170. Memorandum for the Record, February 191
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Meeting of the Principals Re Nuclear Testing, 10:30 a.m., February
18, 1963
PRESENT
- The President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Bundy, The Vice President, Mr. Fisher, Mr. McCone, Mr. Wiesner, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Mr. Hayworth
(From hand-written notes prepared by DCI)
Rusk opened discussion of paper.
McNamara agreed about 60
suspicious events a year—6 or 8 to 10 provide sufficiently high
probability to foreclose a significant test.
McCone—Report on
intelligence.
Fisher—Explained Annex B.
McNamara says table not
good.
Taylor—Four areas of doubts—i.e.
signals area, find spot, reach conclusion.
President—How big a test can be run—Fisher 4.2 at outset, later 4.0 and possibly 3.8.
Indicated 30 KT—McNamara and Wiesner 10/20 KT. Columns on Page 10 about agreed position and treaty
should be defended on basis of the lower limit of system.
Thompson thought numbers serious.
Sovs. never go above 5—areas important—Rusk does not wish to open up numbers.
Fisher—area problem—500
circular/300 eliptical.
[Typeset Page 459]
President—Rusk—Fisher—Wiesner—on question of black box—Wiesner says 0, AEC—0. Rusk—stay with?
Withdrawal clause.
Taylor—under threshold—firing
weapons—training reliability.
[Facsimile Page 2]
Attachment
February 18,
1963
With respect to the proposed test ban treaty, the U.S. position as
outlined in the ACDA dated
February 17 represents a departure in many respects from positions
taken previously by interested parties in the Administration and in
the Congress, including myself.
Paper accepts principle adopted about a year ago of total suspension,
thus eliminating the threshold. The rationale is that testing over
the threshold would be too risky because a series of tests would be
detected and anything less than a series would not be meaningful.
Secondly, there is a connotation that such testing would not affect
the balance of power from a nuclear standpoint.
I feel the Soviets could conduct a series of underground tests by
careful planning by the use of a number of geographic locations and
if they choose to do so, results obtained would be meaningful with
respect to their nuclear weapon know-how. I believe this can be done
without danger of detection from the system proposed or from other
sources including Attaché reports or clandestine resources.
With respect to the value of such tests to the USSR and to ourselves, it is
difficult for me to reach a conclusion that some benefits of a
military nature are not possible, or further improvement in weapon
technology. The National Laboratories
[Facsimile Page 3]
In other areas our position seems to lack realism. De Gaulle has announced a program
and will not, in my opinion, be deterred and our estimate of the
time required for him to develop satisfactory warheads for ballistic
missiles would be at least 1970 or later, not 1965.
The Chinese Communists, likewise, have informed Sir Harold Caccia they are pursuing a
program, that they will not be deterred and therefore we can expect
tests from that country at some time in the future.
[Facsimile Page 4]
[Typeset Page 460]
Attachment
February 17,
1963
SUBJECT
- U.S. Position for a Test Ban Treaty
Attached is a revised paper containing recommended U.S. Position in
the Geneva test ban negotiations for discussion at a meeting of the
Committee of Principals with the President at The White House on
Monday, February 18, 1963, at 10:30 a.m. The paper contains annexes
A, B, C, D. Annex C, entitled “An Elaboration of the Procedure for
Conducting an On-Site Inspection,” is not attached. It is not needed
for the February 18 meeting. It will be circulated later.
Adrian S.
Fisher
Acting Director
