199. Telegram 184 from Moscow, July 171
Following full report of discussion on test ban and NAP at plenary session Wednesday, July 17, which you may find useful. Session lasted from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. In addition to Harriman there were present [Typeset Page 557] on US side Kohler, Kaysen, Fisher, Tyler, McNaughton, Long and Akalovsky.
Harriman suggested principals receive report of Test Ban Drafting Committee, which had met at 11 a.m. (composed of Tsarapkin plus five; Fisher plus McNaughton and Akalovsky; and Darwin). Tsarapkin reported that committee had agreed to postpone work on preamble pending discussion by principals, and to work on article one, implementing agreement of principals on Tuesday. Draft on article one was worked out containing but one disagreement, namely, US/UK exception for peaceful purposes by way of cross reference to article two. (This draft of article one being cabled separately.) Fisher concurred in Tsarapkin report on drafting committee work.
Harriman what next. Gromyko suggested acceptance of Soviet proposals to eliminate all reference to peaceful uses and withdrawal. Harriman said that US must have withdrawal clause and that it is more important than peaceful uses. Though withdrawal clause quote absolutely essential unquote, could be worded differently from US/UK draft. Could call it quote duration clause unquote. Could phrase it positively. Harriman read, as example, of positive approach: quote It is the anticipation of the parties that this treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely and shall be adhered to by all states, particularly those states that could be in a position to carry out an explosion prohibited by this treaty. Unquote. He said that it would then go on to deal with how a state might have to [Facsimile Page 2] reconsider under certain circumstances. He offered to hand Gromyko an illustrative draft, making clear it was a US draft since UK had not had chance to approve it.
Gromyko asked for draft, saying it might narrow differences.
Harriman gave it to Gromyko and Hailsham (Hailsham had in fact seen it before meeting and had suggested change which Harriman rejected.)
The remainder of paragraph is contained in separate Harriman/Fisher cable on test-ban details. (Embtel 183).
Gromyko said that substance same as former US–UK position. Hailsham noted that every contract had limits stated or implied. New clause was especially good because it limited right to withdraw. He noted that both sides had stated reservations: USSR re France, US re China. These reservations cannot be secret. Better impact on public opinion to have duration clause with limits like this on right to withdraw.
Gromyko said often contract omits reference to duration of withdrawal. He then asked Harriman’s attitude toward peaceful uses—was US willing to drop article two? Harriman said if Gromyko accepted withdrawal article, he believed US could drop peaceful uses article. [Typeset Page 558] Gromyko asked if he understood statements made before correctly, that US Senate might object to absence of withdrawal clause. Harriman said that this was understatement. Answer is yes. That it would be more difficult. It might be impossible. Gromyko said we should study the situation and return to the peaceful uses and withdrawal articles tomorrow. Hailsham interjected that difficulty in UK Parliament would not be absence of withdrawal clause in treaty but would be any secret understandings regarding withdrawal. Principals agreed to return to these two matters tomorrow.
Harriman suggested discuss preamble next. Hailsham added that might discuss identity of depository of treaty. Harriman, on this matter suggested UN, a neutral or all three original signatories. Gromyko referred to Tuesday offer to have USSR the depository and to have treaty signed in Moscow. He noted that Antarctica Treaty deposited in US. But said would not force USSR on US and UK, it did not affect fundamental interests; was only politeness.
[Facsimile Page 3]Discussion shifted to preamble. Harriman said he wanted the preamble to include the points in the US/UK treaty draft but was willing to discuss this. He said that US/UK willing to accept number of points in Soviet preamble with certain amendments. Specifically, first, in Soviet second paragraph, words quote including nuclear weapons unquote should be deleted: preceding words quote all kinds of weapons unquote covers nuclear weapons. Second, in second paragraph, after quote general and complete disarmament unquote should go words quote in a peaceful world unquote. And, lastly, if GCD is to be mentioned, should add quote progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintenance of peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means unquote. He stated that inserts came from US/USSR agreed statement of principles of 1961.
Gromyko said he disliked amendments to Soviet preamble/in Soviet draft, disarmament mentioned only quote by the way unquote; USSR mentioned it only to relate test ban to GCD. US changes would introduce conditions for GCD. Harriman said we have inherited custom of linking disarmament to peace-keeping machinery. If Gromyko dislikes linkage, need not refer to GCD at all and omit reference to both GCD and peace-keeping machinery. Gromyko said that omission of GCD would be a pith, that USSR did not think of mention of GCD as being a condition to test ban. Harriman suggested that drafting committee might work out language. Hailsham agreed, suggesting special committee of quote political unquote specialists. Harriman said no, use same committee. Gromyko agreed to referral to drafting committee, with instructions to keep language simple to meet needs of public opinion.
[Typeset Page 559]Harriman noted that rest of test ban (except controversial articles two and three, on peaceful uses and withdrawal) had been referred to drafting committee. After some mild levity, test ban portion of meeting ended.
Gromyko shifted to non-aggression pact when Harriman expressed desire to get communiqué to President in time for Wednesday press conference. Gromyko asked Western representatives for comments on NAP draft and said quote in passing unquote that degree of optimism which could be expressed in this communiqué and future ones depended on progress which would be made on NAP. Stressed importance Soviet Government attached to NAP.
- Full report of test ban discussions at plenary session, July 17. Secret. 3 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 USSR (MO).↩