Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Address of the President to Congress December 2, 1913

File No. 71.1.21/139.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

No. 135.]

American Legation,
Bogotá, February 5, 1913.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a brief statement concerning the preliminary conversation about the suggestions which I was instructed to present to the Colombian Government for the purpose of securing if possible, an adjustment of the differences between the two countries. As I notified the Department by cable, the Colombian Government firmly refused to agree to the completion of the Tripartite Treaties, and after the second preliminary conference the Foreign Office informally notified me that the Atrato concession, the perpetual lease of the islands, and the arbitration suggestions were not acceptable to the Colombian Government. Believing that the objection to the arbitration suggestion might be overcome, I cabled the Department asking that the suggestion concerning the Atrato concession and the perpetual lease of the islands of San Andreas and Providencia might be changed into a suggestion for an option on the Atrato route and a privilege for coaling stations on the islands. The Department’s answer to that cable was of such a character that I felt free to have a preliminary conversation along the lines suggested, always bearing in mind that a long time option must be granted if the sum of $10,000,000 were to be paid.

As the original suggestion of a “concession” for a canal on the Atrato route, and a “perpetual lease” of the islands of San Andreas and Providencia could not be considered by the Colombian Government I have eliminated those suggestions from the inclosed report and substituted the modified suggestions that are now under informal consideration. It will be noted that in my explanation of time limit of the option, I have used the term seventy five years simply as an argument to show to the Colombian Government what the revenue from such a large sum means when the interest on the sum is taken into consideration, and not that a seventy five years’ option would be acceptable. The explanation of the “advantages” which would come to Colombia, should she propose the ideas embodied in this statement for our consideration, has been necessary in order to assist those directly interested to grasp the great value of the generous position taken by the United States Government in its desired adjustment of the pending differences.

What the outcome of these conferences will be is still uncertain. Beyond the per adventure of a doubt word has reached headquarters here from the United States that the Democratic administration “should have the prestige” of a settlement between the two countries and will make a much more generous arrangement than the present administration can possibly offer. I have tried to impress upon those in authority here that the policy of the Department on general principles is unaffected by a change of administration, that it always remains true to the broadest lines of treatment of all nations, and that, while I have no authority to speak for the incoming administration, still it is difficult to conceive of any plan it could adopt that would be more just and honorable and generous than the one now under consideration, and which, at the same time, would meet with the approval of the American people. Whatever happens the Department of State has now suggested a settlement which for liberality, practicability and deference to the susceptibilities of the Colombian people, must challenge the admiration and sympathy of all right thinking persons no matter what their nationality may be. I hope that the Colombian authorities may find it possible to arrange a settlement on the lines now proposed, and I suggest that if the Department deems it proper the statement herewith inclosed might be published, provided Colombia refuses to treat along these lines; notice of such refusal would of course be cabled to the Department as soon as it is known here. It would prove to the world that the United States has made a sincere and honest endeavor along broad and generous lines to render every possible justice to the Republic of Colombia whose ancient friendship our country would rejoice to see renewed.

I am inclosing a statement which I may, if in the end I deem wise, present to the Foreign Office as purely an informal explanation of the advantages to Colombia contained in the suggestions.

I wish respectfully to call the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that the mention of the “option” and the “privilege” contained in the enclosed statements are simply and purely informal suggestions not to be seriously considered until I have the approval of the Department.

I have [etc.]

James T. Du Bois.

[Inclosure 1.]

Statement of the American Minister regarding the preliminary conversations with the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia looking to an adjustment of the differences between the United States and Colombia.

While the United States has for years earnestly desired to put an end to the ill-feeling of Colombia arising out of the loss of Panamá, it has always been met on the part of Colombia by a demand for arbitration, but as the United States is unalterably opposed to submitting its political acts to the consideration of arbitral tribunals it has never been able to reach a settlement. On the 20th day of October, 1912, Minister Du Bois, while on a leave of absence, submitted to the Department of State a report which contained the welcomed information that Colombia was ready to enter into direct negotiations for the adjustment of her differences with this country. The Department of State promptly considered the new situation and feeling that the friendly relations established by Minister Du Bois with the Government and people of Colombia had created a good atmosphere in which to discuss an arrangement, he was instructed to proceed to Bogota and take up the question with the Colombian authorities. He was instructed to hold preliminary conferences upon five distinct suggestions.

