200. Telegram 186 from Moscow, July 171

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From Harriman. Gromyko accompanied by 10 advisers, including Zorin, Tsarapkin, Mendelevich, Novikov, and Roshchin. Hailsham accompanied by Trevelyan, Wilson, Zuckerman, Darwin, and Wheeler. Harriman accompanied by Kohler, Kaysen, Fisher, McNaughton, Long, Akalovsky.

Gromyko opened suggesting there be no chairman and discussion be informal without strict procedures. Said since he had started speaking first, wished used opportunity he had given himself and invite US and UK comments on test ban and NAP drafts Sovs had given yesterday.

Harriman suggested US/UK and Sovs draft test ban treaties be reviewed article by article. Noted, however, preamble should be left aside until body of treaty agreed.

Hailsham expressed agreement with procedure suggested by Harriman.

Gromyko had no objection, but pointed out if any participant wished address himself to more than one article at same time, there should be no rigidity re procedure.

Harriman and Hailsham agreed.

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Gromyko said since drafts were Soviet papers, he wished stress Sovs believed necessary discuss both drafts presented by USSR, i.e., test ban and NAP. As to order of discussion, it depended upon participants and they free discuss what they wanted.

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Harriman said US not prepared discuss NAP today, as we had not studied draft. All we prepared discuss today was test ban. Pointed out this was how he had understood Khrushchev yesterday. Commented there was no relationship between drafts on two subjects, they contained no over-lapping provisions, and we not prepared discuss at this point anything but three-environment test ban. Thought this procedure had been agreed in principle yesterday.

Gromyko said that of course if US/UK not prepared discuss NAP today—he understood Sov proposal required internal study and discussion—then he had no objection to discussion test ban today. Stressed, however, both drafts must be discussed in due course in light considerations voiced by Khrushchev yesterday.

Harriman said there were number of questions mentioned yesterday which we would like discussed later; we would later discuss NAP just as other matters raised yesterday by Khrushchev, Hailsham and himself.

Gromyko then suggested group discuss subject which everybody prepared take up today, i.e., test ban.

Gromyko continued if no objection he wished comment on US/UK draft test ban given Sovs yesterday. Said would comment in general terms rather than on specific language; believed once agreement was reached on substance there would be no difficulty deciding on specific wording. Sovs proceeded from premise Sov draft met objective to be achieved, but nevertheless he wished state Sov attitude toward some of main points in US/UK draft.

Gromyko noted US/UK draft provided for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which indicated US/UK believed three-environment test ban should leave room for such explosions. Sov view was no need for such provision. Agreement would be limited in scope as it would allow underground explosions, including those for peaceful purposes. To provide for explosions for peaceful purposes in any environment would mean another limitation of treaty coverage, and would result in one limitation being superimposed on another. This would detract from value of agreement in eyes of peoples. Therefore Sovs believed [Facsimile Page 3] no provision for explosions for peaceful purposes should be included. Hoped US/UK would take Soviet view into account and not insist on inclusion that provision.

Turning to withdrawal clause in US/UK draft, Gromyko said Sovs believed such clause should not be included in treaty. Sovs did not [Typeset Page 561] deny any party could and should have in mind hypothetical situations which could lead to certain consequences, and this of course applied to USSR as well. Wondered, however, why one should refer to this in treaty and, so to speak, relish this possibility. This would also detract from impact of treaty on public opinion and make negative impression on peoples. Did not believe US, UK, or USSR, or any other state that might accede were interested in this. Importance of agreement should be strengthened rather than weakened, and this why Sovs believed provision for possible withdrawal should not be included. Hoped US/UK would take Sovs views into account and not insist on its inclusion.

Hailsham remarked Harriman should be first to comment on Gromyko’s statement, but said he also wished express certain views either now or later. He understood views expressed by Gromyko and thought they clearly must be taken account of. He wished express his views on Article 1 Sov draft and also compare US/UK and Sov drafts.

Harriman preferred hear all comments Gromyko might have before replying.

