Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Address of the President to Congress December 2, 1913

File No. 893.00/1529a.

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Department of State,
Washington, February 4, 1913.

My Dear Senator Cullom: Referring to your conversation this morning with Mr. Huntington Wilson, I have the honor to enclose herewith for your personal information a memorandum which I trust will give the information you desire on the status of the question of the recognition of China.

Very sincerely yours,

P. C. Knox.

[Inclosure.]

Memorandum on the recognition of the “Republican Government of China.”

The joint resolution providing for the immediate recognition of the Republican Government of China, introduced by Senator Bacon on January 2 (S. J. R. 146)¹ raises important questions of fact, law, and policy.

The resolution provides that—

Whereas the people of China have asserted the right of self-government, and in pursuance thereof have thrown off the rule of monarchy and sought to establish for themselves a representative republican Government: and

Whereas in the time which has elapsed since the establishment of their present republican Government satisfactory evidence has been given that a permanent and stable Government has been established and will be maintained: Therefore be it

Resolved, etc., That the present republican Government of China is hereby recognized by the United States of America, with all the powers and privileges of their intercourse and relations with this Government properly appertaining to and in general extended to independent and sovereign governments and nations.

The resolution is based upon the assumption that the present Government of China is, in point of fact, “representative”, “permanent”, and “stable” whereas the information received by the Department, both from its own representatives and by a comparison of views with other governments having large interests in China, goes to show that while it may be republican in principle the Government as at present constituted can not be considered truly representative; that it does not claim to be permanent; and that its stability is open to serious question.

i. facts.

The present Government of China is admittedly a provisional one formed to conduct the affairs of state until the meeting of the representative Constitutional Assembly which is to be soon convened for the purpose of adopting a permanent constitution and governmental organization which may be accepted as truly expressive of the will of the people.

The development and character of the existing Provisional Government in China may be briefly described as follows:

Early in the disturbances the revolutionary military leaders in the various Yangtze Provinces and in southern China established a cabinet form of government with Nanking as headquarters, and convoked in that city an assembly composed of their special representatives. On December 29¹ this assembly unanimously elected Sun Yat Sen Provisional President of the Republic of China and he was inaugurated as such on New Year’s Day at that city. On February 12² the Throne abdicated in favor of a republican form of government, at the same time conferring on Yuan Shih-kai full power to organize such a government. Three days later Yuan was unanimously elected Provisional President by the Nanking Assembly and the resignation of Sun and his Cabinet was accepted by the Assembly to take effect on the inauguration of Yuan, which took place at Peking on March 10.

On February 13 the American minister at Peking was officially informed that the Chinese minister accredited to the Government of the United States would continue in the discharge of his functions under the designation “provisional diplomatic agent.”

On March 10, the date of Yuan’s inauguration, a provisional constitution, previously approved by the Peking authorities, was adopted by the Nanking Assembly providing that within 10 months after its promulgation the Provisional President should convene a representative national assembly to adopt a permanent constitution and elect a president, thereby providing for the normal establishment of constitutional government. In the meantime the authority of the State was to be exercised by an Advisory Council, the Provisional President, and his Cabinet.

The character and composition of the Nanking Assembly, which exercised such liberal powers on behalf of the 400,000,000 Chinese people, was indicated in a memorandum received through official channels, based upon information furnished by a member of the Nanking Government. From this memorandum dated March 19, 1912, it appears that the total membership of the Assembly was 34, and the Provinces and outer dependencies were represented as follows:

Kweichou	2
Szechwan	3
Funkien	3
Kwangtung	3
Kwangsi	3
Chekiang	3
Honan	2
Chihli	1
Anhwei	1
Hunan	3
Shansi	2
Shensi	1
Fengtien	1
Yunnan	1
Shantung	2
Hupeh	0
Kansu	0
Sinkiang	0
Kirin	0
Heilungkiang	0
Inner Mongolia	0
Outer Mongolia	0
Ch’inghai	0
Tibet	0
Total	34

Hupeh and Kiangsu formerly sent three delegates each, but all had resigned. Shensi originally appointed three. One failed to attend and one had resigned. Shansi originally appointed three, but only two reported at Nanking. Che-kiang originally had three delegates, but one resigned. None of the members was regularly elected by the people of the respective Provinces. Some seem to have been self-appointed. Some were selected by the provincial assemblies and some appointed by the “Tu-tu”, or military governor. The memorandum adds:

The Assembly seems to have taken itself very seriously, but it is difficult to see how it can be considered really representative.