The first was the completion of the Root-Cortes and the Cortes-Arosemena Treaties by Colombia. Both these treaties had already been ratified by the United States Senate.

The second, an option to construct a canal over the Atrato route and the privilege of coaling stations on the Islands of San Andreas and Providencia, for which the United States would pay ten millions of dollars.

The third, the United States would offer its good offices to settle the boundary line and other disputes between Colombia and Panamá.

The fourth, the arbitration by a tribunal to be constituted for that purpose of the material claims of Colombia respecting the reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad.

The fifth, a supplementary canal treaty, amendatory of the Root-Cortes treaty, removing all the features which were objectionable to Colombia in the Root-Cortes Treaty, asking of Colombia only the right of refuge for vessels in distress, which is an international right, and giving to Colombia extraordinary preferential rights on the Panamá Canal.

Minister Du Bois was instructed not to enter into actual negotiations until the Colombian authorities had approved of the foregoing suggestions and the Department had been notified and had instructed him to proceed with the negotiations.

Minister Du Bois arrived in Bogotá on January 15, 1913, and was received by the Government and people with kindness and marked cordiality. Two days afterwards he called on Minister Carreño, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by Mr. Leland Harrison, the Secretary of the Legation. After being kindly received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Du Bois expressed a wish to pay his respects to President Restrepo. On the 20th of January the carriage of the President of the Republic called at the American Legation and together with Minister Carreho, Secretary Harrison and Mr. Montejo, the American Minister went to the palace, where he was most cordially received by the President.

Minister Du Bois informed the President that if Colombia were inclined to enter upon direct negotiations with the United States for a settlement of her differences, he was empowered to take preliminary steps to that end. The President said that Colombia desired an honorable and just arrangement with the United States and was ready to consider the important question. The American Minister, in as informal and discreet a manner as possible, asked the President if Colombia had yet reached that point where she would be willing to complete the tripartite treaties. Without the least hesitation and with firmness the President said, “Those treaties could not be ratified by the Colombian Congress, and I cannot and will not recommend their completion.” He thoughtfully added, “The recognition of Panamá by Colombia, however, may follow an honorable treaty with the United States as a natural consequence.”

A conference with Minister Carreño was then arranged to take place at the Foreign Office five days later, the 25th of January, for a preliminary consideration of the subject. In the meantime Mr. Du Bois notified the Department of the attitude of the Colombian Government toward the tripartite treaties and was instructed to proceed with the remaining four suggestions.

The first was that the United States would pay to Colombia $10,000,000 for an option giving the right to build an interoceanic waterway on the Atrato route and for the privilege of establishing coaling stations on the Islands of San Andreas and Providencia.

Minister Du Bois carefully explained the advantages to Colombia of these two suggestions as follows:

If the canal were ever built under this option, Colombia would have an interoceanic waterway within her own undisputed borders and over which her sovereignty would be absolute and inviolable. As the construction of the canal was left equally at the discretions of both nations, if the time should come within the limit of the option when the commerce of the world demanded the opening of this new waterway, a treaty as to the details of construction and operation would have to be negotiated, signed and ratified by both countries before it would be valid. If the canal were not constructed within the time limit of the option, Colombia would have received $10,000,000 which, with 5% interest during the option, say 75 years, would bring to the treasury of Colombia the large total of $47,500,000. Should the canal be built, Colombia would, in addition, be the recipient of an annual rental of a handsome sum as well as the beneficiary of liberal special privileges on the canal during its operation. Such a canal, if built, would bring both nations into intimate and important relationship, give to Colombia great advantages over all other countries, and afford her a strategic position of inestimable value by connecting her coast lines on either ocean with a great waterway.

In this suggestion, therefore, is much that made for the welfare of Colombia and nothing that could by the widest stretch of the imagination be justly considered as wounding the susceptibilities of the Colombian people.

The privilege of establishing coaling stations on San Andreas and Providencia would if granted and utilized result in important benefits to the Islands, which are situated one hundred and fifty miles off the coast of Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea and nearly five hundred miles from the north coast of Colombia. They are inhabited mostly by foreigners, who are engaged largely in the cultivation of cocoanuts.

