File No. 837.156/138.
The American Minister to
the Secretary of State.
No. 637.]
American Legation,
Habana
,
February 26, 1913
.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt
of the Department’s instruction No. 195 of the 13th instant concerning
the Habana-Casa Grande bridge project, and to transmit herewith enclosed
copy of a note, which, in pursuance of the Department’s instructions, I
addressed to the Cuban Government on the 24th instant.
On that day Mr. J. A. L. Waddell, representing the firm of Waddell and
Harrington, who appear now to be the promoters of the project, called at
the Legation and stated that, as he did not consider our objections to
the project valid and reasonable, he intended to go ahead “and put the
project through despite the objections of the American Government.”
The Legation did not endeavor to enter into a discussion with him as it
did not consider it within its province, but, at his request, agreed to
inform the Department of his intention of going ahead with the
construction of the bridge.
I have [etc.]
[Page 378]
[Inclosure.]
The American Minister
to the Cuban Secretary of State.
No. 501.]
American Legation,
Habana
,
February 24, 1913
.
Your Excellency: Referring to your
excellency’s confidential note No. 9 of January 24, 1913, in regard
to a concession for a bridge across Habana harbor, I have the honor
to inform your excellency that my Government has now completed its
study of the matter, as a result of which it is convinced that the
project is inadmissably detrimental to the vital interests of both
Governments, and I am instructed accordingly to express to your
excellency’s Government the confident hope that appropriate measures
will be taken to prevent its execution.
The project is objectionable upon the following principal grounds
among others of less import:
- 1.
-
Location of piers.—The channel of
Habana harbor is already very narrow for existing traffic.
The immediate effect on the location of bridge-piers in the
shallower water on either side of the channel will be to
divert to the main channel, and thus further congest it,
small vessels which can now use the shallower water. The
inadequacy of the channel will be further accentuated by the
progressive increase in the volume of oversea traffic, and
in the size of vessels calling at Habana, particularly after
the opening of the Panama Canal. For these reasons the
widening of the channel will in all likelihood eventually be
found necessary, but obviously could not be accomplished
with bridge-piers occupying the space available for the
purpose. In this connection attention is invited to a
project formulated, after an exhaustive study of the matter,
by a board of engineers appointed for the purpose,
contemplating certain needed improvements in the littoral
between La Fuerza and the Punta. This project was formally
sanctioned by the Provisional Governor of Cuba on November
19, 1908, and is described on pages 348 and 349 of Governor
Magoon’s report for the period between December 1, 1907, and
December 1, 1908, and a map is inserted opposite page 390 of
the same document. These improvements would seem to be of
greater moment to the public welfare than a bridge across
the harbor of doubtful or unproven necessity.
- 2.
-
Clearance under bridge.—It seems that
as the bridge is now planned the clear (maximum) height from
water-level is but 150 feet. While it is true that none of
the vessels which regularly call at this port now require a
greater clearance, there is a marked tendency to increase,
and during the past two tourist seasons larger ships have
come here than a few years before had been thought likely.
The larger modem vessels plying between European ports and
the United States have a mast height of from 156 to 212
feet, and there is a general tendency to increase the height
of wireless-telegraph masts. After the Panama Canal is
opened much larger vessels will regularly call at this port
than at present.
- 3.
-
Danger of bridge.—The possibility
that the bridge might, through accident or design, be
dropped into the harbor, and thus completely block egress
and ingress, is regarded by my Government as one of the
serious disadvantages of the project—a compelling
consideration, in fact, which outweighs in itself any
advantages which friends of the bridge might claim for it.
In case of war no more effectual nor an easier method could
be found to blockade the harbor.
- 4.
-
Cabaña Military Reservation.—The
alienation of the excellent military reservation back of
Cabaña fortress must, upon mature reflection, seem to the
Cuban Government, as it does to my own, very ill-advised.
This is the only State land close to the city suitable for a
military encampment, and it is necessary, moreover, as a
field of fire for the Cabana and Morro fortresses; for,
while the fortresses themselves are out of date, new
defenses for this harbor will eventually be required on this
reservation, and none of it ought, therefore, to be
alienated from the State.
There are other considerations scarcely less compelling than the
foregoing—such, for instance, as the marring effect which a bridge
across the entrance to Habana harbor would have upon its enviable
and universally admired beauty and picturesqueness—into which I need
hardly enter.
The friends of this bridge may cite, in attempted refutation of these
arguments, the examples of bridges in other ports of the world; but
they can hardly point to a bridge across the very
entrance of a harbor of the commercial and naval importance
of Habana.
[Page 379]
It has been suggested that under the Constitution and laws of Cuba
the Executive could not legally annul this concession. I understand,
however, that it is a well-established principle of Spanish, and
consequently of Cuban, jurisprudence that the Government may at time
revoke or annul a contract or concession, not alone for infraction,
of any of its terms or conditions by the party or concessionaire but
merely on grounds of public interest or convenience; for the rule is
universally accepted that a State may rectify its errors even at the
cost or inconvenience of another, because, as distinguished from the
errors of a private party, they affect the general public interest.
The fact that in this case the concession was authorized by an act
of Congress should have little or no bearing; for, after all, the
Congress merely authorized the Executive to exceed a power already
vested in him by the laws in force; that is to say, to grant, in
addition to the bridge concession, certain public lands desired by
the concessionaire. Thus viewed, this special act of Congress is no
more mandatory than the Law of Waters or other general laws
ordinarily applicable.
I avail [etc.]