Early in May, after the formation of a coalition government under Yuan, the Department telegraphed the Legation at Peking to report promptly as to how far, in the judgment of the Legation, and in the light of the more recent reports from our consuls, the situation in China was responsive to the conditions of recognition of governments under international law and specifically in what respects the Provisional Government still fell short of the requirements. In reply the Department received the following telegram, dated May 7.¹

In July the Department addressed a circular telegram² to all the principal powers having important interests in China inquiring their disposition toward the question of recognition, based upon the information they had received from their representatives as to existing conditions in China. The governments were unanimous in replying³ that, in the light of their reports, they did not regard conditions such as to warrant the consideration of the question of the formal recognition of the present Government until the assurance of its permanent stability should be of a more promising, nature and until it should itself have been confirmed by the vote of the National Assembly convoked for the purpose and regularly invested with authority to express the will of the people.

In July, during a cabinet crisis precipitated by the sudden resignation of the Premier, Tong Shao-yi, President Yuan issued a public proclamation in which he declared that the Republic was not yet established; its foundations were yet insecure; and that it could hardly stand any political storm. The situation was so critical that he succeeded in getting a new cabinet confirmed by the Advisory Council only by a show of military force. During the past few months the situation, while gradually improving, has not changed in any material respect save that the elections have been going on for the members of the new National Assembly, which is soon to be convened, probably in February or March. According to the latest official advices from Peking the date has not been definitely fixed, although the Provisional Constitution provides that it should meet not later than January 10.

It was upon these grounds that the President in his annual message⁴ stated that—

During the formative constitutional stage and pending definitive action by the assembly, as expressive of the popular will, and the hoped-for establishment of a stable republican form of government, capable of fulfilling its international obligations, the United States is, according to precedent, maintaining full and friendly de facto relations with the Provisional Government.

ii. law.

In introducing the resolution Senator Bacon spoke as follows:⁵

It has been a subject matter of discussion almost ever since the foundation of this Government as to whether the function of the recognition of an independent government, or, when there has been a change in government, the recognition of the stability and authority of a government is a function which belongs to the executive or to the legislative branch of the Government. When I say “legislative” I should properly say the lawmaking branch of the Government, which includes both the two Houses and the President.

By some it is contended, and has been contended with much earnestness, that it is a function which exclusively belongs to the executive branch of the Government, whereas by others it has been contended with equal earnestness that it belongs to the law-making power of the Government. I believe the more conservative view is that which is represented by the opinion of many, that the initiative can be taken by either the Executive alone or by the law-making power, embracing the joint action of both the legislative and the executive branches of the Government—the Congress and the President—acting in a legislative capacity. In my opinion, the ultimate power of decision is with the law-making power, and where the final action in such case has been taken by the Executive it has been final through the acquiescence and approval of the Congress. But without now stopping to discuss the question I simply make the statement in order that my attitude may not be misunderstood in introducing the joint resolution. I move that it be referred to the Committe on Foreign Relations.

In regard to this aspect of the question it is perhaps sufficient to point out that Mr. Moore, in his International Law Digest, sums up some 170 pages of precedent and opinions in the following words:

In the preceding review of the recognition, respectively, of new states, new governments, and belligerency, there has been made in each case a precise statement of facts, showing how and by whom the recognition was accorded. In every ease, as it appears, of a new government and of belligerency, the question of recognition was determined solely by the Executive. [Vol. 1, p. 243.]

It should be noted that in the case of China the question involved is the recognition of a new Government and not a new State.

In a “Memorandum upon the Power to Recognize the Independence of a New Foreign State,” presented to the Senate in January, 1897, by Mr. Hale (see Senate Document No. 56, Fifty-fourth Congress, second session) the statement is made that—

It will be shown, both by the terms of the Constitution itself and by the uniform practice thereunder, that the recognition of independence of a new foreign power is an act of the Executive (President alone, or President and Senate), and not of the legislative branch of the Government, although the executive branch may properly first consult the legislative.

Speaking on the proposition “That the power to recognize belligerency or independence of a foreign government is executive in its nature has been recognized by the weight of authority in Congress, and almost without exception by the executive branch”, the report continues:

Acquiescence by Congress.—It is entirely erroneous to suppose that the present question is a novel one. The boundaries between the legislative and executive powers in relation to foreign affairs have been debated since the very foundation of the Government. The right to recognize the independence of a foreign state was discussed with great ability at the time of the Smith American revolutions, and received some attention again at the time of the revolution in Texas. The weight of authority, legislative as well as executive, was strongly against the right of Congress to interfere. In each case the President, when the time came for recognition, acted in concert with Congress, for the Obvious reason that affirmative action might involve the nation in war, and thus force Congress to make large appropriations and otherwise assist in the settlement of the controversy thus opened. The question has occasionally arisen since for discussion, as in 1864 and 1877. It has never been fully debated, however, since the time of Monroe.

The number of Instances in which the Executive has recognized a new foreign power without consulting Congress (because not anticipating consequences which made such consultation necessary) has been very great. No objection has been made by Congress in any of these Instances. The legislative power has thus for 100 years impliedly confirmed the view that the right to recognize a new foreign government belonged to the Executive; and if it is correct doctrine that the same power can not be exercised for the same purposes by two different branches of the Government, this implied approval is conclusive of the whole present controversy.

iii. policy.

The matter of policy involves the question as to the wisest and most effective way, in according recognition, to safeguard foreign interests and the best interests of China itself. It is desirable that in this, as in other matters concerning China, there should be harmonious action among the powers most vitally interested. The situation is not an ordinary one. It presents the spectacle of about one-fourth of the world’s population overturning a form of government that has been the religion of the people and the supreme expression of their civilization for over 4,000 years.

A new condition of affairs has been created in China which presents many serious and complicated problems, both of internal rehabilitation and of international relations, which will require much time and patience to solve. The establishment of orderly and stable government must necessarily proceed slowly and by degrees. The efforts of this Government have therefore been directed primarily toward securing, if possible, such a sympathetic and just cooperation among the powers as would not only best protect their own interests but would also safeguard the welfare of China. While these efforts have involved no commitment on the part of this Government to the prejudice of such freedom of action on our part as might at any time seem best or necessary in the carrying out of our historic policies in China, it should be noted that in the exchange of views with the interested foreign governments in July last a majority concurred in the opinion that the best results, both for China and the powers, could be obtained only by the harmonious action of the governments largely interested.

When the elective National Assembly of China convenes, the question will arise as to whether this Government shall take cognisance of the first definitive act of this constituent assembly in declaring by proclamation or otherwise that it adopts a republican form of government, or whether we shall wait until the constitution has been adopted and the new Government formally established in accordance therewith.

Our latest precedent—that of Portugal¹—is in favor of the first course, and our precedents generally may be said to the in favor of the earliest recognition consistent with the usual standards of international law and our national interests.

On the other hand, it seems quite certain that none of the other government, with the possible exception of Germany, would be inclined to join us in such recognition before the constitution had been adopted and the new Government fully established in accordance therewith, at which time Great Britain and France as well as Germany might be willing to join us, while it is probable that Japan and Russia would desire, if possible, to delay action still further by demanding certain formal guaranties of the rights of foreigners acquired by treaty or usage.

The position taken in the President’s message quoted above is broad enough to cover either of these courses.

The question, therefore, becomes one of policy and the choice would be between, on the one hand, acting in accordance with our precedents and getting for this administration any advantage that might be attached to the prompt recognition of the Republic and, on the other hand, consistently adhering to our policy of cooperation, which we believe has thus far been to the best interests of China.

It is possible that by adopting the second alternative we might reach a definite understanding with England, France, and Germany that they would act with us without further delay when the new Government had been regularly established, in which case Japan and Russia also doubtless would join. Should we act independently on the first alternative it is quite probable that England and France would then wait until their allies, Japan and Russia, were ready to act and general recognition by the powers, which would be of the greatest value to China, would be thereby considerably delayed. Any understanding such as that above mentioned, unless it could be acted upon before March 4, might be an embarrassment to the next administration.

A third possibility would be simply to stand by the position taken in the message and await developments without either taking cognizance of any preliminary proclamation or making any attempt at an understanding with the other powers, allowing the question, if necessary, to go over to the next administration.

If the first alternative be adopted, it seems that we would be bound in courtesy to give sufficient previous notice of our intention to the other governments with which we have thus far been cooperating to allow them, if they chose, to act simultaneously with us.

1. Cong’l Rec., Jan. 2, 1913, p. 914.
1. 1911.
2. 1912.
1. See For. Rel. 1912, p. 78.
2. Id. p. 81.
3. Id. pp. 82–85.
4. Id. p. XXI, last line.
5. Congressional Record, Jan. 2, 1913, p. 914.
1. See For. Rel. 1911, p. 689