171. Telegram 3127 from New York, February 251

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To Disarmament Del for Foster from Dean. RE: Arms Control. Fol is letter you requested with non-essential words eliminated:

QUOTE

Oyster Bay, N.Y.

February 23, 1963

Dear Mr. Foster:

You advised me by telephone on Saturday morning February 23, 1963 that at a recent plenary meeting of the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov of the USSR had stated in substance, that at a meeting between himself and myself in the fall of 1962 in New York, when we were both representing our respective governments at the United Nations (where I was Chairman of the US delegation to the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference and a member of the US delegation at the 17th UN General Assembly) I had stated that the US was willing to accept three automatic [Facsimile Page 2] stations on [Typeset Page 461] the territory of the Soviet Union and three on-site inspections of unidentified events by the International Commission to be set up under the proposed draft treaty to supervise the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov is mistaken. I never at any time agreed or suggested three automatic stations or three on-site inspections on USSR territory.

In all of the plenary meetings and meetings of the Subcommittee on the Cessation of Nuclear Testing and meetings between myself as Co-Chairman of the conference and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin or Ambassador Tsarapkin and in the First Committee of the General Assembly I carefully and painstakingly referred to the fundamental necessity of the USSR accepting the principle of on-site inspection (which the USSR had flatly rejected on November 28, 1961 after previous acceptance) and the US-UK requirements for (a) an appropriate number of internationally supervised, nationally manned and instrumented detection stations on the territory of the USSR and (b) an equally appropriate number of obligatory on-site inspections by teams appointed by the executive officer of the International Commission after certification of an unidentified event by the executive officer under the treaty pursuant to Article VIII of the draft treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests (ENDC/58) and that there was to be the unquestioned and unmistakable right to make an appropriate number of on-site inspections of otherwise unidentified events as set forth in Article VIII, subdivisions 6 and 11.

Under instructions of the Department of State I never at any time in Geneva or New York or elsewhere except as hereafter specified, made any mention of the number of detection stations or the number of on-site inspections of unidentified events [Facsimile Page 3] we would accept under the treaty we proposed on August 27, 1962. We were doing our level best, by adducing objective scientific information, to get the USSR to accept the principles of nationally manned detection stations under appropriate international supervision and of objective on-site inspection.

Until they did that there was no point in discussing numbers and we did not.

Sometime late in October, 1962—I can supply the exact date if that is important—I had a short conversation in New York with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in which I emphasized the extreme importance of the non-poliferation of nuclear weapons and of working out an adequate, workable and effective nuclear test ban treaty.

He asked, if we could accept two or three detection stations and two or three invitational on-site inspections on their territory, and I replied “emphatically no”, but that if they would accept the theory of [Typeset Page 462] properly instrumented, internationally supervised detection stations and obligatory on-site inspection they would find us reasonable.

The day after our election day he asked me for an appointment. Alex Akalovsky of the State Department and I went to see him and Mr. Timerbaev at their headquarters on 62nd Street, New York.

Based on the July 7, 1962 announcement of the US Department of Defense, I stated to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov that with improved instrumentation and trained personnel, and with a system of internationally supervised but nationally manned detection stations, there would be fewer unidentified earthquakes in each year. But I said that we still could not identify a nuclear event positively by distant instrumentation alone, that we ought to be able to solve to our mutual satis[Facsimile Page 4]faction the problem of so-called espionage occurring on “on-site inspection trips” by the international commission personnel, that there would have to be a reasonable scientific relationship between the number of unidentified events and the number of annual on-site inspections in any one year and that this would have to be reviewed on the basis of scientific evidence.

I referred specifically to our proposal at the 23rd subcommittee meeting on August 9, 1962, and to our proposed treaty of August 27, 1962 (ENDC/58) and to my statements in plenary in Geneva on September 4, 1962 that the number of control posts would be substantially fewer than the 21 or 19 control posts we had proposed in the past.

I then repeated what I had said there, that if we can work out the question on obligatory on-site inspection to our mutual satisfaction there should be no difficulty in reaching agreement on the number of nationally manned, internationally supervised detection posts to be accepted by each of the nuclear powers, parties to the treaty. And that these two features, nationally manned, internationally supervised detection stations and reduced number of detection or control stations represented, in our August 27, 1962 draft, significant changes from the United Kingdom-United States 18 April 1961 draft treaty.

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Mr. Kuznetsov rejected the scientific relationship between the number of annual on-site inspections and said national detection systems were entirely sufficient both to detect, locate and identify all nuclear events and that no international supervision of detection posts or on-site inspections were necessary.

I explained that “appropriate international supervision” meant the physical presence of international supervision personnel at each of the detection stations on the territory of the Soviet Union.

He read out loud to me, in English, a memorandum from Chairman Khrushchev demanding a maximum of two or three automatic stations on their territory and not over two or three invitational on-site inspec[Typeset Page 463]tions. Or at least the language sounded so hedged it wasn’t clear, as he read it, whether the inspection teams to be appointed by the executive officer under the treaty (Article VIII, subdivisions 6 and 11) would have the unquestioned right to make an inspection of an unidentified event or not.

I told him this was unacceptable to us.

He said that I had, in an earlier conversation, said a “small” number of nationally manned but internationally supervised stations and a small number of on-site inspections.

Even though they had not accepted the principle of obligatory [Facsimile Page 6] on-site inspection, I decided the time had come to be specific about what “small” meant. I reminded him that their scientists had earlier claimed there were not over 60 unidentified events per annum in the Soviet Union whereas ours had said there were many more than that, but on the basis of one inspection for five unidentified events, if their scientists were correct, we had said we would take twelve on-site inspections but that if ours were right, we would want a maximum of twenty on-site inspections with one more than twelve for each five additional unidentified events above sixty and up to one hundred.

I said we could reduce the figure of twelve, previously mentioned, somewhat because of our Vela Research Programme and the Scientific criteria set forth in the draft treaty but nearer to the vicinity of eight to ten than to two or three, the figure he mentioned.

I said further I had no authority whatsoever to accept three automatic stations or indeed any automatic stations, as to the efficiency of which I was not advised, and that we wanted nearer ten nationally manned but internationally supervised detection stations with a reasonable amount of international supervision.

He said this was out of the question. I then said and repeated that the two or three stations or two or three on-site inspections he mentioned was equally out of the question. I asked him to adduce objective supporting scientific evidence as to the ability of national detection stations to identify nuclear events which he said would only prolong the discussions and was not necessary.

He again urged me to accept two or three stations and two or three inspections and I told him frankly we could not accept this and he said he wanted to be equally frank and they [Facsimile Page 7] would never agree to anything like eight to ten detection stations or on-site inspections.

There can’t possibly be any misunderstanding about this because the discussion as to numbers was very clear and explicit.

I then entered into a discussion of where earthquakes, according to Soviet statistics, occurred in the Soviet Union.

I said, according to their statistics, most of the earthquakes took place under the ocean south of the Kamchatka Peninsula and on that [Typeset Page 464] peninsula, in the Pamir region, west of Outer Mongolia and in the region of the USSR northeast of Turkey, with the rest of the earthquakes being scattered.

I said we would be glad to have our scientists consider with their scientists the possibility of dividing, on the basis of accepted scientific evidence, the USSR into seismic and non-seismic areas and the placing of most of the detection stations in quiet areas calculated to produce the best detection, location and identification results, and that I thought our scientists and theirs could prorate the detection stations in their territory so that only a few would be in the heartland of the USSR. And if they conducted no nuclear events we could probably also prorate the number of on-site inspections in like manner.

He again indicated very clearly they would only accept two or three automatic stations for the entire USSR territory, so the question of prorating was uninteresting.

I again said we were willing to explore all aspects of the problem scientifically but his statement as to numbers was quite unacceptable. I was very clear on this.

He said “then there can be no agreement.”

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I said, if there were only two or three on-site inspections with twelve months in the year, there would really only be one—as we could never be without any—and if we used one, there would always be a great debate whether we could really use the remaining two, and then I stated the number of on-site inspections would have to bear a reasonable relationship to the number of unidentified events in any year and that it would probably have to be a minimum of around eight to ten and that the number of two or three was completely unrealistic and not in accordance with the scientific criteria set out in the draft treaty (ENDC/58).

I also make it quite clear that I had no instructions about automatic stations and that I was highly skeptical of the so called Pugwash reports with respect to such stations as there were no trained US seismologists at this conference.

He then asked for an earthquake map of the USSR on the basis of the Soviet earthquake statistics I had mentioned.

I reported the conversation to the Department of State and stated clearly that I had urged him to accept a number of internationally supervised and properly instrumented and located detection stations nearer to eight to ten than the two or three which he had demanded.

Subsequently on instructions from the Department of State, I sent to him a map of the Soviet Union, divided up into earthquake and non earthquake areas, based on official Soviet statistics, but we had no further conversation in New York and other than the debate in the [Typeset Page 465] First Committee which resulted in Resolution XVII 1732 A and B, the subject was not taken up again.

Upon my return to Geneva on November 20, 1962 to December 21, 1962 I continued to expound the American position, all [Facsimile Page 9] of which is reflected in the verbatim records.

On January 20, 1963, I told Ambassador Tsarapkin and Mr. Voronshov we would have to have a minimum of eight to ten internationally supervised detection stations and an equal number of obligatory on-site inspections.

I have never at any time or at any place reduced these figures.

I would hope that you can place this letter in the record of the Geneva Conference.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur H. Dean

UNQUOTE

Plimpton
  1. Transmits text of February 23 letter from Dean to Foster regarding Dean’s conversation with Soviet Deputy FonMin Kuznetsov in New York on number of automatic stations on Soviet territory. Confidential. 9 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 SWITZ (GE).