Hailsham agreed.

II.

Gromyko observed US/UK draft provided for ban of tests in three environments but also contained, in para 1.B. Article 1, for prohibition of explosions in any other environment if such explosions caused radioactive debris to be present outside territorial limits of state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions were conducted. Believed intent this language to prohibit underground tests with venting and consequent spread of radioactivity, and said Sovs had no objection to including it in treaty.

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Gromyko said Sovs also agreed to inclusion para 2 US/UK draft Article 1 under which parties would undertake not to cooperate with other states in carrying out nuclear tests.

Turning to Article 4 US/UK draft, Gromyko noted it required unanimity for approval amendments to treaty and said Sovs had no objection to such procedure.

Re US/UK draft Article 5, para 3, Gromyko said Sovs also agreed to inclusion language providing for entry into force after ratification.

Gromyko then referred to Khrushchev’s remarks re France yesterday and said had nothing to add. However, wished point out that in agreeing, for reasons indicated by Khrushchev, to having no specific reference to France USSR proceeded from premise that if France should continue testing after agreement signed Sov Govt would have to examine situation resulting therefrom. Repeated Sovs agreed have no direct reference to France in agreement.

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Gromyko continued that although he not sure to what extent this should be included in treaty, he wished state Sovs prepared extend hospitality and proposed that treaty be signed in Moscow. Thought inclusion reference to this would not contradict and in fact was in full accord established international practice. Also, since these negotiations taking place in Moscow, USSR thought it would be appropriate if Sov Govt were depository government.

Gromyko said USSR Govt would do its utmost to further agreement on three-environment test ban and NAP. Therefore he wished use this opportunity express hope that each of participants should not argue over subsidiary matters or be carried away on matters of procedure. Rather, they should reach agreement on three-environment test ban and NAP.

Gromyko said these were Sov basic views on both US/UK and Sov test ban drafts though when agreement was reached on content of treaty, it would be easy cloak that agreement in appropriate specific language. Opined it should be possible agree at next or one of next meetings on text including some provisions from Sov draft and some from US/UK draft. Said did not intend at this time give any specific language [Facsimile Page 5] for treaty and dot all eyes and cross all tees; repeated agreement on language should be easy once substance agreed. Stressed fact Sovs prepared accept some of US/UK provisions in their present form or almost unchanged, and hoped this would be duly appreciated.

Hailsham said he sure principal thoughts should come from Harriman however, wished thank Gromyko for his business-like and useful approach to business at hand. Stressed seriousness and sincerity which UK approaching present task and said he stating this on behalf HM govt and UK Del.

Hailsham continued he wished make two comments which perhaps would only be footnotes to what Harriman would say. Re explosions for peaceful purposes, Hailsham noted Sov draft provided for cessation only of weapons tests and therefore permitted such explosions. Thought this point must be clarified. Also pointed out US/UK draft provided for such explosions only by unanimous consent of original parties. If Sovs did not wish explosions for peaceful purposes, they had safeguards under this provision.

Re withdrawal clause, Hailsham said he sympathized with Gromyko’s views and agreed it hard to talk about divorce in entering marriage. However, Khrushchev yesterday and Gromyko today had said they would examine the situation with respect to France; others may also have problems in circumstances of concern to them. As lawyer, he wished point out that if parties do have such considerations in mind, it better formulate circumstances now even though this may be difficult. Pointed out US/UK draft provided for notification and in absence such provision there would be danger of sudden withdrawal.

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Hailsham thanked Gromyko again for his careful and extremely helpful considerations; Gromyko’s agreement to some provisions from US/UK draft saved him from need for comment on some points in Sov draft. However, he wished to raise two points re Sov Article 1 which were perhaps matters of drafting. Sov draft said quote on high seas unquote, but he thought correct wording should be quote under high seas unquote. Another [Facsimile Page 6] point was that since concept of outer space still lacking precise definition it would be better use term quote above atmosphere unquote instead of quote outer space unquote.

