The decision with respect to each issue can have grave implications for national security. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard it as essential that their views be considered by the Principals in the resolution of these issues.

3. The following two issues were previously considered and recommendations were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 28 June 1961.

ISSUE:

a. Should the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons be contingent upon prior implementation of measures for the reduction of armed forces and armaments?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes.

REASON: A number of specific conditions which must accompany a “cut-off” are not attainable in today’s political atmosphere or within today’s technology. Satisfactory progress in the implementation of measures affecting force levels and armaments could assist in bringing about a political climate in which the more sensitive disarmament measures could safely be negotiated: and the interim would provide time to achieve necessary technological capabilities for control. (See Appendix A for more detailed reasoning.)

ISSUE:

b. Should it be proposed in Stage II, that states accept an obligation not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and CBR weapons?

RECOMMENDATION: No.

REASON: The US is, and should remain, free to use nuclear weapons if placed in a position of individual or collective self-defense. The proposal should not be made even for CBR weapons because it would open the door to inclusion of all “weapons of mass destruction” including nuclear weapons. (See Appendix B for more detailed reasoning.)

4. The other two issues concern matters which were incorporated in the 28 July 1961 paper without referral to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ISSUE:

a. What specific language should be used in proposing force level reductions in Stage I?

RECOMMENDATION: The language approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 1, page 5, of the Enclosure to their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, JCSM–440–61, dated 26 June 1961, subject. “Recommended US Disarmament Negotiating Proposal”.

REASON: The recommended language would ensure that force levels of the USSR and Communist China are reduced to the existing US level, and verified, before implementation of reductions to the agreed 2.1 million level would begin. (See Appendix C for more detailed reasons.)

ISSUE:

b. Should it be proposed, in Stage I, that limitations and prohibitions be placed upon weapons designed to counter strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles?

RECOMMENDATION: No.

REASON: It ignores current military strategy upon which all plans and programs are based and presumes a hypothetical strategy which has not been adopted. (See Appendix D for more detailed reasons.)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Joint Declaration on Disarmament. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament.