Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

169. Todis 806 to Geneva, February 18¹

February 18, 1963

Following instructions cleared as result of meeting of interested principals with President February 18.

You should indicate to Kuznetsov in private meeting that US has several specific points to make on substance of a test ban treaty.

1. US proposes that on-site inspections be carried out within an agreed upon time sequence and under an agreed procedure with inspections in USSR of seismic events designated by US and UK, with US-UK selection of events, and conducted by 70 percent US/UK nationals and 30 percent nationals from non-NATO and non-Warsaw Pact nations with provision for an equal number of USSR observers. (FYI: Present thinking is that the Inspection Team should include fourteen US-UK technical experts plus the number needed for support and drilling operations, if the latter are required. The drilling operations will require an additional number of people depending upon the area, etc. END FYI.) Chief of team would be US or UK national. In designating seismic events for inspection in USSR, the US–UK would submit seismic data from four seismic stations to establish location of event, which it may want to inspect together with a statement that it could not identify the event as natural in origin under criteria contained in para 3 of Article VIII of August 27, 1962 comprehensive treaty draft. USSR would be responsible for supplying all heavy transportation equipment, e.g., helicopters, trucks, for inspection in USSR. Reverse procedures would apply for inspections in US or UK.

2. Review of scientific problems in determination of locating epicenter indicates area can be reduced to an area of 500 square kilometers specified as an elipse with a semi-major axis of a maximum of 15 kilometers.

3. In USSR the US would supply sealed recorders and certain sealed instruments for the automatic recording stations which would be built according to specifications agreed to by US, UK and USSR and for which USSR would have certain responsibilities for maintenance. Sealed recorder would be picked up and checked by non-Soviet personnel maximum of eight times a year. Data from these stations would also be recorded outside the station by a recording device identical to the one within and this data obtained outside would be picked up and transmitted regularly, e.g., once a week by Soviet personnel to International Commission for use there and for transmission to other side. Reverse situation pertains for such stations in US. US proposes seven such stations be located in US and USSR.

4. US, after further study of question of on-site inspection quota, believes that if the procedures for on-site inspection, along the lines indicated, are acceptable to Soviet Union and can be agreed on in more detail the US would accept a quota of seven on-site inspections annually on the territories of the US and the USSR.

5. US in making these proposals hopes they will be acceptable to Soviet Union and negotiations for drafting treaty can proceed without delay.

We have notified foregoing to British Embassy to inform UK FONOFF. Subject to FONOFF approval, these proposals can be notified to USSR at your meeting on Tuesday, 10 am as joint US/UK views, such approval to be notified to you by your UK colleague in Geneva. In absence of such notification these proposals should be put forward as US proposals.

You should emphasize that the US does not intend to confirm its proposals publicly until there are indications of moving toward an agreement.

Following are additional instructions on the conduct of on-site inspections for use as appropriate.

Discussion is in terms of US–UK requesting an inspection in Soviet Union; obviously same procedure would apply in reverse case.

1. US–UK would submit seismic data to International Commission regarding unidentified seismic event no later than 60 days after event had occurred. Data must be sufficient to locate event, i.e., must include clearly measurable arrival times from four stations, and must include a statement from US–UK that the data do not indicate the event has been identified as natural in origin using criteria specified in treaty.

2. Soviet Union would have seven days in which to present any supplementary information regarding event. Any other data not previously available, such as data from automatic recording seismic stations, must also be submitted within seven days; longer time may be permitted by mutual agreement, due to emergency situations.

3. US–UK would decide within seven days from the receipt of the extra data whether to designate the event for an on-site inspection. The designation would include the location and a description of the area to be inspected as well as the manner in which the inspection team planned to arrive at the port of entry.

4. Soviet Union would have five days in which to notify the Commission of its arrangements for receiving the inspection. Soviet transportation would be used to take the team to the site of the inspection team’s headquarters.

5. The Soviet Union could exclude from inspection a building located within the area to be inspected, which the Soviet Union explained, in a report, must be excluded on the grounds it was a sensitive defense installation. An abuse of the exclusion provision would be considered a violation of the terms of the treaty.

6. The maximum size of the area to be inspected would be 500 square kilometers specified as an elipse with a semi-major axis of a maximum of 15 kilometers.

7. Composition of surface inspection teams for Soviet Union would be 20 persons, including 14 US–UK nationals as technicians and 6 nationals from non-NATO and non-Warsaw Pact countries selected by Commission on recommendation of administrative officer. Chief of team would be US or UK national. Soviet Union would have number of observers equal to total number of inspection team.

8. Inspection team would have maximum of six weeks to complete its surface inspection including low level helicopter flights; this could be delayed by mutual agreement. If drilling was considered necessary, notification of this need would be given within five weeks from start of inspection, would include provision for additional persons, to be agreed upon, and must be completed within a specified time period (FYI: Time period under consideration for drilling is 3–6 months. END FYI) from the time of arrival of the drilling equipment; such equipment must arrive by end of sixth week from start of surface inspection.

9. Report of inspection team would be made no later than 30 days after team had completed its inspection.

Rusk

1. Negotiating instructions on substance of a test ban treaty. Confidential. 6 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 SWITZ (GE).