Harriman said he first wished assure Gromyko US approaching matter in exactly same spirit as Gromyko and Hailsham. US wanted reach agreement. Appreciated frankness with which Gromyko had expressed his objections and also acceptance some of US/UK provisions. Said would speak with same frankness and friendly spirit.

III.

Re explosions for peaceful purposes, which proved for in Article 2, US/UK draft, Harriman noted Gromyko seemed be concerned about impact such provision on public opinion. Pointed out US/UK article divided in two parts: first part permitted use nuclear devices for peaceful purposes if unanimously agreed by original parties, while second referred to more involved formula which had not been tabled. Wondered whether Gromyko would object to retaining first proviso or whether he objected to both first and second. Observed that on basis his reading Sov press he had been led believe Sovs had some ideas re peaceful uses nuclear devices in developing their country. Also noted there had been great deal of discussion in international press of possible values such uses. Asked again whether Gromyko objected to provision for nuclear explosions for peaceful uses if it related only to first proviso in Article 2 US/UK draft. Added US public opinion had imaginatively speculated about some areas where nuclear explosions could be of some value. If no explosion were to be undertaken without approval by all original parties those concerned about such explosions might be protected. Noted he not entirely abandoning second proviso in Article 2 US/UK draft and wished talk about it, but thought it might be easier abandon second proviso if Gromyko would agree to first proviso.

Gromyko said Sovs were not proceeding on basis narrow considerations; they not concerned about whether explosions for peaceful purposes would be conducted with or without Sov approval, which would be required under first proviso. Sov view was provision for explosions for peaceful purposes [Facsimile Page 7] would weaken agreement and detract from its importance, and this was what Sov Govt guided by. Therefore, he hoped US/UK would not insist on inclusion provision for such explosions.

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Harriman said wished underline what he had already said, namely, that public opinion in US had developed considerable hopes re peaceful uses nuclear devices since such uses could open values for mankind not only in US but also elsewhere in world. We were under impression this true of USSR too. If provision of this kind was included, although its wording might not be exactly same, we believe subject would be left open. While some might be disappointed, mankind would not be cut off from future use nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. In absence such provision mankind would be precluded from enjoying possible benefits; at least that was how many people would consider this. Harriman also noted under US constitutional procedure two-thirds vote required for approval treaties in Senate and said we believe omission certain provisions would make more difficult for President obtaining such approval. Expressed hope Gromyko would give consideration to our views.

Re withdrawal clause, Harriman said he impressed by Hailsham’s statement on this matter and wished associate himself with it. As Hailsham suggested, he would await Gromyko’s consideration how unforseen contingencies should be covered in treaty. Gromyko himself had indicated reservation if France should test in atmosphere. Harriman comment his govt would feel differently re withdrawal provision if Sovs could assure US that CPR would adhere in some reasonable time or that it would not become danger to mankind, which might necessitate, much as we would regret it, resumption tests by US to improve weapons for defense and deterrence. Observed he had mentioned China just as Gromyko had mentioned France.

Harriman continued he appreciated Gromyko’s remarks re article 1 and his acceptance certain language from US/UK draft of that article. Agreed with Hailsham re definition of testing and thought perhaps some misunderstanding existed in connection reference to quote any nuclear weapon test unquote. We had in mind some more precise language. Noted US/UK draft Article 1 based on assumption article 2 would be accepted, but thought even if there should be any [Facsimile Page 8] consideration of abandoning Article 2, Article 1 might require clarification. However, if there should be no such consideration or if only first proviso Article 2 were to be retained, Article 1 should also be made more precise to cover all nuclear explosions. Said this matter could be discussed in detail at some other time in order clean up text. Believed parties in substantial agreement on Article 1, particularly if Gromyko accepted broader definition nuclear explosions.

Re Article 4, amendments—Harriman appreciated greatly Gromyko’s acceptance US/UK proposal amendments should be approved only if there was agreement among three original parties. Expressed doubt, however, Gromyko very clear on other contingencies provided [Typeset Page 565] for in US/UK draft article 4. As far as US concerned it prepared discuss and negotiate this matter, i.e., two-thirds vote by other parties, which was to take account of future signatories. Said US did not wish place too much emphasis on this point.

Harriman thanked Gromyko for accepting US/UK Article 5, pointing out ratification clause necessary under US constitutional procedure. Noted Gromyko’s proposal or mentioning USSR as depository govt. Did not wish comment on this now but suggested perhaps some neutral country could be selected which would be mutually acceptable to three original parties. As to place of signing believed that should be very easily arranged after we found out who would sign for our countries, and suggested leaving this matter open for time being.

IV.

Referring to Hailsham’s comments on Sov draft, Harriman said if he had followed them correctly he wished associate himself with them. Believed some of them had been taken care of by Gromyko’s acceptance of some language from US/UK Article 1. Suggested this matter be left aside until Sov suggestions re Article 1 put on paper. Believed matters like this should be dealt with in drafting committee or some such appropriate group.

Agreed with Gromyko perhaps some progress could be made in this connection if development specific language were based on agreement in principle with respect relevant points. Suggested each group designate [Facsimile Page 9] representatives to participate in drafting committee. Believed large measure of agreement existed, except re withdrawal and explosions for peaceful purposes. Stressed importance withdrawal clause to US but agreed go over peaceful uses, noting, however, some satisfaction should be given to people placing high value on peaceful uses of nuclear devices.

Gromyko stated could not give any assurances re CPR in course discussion this matter or any other matter. This was clear from Khrushchev’s remarks and underlying reasons should be quite understandable. Also wished to point he saw no analogy between France and CPR as France already nuclear power. Harriman had rightly said to Khrushchev France was a special case.

Re explosions for peaceful purposes, Gromyko said even if someone attached significance to this matter, he wished point out we speaking of three-environment test ban which did not cover underground environment and therefore question of explosions for peaceful purposes could be decided by each party itself. Said Sovs objected to inclusion provision for peaceful explosions not because USSR had special interest in leaving it out. If it had such interest USSR would have accepted first proviso US/UK Article 2, but it hadn’t. Sovs believed [Typeset Page 566] such proviso would detract from importance of agreement and hoped US/UK would not insist on its inclusion. Sovs believed this provision not only unnecessary but also harmful.

Re withdrawal clause, Gromyko said did not wish repeat himself. Sovs did not wish have such provision so as not to reduce importance of treaty. As to French problem, he had already explained Sov point of view. Each state had its own considerations, but better not include any provision. Omission such provision would be better from standpoint of all, US, UK and USSR.

Gromyko said if Article 2 re peaceful uses omitted, perhaps might be useful make language Article 1 of Sov and US/UK drafts more specific.

Re amendments, Gromyko believed what he had said made Sov attitude sufficiently clear. He proceeded from premise US/UK language clearly stated amendments should be adopted under rule of unanimity of three original parties. As to whether any language re voting procedure for other parties should or should not be included that could be discussed.

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Gromyko agreed with Harriman broad area of agreement existed. Thought Hailsham would agree with this too. Urged US/UK drop two provisions Sovs believed should be omitted. Had no objection to creation drafting committee.

Hailsham referred to withdrawal problem. Noted Gromyko had suggested each party put own construction on agreement and, although this not very clear, make that construction public. That would be better than nothing at all. Hailsham noted he had spent most of his life in Parliament, which not same as US Congress but similar in many ways. Said he knew how difficult obtain agreement of Parliament to treaties, as there was always opposition. Doubted test ban agreement would be attacked in Parliament as strongly as in US Congress, which reflected many shades of opinion. However, believed agreement should not leave gaps opposition could use in criticizing treaty; hidden rocks of this kind were dangerous. Hailsham continued he did not mind saying that rather than have no agreement he would have agreement defective in this respect. However, he knew he would be subjected to criticism if he agreed to exclusion withdrawal clause. It clear from what Sovs and US had said they would have second thoughts about France and China. It was true France and China were not on equal footing now and US would not consider them as such so long as CPR did not test. However, once CPR tested US would regard it and France as being on same footing. Therefore, he saw force in Harriman’s arguments. Observed did not see UK withdrawing from test ban agreement.

Re peaceful explosions, said this problem somewhat academic to UK as it had no intention engage in them. Gromyko’s statement three-[Typeset Page 567]environment ban would open way for peaceful explosions did not meet point as in big experiments or engineering projects there would be venting.

V.

Harriman said he readily agreed with Gromyko re yesterday’s discussion of France. He agreed there was difference between France and China since France was already nuclear power. We accepted Sov concern re France, and if Hailsham agreed we would tell USSR we would talk to France but we could not give any guarantees. Thus we understood Sov reservations in case France failed to accede or if it undertook further testing in atmosphere. Stressed withdrawal clause of really great importance to US but observed that as Hailsham had said it conceivable each party [Facsimile Page 11] could list its reservations and omit withdrawal clause. However, that would create great problems with US Senate. He sure many more reservations might be found by Senate during consideration of treaty and some of them could be quite distasteful to USSR and some other people in world. However, this was price we paid for our democratic form of govt. Therefore, he wished urge Gromyko consider including some suitable provision for withdrawal. Language must not necessarily be US/UK proposed language but to meet our purposes formula should be broad enough to cover all our reservations, particularly testing by China. This latter reservation was not only one we had but language should definitely be sufficiently broad to cover commencement of testing which required for CPR to become nuclear power through her own efforts. We did not envisage, however, mentioning any country by name.

Hailsham agreed UK would try induce France to adhere. He had no doubts about this, but did have doubts as to degree of influence which could be exerted.

Gromyko observed Hailsham knew best characters of members his family.

Hailsham said many members his family most charming but quite difficult.

Gromyko thought most charming people are the ones who are the most difficult.

Gromyko continued he wished draw attention to fact Sovs had accepted number of US/UK provisions. Hoped US/UK would also consider points made by USSR. Re Hailsham’s reference to opposition UK Parliament, believed most difficult see Labor Party opposing three-environment test ban.

Noted, however, there would be opposition of both sides of aisle if treaty were not sufficiently business-like. Appreciated Gromyko’s kind and helpful approach to these discussions, as well as his accept[Typeset Page 568]ance drafting committee. Believed drafting committee should examine article 1 and other articles where problems existed. Wondered whether Gromyko could state exact extent Sov reservation re France as that would influence his own thinking.

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Gromyko replied could not add much to what Khrushchev had said yesterday. Briefly, if France did not adhere and continued testing, then Sov Govt would examine situation in light of these facts. Hoped, however, that if agreement reached on test ban and NAP US and UK Govts, as France’s allies, would succeed in persuading France it in its best interests to become party to the treaties.

Hailsham thanked Gromyko and said would do everything possible in this respect. Inquired re Gromyko’s reaction to his suggestion for program work drafting committee.

Gromyko agreed drafting committee should work on points where substance agreed. Voiced hope US/UK would approach consideration Sov views on two outstanding questions with same attentiveness and understanding as applied by Sovs in considering US/UK draft. That would open prospects for three-environment test ban. At same time wished point out NAP should be discussed at one of next meetings. Drafting committee could meet tomorrow at ten or eleven, while another meeting of principals could be held at three PM tomorrow.

Hailsham agreed and believed that except for two points of contention sides could prepare whole text of treaty. Observed he did not attach great importance to question of depository.

Harriman also agreed drafting committee meeting tomorrow. Said wanted concentrate on test ban at this time. As to other questions wished point out not only question which had been tabled must be discussed but also other matters raised by Khrushchev, Hailsham and himself. Such discussion could be held after fruitful discussion of test ban concluded.

It was agreed drafting committee meeting eleven AM and principals meeting three PM July 17.

Kohler
  1. Readout of meeting with Gromyko delegation. Secret. 12 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 USSR (MO).