By granting to the United States the privilege of coaling stations, the absolute sovereignty of Colombia over the Islands would in no way be affected, while on the other hand the privilege if utilized would benefit commerce, increase the revenue to the Colombian Government and bring life and trade to the Islands. Should $2,000,000 of the $10,000,000 to be paid for the Atrato option and the coaling station privilege be set aside for the Islands, it would, at 5%, produce an annual revenue for the Colombian Government of $100,000. The present revenue above the cost of administration is about five thousand dollars. As under this suggestion Colombia continues her absolute sovereignty and supervision of the Islands, it is impossible to conceive wherein this arrangement could in any way clash with the susceptibilities or patriotism of the Colombian people.

The “good offices” suggestion means that the United States, moved by a friendly desire to aid Colombia to settle at an early date the troublesome boundary question on its northwestern frontier, and other questions resulting from circumstances out of which the boundary dispute arose, and comprehending the peculiar difficulties which confront the Colombian Government in dealing with these questions, would, if Colombia so desired and requested, use its good offices in settling all differences between Colombia and Panamá. If a treaty were made between the United States and Colombia, the former would take a sincere interest in the prosperity and development of the latter, which borders on both oceans and is contiguous to the canal country.

The reversionary rights. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States believes the reversionary rights of the Panamá Railroad vested in the Government of Panamá at the time of its separation from Colombia, and has paid Panamá liberally for those rights, still in its oft-manifested desire to settle its differences with the Republic of Colombia, the United States, mindful of the justiciable character of this difference of view, is willing to submit this question to an arbitral tribunal constituted for that purpose and under a convention which must clearly specify the points to be considered.

As Colombia for nine years has demanded arbitration, and as the United States, in harmony with the attitude of all the great powers, cannot permit the arbitration of a political act, it has decided, owing to its wish to secure a just and friendly arrangement with Colombia, to arbitrate the material claims of that country relating to the reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad. Under the circumstances, these are the only claims that can be admitted to arbitration.

This suggestion should meet with the approval of the Colombian people, as there are many persons who believe that the claims of Colombia in this matter are legitimate and justiciable.

Preferential rights, on the canal. The principal and most important feature of the proposed arrangement was the completion by Colombia of the tripartite treaties and of the accomplishment of this the Government of the United States was greatly in hopes. But as the Colombian authorities positively refused to accede to this suggestion Minister Du Bois was authorized by cable to withdraw it and suggest an amendatory treaty that would remove all of the features which were objectionable to Colombia in the Root-Cortes Treaty. By this amendatory treaty Colombia was asked simply to grant the right of refuge for ships in distress, which all civilized nations permit, and was to receive all the preferential rights on the canal granted by the Root-Cortes Treaty.

The peculiar position of Colombia with her extensive coast line on either ocean would make such special privileges far more valuable to her than they could be to any other Latin-American Republic. By the amended treaty Colombia would have great advantage over all other countries in both peace and war. In peace the products of her industry and soil would be admitted to the Canal Zone subject to only such duties as are paid by similar goods from the United States; her mails would have the same privilege as those of the United States at Cristóbal and Aneón, and her troops, materials of war and ships of war would have at all times special privileges on the canal. In the future development of Colombia these advantages would be of more value than it is possible to estimate at present. Colombia has five hundred thousand square miles of territory of all climates and all soils where may be produced every product known to or required by the human race. To develop these wonderful resources Colombia must obtain increased transportation facilities on a large scale and the Canal would be for all time the most important and useful of these facilities.

[Inclosure 2.]

Memorandum which the American Minister may present to the Colombian Government.

The Government and the people of the United States honestly regret anything should have ever occurred to mar, in any way, the long and sincere friendship that existed for nearly a century between Colombia and the United States, and the latter country has for years earnestly desired to remove the ill feeling aroused in Colombia by the separation of Panamá. In all former efforts for a settlement Colombia has urged the arbitration of the political act of the United States in this matter, but the United States following in the footsteps of the older nations of the earth, has refused to submit its political acts to the consideration of any arbitral tribunal, in matter what was the character of the political transaction. It was not until the Minister of the United States at Bogota, Mr. Du Bois, submitted his report to the Department of State, dated September 30, 1912,¹ informing it that Colombia had reached a point where the Government saw its way clear to directly negotiate a settlement of their differences with the United States on just and honorable terms, that it found itself in position to act and with commendable promptness it considered the matter. Believing that the friendly relations of Minister Du Bois with the Government and the people of Colombia had created a favorable atmosphere in which to discuss an adjustment, the Minister was instructed to return to Bogota and take steps looking to a satisfactory settlement.

The Minister was instructed to present informally five propositions for the consideration of the Colombian Government.

They were as follows:

• First. The completion of the tripartite treaties by Colombia.
• Second. The payment of ten millions of dollars to Colombia for an option to construct an interoceanic waterway in the Atrato route and for privilege of coaling stations on the islands of San Andreas or Providencia.
• Third. The good offices of the United States in the settlement of all disputes between Colombia and Panamá.
• Fourth. The arbitration of the claims of Colombia to reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad.
• Fifth. The granting of extraordinary preferential rights to Colombia in the Panamá Canal.

The Government of Colombia promptly rejected the proposal to complete the Root-Cortes and the Cortés-Arosemena treaties, and the United States, deeply desirous of securing a friendly settlement, promptly withdrew this proposition although it earnestly desired the conclusion of these treaties by Colombia.

The second suggestion, that of an option for the construction of an interoceanic waterway on the Atrato route and the privilege of coaling stations on the islands of San Andreas and Providencia would result in the following advantages to Colombia. If the canal were ever built, Colombia would have a great interoceanic waterway within her own borders over which her sovereignty would remain undisturbed. As the question of the actual construction of the canal is left equally at the discretion of both nations, the United States would have to negotiate a treaty with Colombia if the increased commerce of the world demanded the opening of the canal within, say, seventy-five years, and at that time Colombia would have the right to dictate the terms upon which the canal should be constructed, such as administration of zone, rent, preferential rights, etc. If at the end of the option term the canal were not constructed, Colombia would have had the use of ten millions of dollars for, say, seventy-five years, which at 5% interest during that period would have, together with the principal, amounted to $47,500,000. Besides, Colombia would be sure of a perpetual revenue from the ten millions alone of $500,000 annually. If the canal were built, Colombia would not only have had the ten millions but from the day of the actual operation of the waterway she would commence to receive a rental amounting to a sum to be agreed upon by the two nations, which might be quite as large or larger than that paid for the Panamá Canal. Such an interoceanic waterway would bring the two countries into close and valuable relationship, giving to Colombia extraordinary advantages over all other nations of the world and the prestige that would come to Colombia, if this canal were ever opened to the commerce of the nations under these conditions, would be of inestimable advantage to the Republic, which possesses extensive coast lines on both oceans with excellent harbors. In this second suggestion everything is favorable to Colombia and there is nothing which in the widest stretch of the imagination could wound the pride or susceptibilities of the Colombian people.

The privilege for coaling stations on San Andreas and Providencia would have this advantage to Colombia: that if there were set aside $2,000,000 of the $10,000,000 for this privilege, this sum at 5% per annum would produce an annual revenue for the Colombian Treasury of $100,000, while the net revenue from the islands to-day is not more than five thousand dollars. The granting to the United States by Colombia of the privilege to maintain coaling stations on the islands would not in any way affect the sovereignty over or the superintendency of the islands by the Colombian Government, while on the other hand if the privilege were ever utilized it would enhance the value of the islands and increase the Colombian revenues by bringing a larger amount of business to their shores, as well as more life and people, and all the inhabitants would be the beneficiaries of the new activity. As Colombian sovereignty would remain absolute and inviolate over the islands there would be nothing in this arrangement that should in any way wound the feelings of any reasonable and thoughtful citizen of the Republic, and, besides, this arrangement would be another link to draw the two nations closer together in friendship, in trade and in commerce.

The third proposition was that of exercising the good offices of the United States to settle the disputes of Colombia with Panamá, and incidentally with other countries if so desired. This means that the United States, moved by a cordial desire to aid Colombia to adjust at an early date the troublesome boundary and other questions in dispute between Panamá and the Republic of Colombia, and comprehending the peculiar difficulties which confront the Colombian nation in dealing with these questions, would, if Colombia desired, act in its behalf to bring about an adjustment and thus minimize and possibly avoid direct negotiations with a state whose independence she denies. There are many other disputes in which the United States would use its good offices, if requested by Colombia, but could not and would not use these good offices except at the request of Colombia and then only in the interest of harmony and justice. If a treaty were concluded between Colombia and the United States the latter would have an increased friendly interest in the former, whose territory lies next to the great waterway soon to be opened and is washed by the tides of the two great oceans which it connects. It would naturally desire to see Colombia develop and prosper and that peace should reign throughout her wide-reaching confines, and all disputes with adjacent countries adjusted upon lines of justice, equity and right.

Reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States believes that these reversionary rights vested in Panamá at the time of the separation, and notwithstanding that the United States has already compensated Panamá for these rights, still, with a sincere desire to renew the ancient friendship which it deeply regrets has ever been disturbed, the United States is willing to arbitrate the question with Colombia, who claims that she is the lawful owner of the reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad.

Colombia, ever since the separation of Panamá, has earnestly demanded the arbitration of the whole question before The Hague Tribunal; but as the United States, in harmony with the attitude of all the great powers, is unalterably opposed to the arbitration of any of its political acts, it has been impossible to comply with Colombia’s demands. The Government of the United States, however, mindful of the justiciable character of the difference of views concerning the material claims of Colombia, is willing to submit these claims to an arbitral tribunal constituted for that purpose and under a convention that must clearly specify the points to be considered. This decision should meet with the warm approval of the Government and the people of Colombia, especially as the rights of Colombia in the Panamá railway are considered by many as a perfectly legitimate and justiciable claim. Under the contract of 1867 Colombia ceded the trans-isthmian railway to the Panamá Railroad for a period of 99 years, at a royalty of $250,000 a year; when the payments ceased at the time of the separation the contract had 64 years to run. This left 64 payments or a total of $16,000,000 to complete the contract. This claim might by mutual consent be submitted for arbitration. As Senator Bristow officially reported in 1906 that the value of the Panamá railway was $16,446,000, the total amount that might be submitted for arbitration would be $32,446,000. Besides this sum there is the amount of the Salgar Wyse concession which was to expire in 1984, and for which the Colombian Government was to receive $250,000 per annum from the opening of the canal. Should the canal open next year this would make 70 payments that would have been due Colombia or $17,500,000. Should the arbitral tribunal consider this claim the total amount under arbitration would be $49,946,000.

This sum, which is possible, together with the $10,000,000 for the option and privilege on the Atrato and islands, which is certain, and the interest on this sum during the life of the option, say 75 years, of $37,500,000 make a total amount under consideration of $97,446,000. Of this sum Colombia is certain of $47,500,000 for the say, 75 years option, and would probably be awarded the value of the railroad, say $16,446,000, and might receive awards in the other two claims amounting to $33,500,000 if they were admitted to the tribunal.

Preferential Rights.—The fifth suggestion considered in the preliminary conference was the preferential rights of Colombia in the Panamá canal which was unquestionably the most important feature under contemplation. As Colombia positively refused to complete the tripartite treaties, and as the United States earnestly desired to remove the Colombian grievances, it withdrew that suggestion and proposed an amendatory treaty to the Root-Cortes Convention that does away with all features that were unacceptable to Colombia, leaving in the treaty only the right of refuge, which is an international right, and the special right on the canal which gives to Colombia extraordinary advantage over all other countries. The peculiar position of Colombia with extensive coast lines on each ocean makes such privileges far more valuable to her than they would be to any other country in South America. By the amended treaty Colombia will have not only superior advantages in times of peace, when she may enter all of the products of her soil and industries into the canal zone free, but in times of war her troops, materials of war and ships of war together with her agents and employees may pass freely through the canal and in addition her mails have special privileges at Cristobal and Ancon. In the future development of Colombia these privileges will increase in importance and value. Colombia is a country containing 500,000 square miles of territory of all kinds of climates and soils in which may be produced every product and mineral known to or required by the human race. To develop these wonderful resources Colombia needs increased transportation facilities on a large scale and the canal would prove to be the most valuable of all these advantages.

Note.—On February 13, 1913, the American Minister informally presented the above-printed memorandum (inclosure 2 with his despatch of February 5) to the Colombian Government, and notified the Department thereof, by telegraph.

1. Not printed.