27. Memorandum from Bundy to President Kennedy, August 81
SUBJECT
- The NSC Meeting on Nuclear Tests
The main business of this meeting is the presentation and discussion of Panofsky’s report. Since you have heard the report, and copies have been in circulation to all those present, Jerry Wiesner and I are asking Panofsky to begin with a brief summary. Our suggestion is that you may wish to press the discussion in three directions: the prospects of better intelligence, military implications of various postures on testing and non-testing on each side, and political discussion of the elements to be weighed in any decision to resume or not to resume.
In all of this discussion it seems important to concentrate attention on limited time span. No one really knows what may be possible five or ten years from now, either in the gathering of intelligence or in the design of weapons—even the political situation may be changed long before that by extensive Red Chinese testing. And at the shorter range, there is no one who sees much net advantage in the resumption of testing before the end of 1961. The real question that remains is whether [Typeset Page 108] you will wish to test, on balance, early in 1962, or whether the decision can be put over for as much as a year or two beyond that date, if it seems politically desirable.
1. Intelligence
The report itself comments on what we can and cannot know about Soviet testing, and not much can be added. But one interesting question is whether intelligence will allow us in the future—with [text not declassified]—to identify a really large-scale Soviet [Facsimile Page 2] clandestine test program. The point here is that clandestine testing is not an absolute matter—different amounts of testing imply different risks at different stages of our own intelligence capability. Allen Dulles is probably the best witness here.
2. Military Aspects
The paper from the Joint Chiefs is very bad, but you have a new memorandum from Max Taylor which is much more significant, and since others will not have heard his argument, it may be useful to ask him to comment. In essence his contention is that specific characteristics of U.S. military strategy place a particular premium for us upon improvements in both strategic and tactical weapons. He implies that the Soviets have no parallel need, and in this respect I myself think his paper is subject in a measure to criticism that one can generally apply to estimates from professional soldiers on weapons development: they tend to think in terms of what we can do while minimizing what the enemy can do with the same opportunity.
One other basic point in the military area is that of timing. The JCS and General Taylor ask for prompt resumption at once unless there are overwhelming political arguments against it. But the whole argument of the Panofsky panel indicates that a temporary delay would not be of critical importance. This issue deserves to be sharpened. As far as I myself can make out from the papers, the most valuable new weapon we are likely to get within a year of the resumption of tests is a [text not declassified] but I find nothing that tells me just how important that is.
Still on the military side, there are two weapons about which much nonsense is spoken: the neutron bomb and the AICBM. The scientists appear to think that tests are not needed for either one in the next year or two, but the military argument appears to assume the opposite.
[Facsimile Page 3]More generally, you may wish to have criticism of the JCS report as a whole. For example, the JCS says: “there are many points in the report which are considered to be inaccurate or which express opinions and military judgments with which the JCS do not agree.” This is a strong statement and one does wonder whether it can be substantiated.
[Typeset Page 109]One further technical question is what can be learned by laboratory experiments with nuclear yields up to one ton of TNT equivalent as opposed to the present ten-pound limit. This was Seaborg’s suggestion, and at your instruction I have asked that special attention be given to it.
3. Political
The politics of testing obviously have two great aspects: the national and the international. I doubt if you need any help on the national side. On the international side, you may wish to ask McCloy and Dean to comment—in supplement to the able report which the State Department has presented. In particular, we may want some discussion of the possibility of taking up a stand against “fall-out testing” at some later stage, in an effort to distinguish atmospheric from underground tests. You have a powerful memorandum from Dean raising questions about this possibility, which still seems attractive to many of us.
Conclusion
While you probably will wish to reserve any definite judgments and decisions until after this meeting, it may be useful to give all concerned a clear sense of your thinking. In particular, the military need to understand the political reasons for playing out the test ban negotiations both at Geneva and at the UN. If you are persuaded by Seaborg’s sensible argument about test preparations, you may be willing to authorize work at Nevada as early as the end of the UN session. (or, of course, sooner if you felt the advantages outweighed the disadvantages.) You may also wish to ask for more detailed assessment of some of the special possibilities like laboratory tests and new anti-fall-out proposal, before reaching further decisions.
[Facsimile Page 4]Finally, it occurs to me that whatever way you choose to move on testing, General Eisenhower can be a powerful ally. His advisor, Dr. Kistiakowsky, believes that the Russian are champing at the bit in the hope that we may test, thus opening the way for them. If you decide not to test, support from Ike will be invaluable at home, and if you decide the other way, his voice as a man of peace will be important abroad.
- Background information for meeting with the NSC on nuclear tests. Top Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, 7/16/61–8/9/61.↩