Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

201. Memorandum of Conference with President Kennedy, July 18¹

July 18, 1963

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Rusk
• Secretary Ball
• Ambassador Thompson
• Mr. William Foster
• Mr. Bundy
• Mr. Smith

Prior to the arrival of the President, the group discussed Harriman’s reports and his request for instructions on several points. The comment was made that the Moscow delegation had “pact fever” and needed to be slowed down.

The President participated in a discussion of the three proposed versions of the withdrawal article (see attached paper). Mr. Bundy said that Ambassador Thompson, as well as the others present, agreed that the Soviets want a test ban agreement. Hence, if we wait, the Russians will accept what we want.

Mr. Ball said he doubted we could obtain Senate approval of the agreement if it contained the withdrawal clause proposed by the Russians. He felt that a withdrawal provision so broadly phrased would lead Senators to conclude that the treaty was illusory and that the commitment meant nothing if it could be denounced for reasons not connected with the test ban treaty at all. He added that when the Soviets resumed testing in 1961, their justification of their action was approximately the same as that proposed in the withdrawal clause.

The suggestion that Senators go to Moscow to sign the agreement led to several comments that many Senators would want to attend a signing ceremony.

The Harriman instructions were revised to reflect a more affirmative position on trade between the USSR and the West.

The President agreed to see Senator Pastors and to telephone Senator Anderson in an effort to reassure them about the course of negotiations and avoid their taking a position in opposition to the treaty before the negotiations had been concluded.

There followed a discussion of how to deal with the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President asked that the military disadvantages of the treaty be listed so that we would be in a better position to deal with opposition to the treaty based on military grounds. A suggestion to hold a Committee of Principals meeting with the Chiefs was not approved.

The instructions were amended to reflect the decision that Harriman was not authorized to agree to any summit meeting without further instructions from Washington.

In response to a question about the arms control plan which Khrushchev had mentioned to Harriman, Mr. Foster said the simplest way to describe what the Russians were talking about was to recall the Norstad plan. The proposal involved static control posts and did not involve the thinning out of military forces. It did involve a kind of neutralized zone, often described as the Rapaki plan.

In connection with the Khruschev proposal on reduction of military budgets, the President authorized the addition of a sentence, later approved by Secretary McNamara, which stated that if there is no increase in international tensions, it is our current expectation to put forward a 1964 military budget in the same range as that submitted for 1963.

Bromley Smith

1. Discussion of Moscow telegrams and revised instructions for Harriman. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test-Ban Negotiations, Harriman Trip.