File No. 71.1.21/139.
The American Minister to
the Secretary of State.
No. 135.]
American Legation,
Bogotá
,
February 5, 1913
.
Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a
brief statement concerning the preliminary conversation about the
suggestions which I was instructed to present to the Colombian
Government for the purpose of securing if possible, an adjustment of the
differences between the two countries. As I notified the Department by
cable, the Colombian Government firmly refused to agree to the
completion of the Tripartite Treaties, and after the second preliminary
conference the Foreign Office informally notified me that the Atrato
concession, the perpetual lease of the islands, and the arbitration
suggestions were not acceptable to the Colombian Government. Believing
that the objection to the arbitration suggestion might be overcome, I
cabled the Department asking that the suggestion concerning the Atrato
concession and the perpetual lease of the islands of San Andreas and
Providencia might be changed into a suggestion for an option on the
Atrato route and a privilege for coaling stations on the islands. The
Department’s [Page 288] answer to that
cable was of such a character that I felt free to have a preliminary
conversation along the lines suggested, always bearing in mind that a
long time option must be granted if the sum of $10,000,000 were to be
paid.
As the original suggestion of a “concession” for a canal on the Atrato
route, and a “perpetual lease” of the islands of San Andreas and
Providencia could not be considered by the Colombian Government I have
eliminated those suggestions from the inclosed report and substituted
the modified suggestions that are now under informal consideration. It
will be noted that in my explanation of time limit of the option, I have
used the term seventy five years simply as an argument to show to the
Colombian Government what the revenue from such a large sum means when
the interest on the sum is taken into consideration, and not that a
seventy five years’ option would be acceptable. The explanation of the
“advantages” which would come to Colombia, should she propose the ideas
embodied in this statement for our consideration, has been necessary in
order to assist those directly interested to grasp the great value of
the generous position taken by the United States Government in its
desired adjustment of the pending differences.
What the outcome of these conferences will be is still uncertain. Beyond
the per adventure of a doubt word has reached headquarters here from the
United States that the Democratic administration “should have the
prestige” of a settlement between the two countries and will make a much
more generous arrangement than the present administration can possibly
offer. I have tried to impress upon those in authority here that the
policy of the Department on general principles is unaffected by a change
of administration, that it always remains true to the broadest lines of
treatment of all nations, and that, while I have no authority to speak
for the incoming administration, still it is difficult to conceive of
any plan it could adopt that would be more just and honorable and
generous than the one now under consideration, and which, at the same
time, would meet with the approval of the American people. Whatever
happens the Department of State has now suggested a settlement which for
liberality, practicability and deference to the susceptibilities of the
Colombian people, must challenge the admiration and sympathy of all
right thinking persons no matter what their nationality may be. I hope
that the Colombian authorities may find it possible to arrange a
settlement on the lines now proposed, and I suggest that if the
Department deems it proper the statement herewith inclosed might be
published, provided Colombia refuses to treat along these lines; notice
of such refusal would of course be cabled to the Department as soon as
it is known here. It would prove to the world that the United States has
made a sincere and honest endeavor along broad and generous lines to
render every possible justice to the Republic of Colombia whose ancient
friendship our country would rejoice to see renewed.
I am inclosing a statement which I may, if in the end I deem wise,
present to the Foreign Office as purely an informal explanation of the
advantages to Colombia contained in the suggestions.
I wish respectfully to call the attention of the Secretary of State to
the fact that the mention of the “option” and the “privilege” [Page 289] contained in the enclosed
statements are simply and purely informal suggestions not to be
seriously considered until I have the approval of the Department.
I have [etc.]
[Inclosure 1.]
Statement of the American Minister regarding the
preliminary conversations with the President and the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Colombia looking to an adjustment of the
differences between the United States and Colombia.
While the United States has for years earnestly desired to put an end
to the ill-feeling of Colombia arising out of the loss of Panamá, it
has always been met on the part of Colombia by a demand for
arbitration, but as the United States is unalterably opposed to
submitting its political acts to the consideration of arbitral
tribunals it has never been able to reach a settlement. On the 20th
day of October, 1912, Minister Du Bois, while on a leave of absence,
submitted to the Department of State a report which contained the
welcomed information that Colombia was ready to enter into direct
negotiations for the adjustment of her differences with this
country. The Department of State promptly considered the new
situation and feeling that the friendly relations established by
Minister Du Bois with the Government and people of Colombia had
created a good atmosphere in which to discuss an arrangement, he was
instructed to proceed to Bogota and take up the question with the
Colombian authorities. He was instructed to hold preliminary
conferences upon five distinct suggestions.
The first was the completion of the
Root-Cortes and the Cortes-Arosemena Treaties by Colombia. Both
these treaties had already been ratified by the United States
Senate.
The second, an option to construct a canal
over the Atrato route and the privilege of coaling stations on the
Islands of San Andreas and Providencia, for which the United States
would pay ten millions of dollars.
The third, the United States would offer its
good offices to settle the boundary line and other disputes between
Colombia and Panamá.
The fourth, the arbitration by a tribunal to
be constituted for that purpose of the material claims of Colombia
respecting the reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad.
The fifth, a supplementary canal treaty,
amendatory of the Root-Cortes treaty, removing all the features
which were objectionable to Colombia in the Root-Cortes Treaty,
asking of Colombia only the right of refuge for vessels in distress,
which is an international right, and giving to Colombia
extraordinary preferential rights on the Panamá Canal.
Minister Du Bois was instructed not to enter into actual negotiations
until the Colombian authorities had approved of the foregoing
suggestions and the Department had been notified and had instructed
him to proceed with the negotiations.
Minister Du Bois arrived in Bogotá on January 15, 1913, and was
received by the Government and people with kindness and marked
cordiality. Two days afterwards he called on Minister Carreño,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by Mr. Leland
Harrison, the Secretary of the Legation. After being kindly received
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Du Bois expressed a wish to
pay his respects to President Restrepo. On the 20th of January the
carriage of the President of the Republic called at the American
Legation and together with Minister Carreho, Secretary Harrison and
Mr. Montejo, the American Minister went to the palace, where he was
most cordially received by the President.
Minister Du Bois informed the President that if Colombia were
inclined to enter upon direct negotiations with the United States
for a settlement of her differences, he was empowered to take
preliminary steps to that end. The President said that Colombia
desired an honorable and just arrangement with the United States and
was ready to consider the important question. The American Minister,
in as informal and discreet a manner as possible, asked the
President if Colombia had yet reached that point where she would be
willing to complete [Page 290] the
tripartite treaties. Without the least hesitation and with firmness
the President said, “Those treaties could not be ratified by the
Colombian Congress, and I cannot and will not recommend their
completion.” He thoughtfully added, “The recognition of Panamá by
Colombia, however, may follow an honorable treaty with the United
States as a natural consequence.”
A conference with Minister Carreño was then arranged to take place at
the Foreign Office five days later, the 25th of January, for a
preliminary consideration of the subject. In the meantime Mr. Du
Bois notified the Department of the attitude of the Colombian
Government toward the tripartite treaties and was instructed to
proceed with the remaining four suggestions.
The first was that the United States would pay to
Colombia $10,000,000 for an option giving the right to
build an interoceanic waterway on the Atrato route and for the
privilege of establishing coaling stations on the Islands of San
Andreas and Providencia.
Minister Du Bois carefully explained the advantages to Colombia of
these two suggestions as follows:
If the canal were ever built under this option, Colombia would have
an interoceanic waterway within her own undisputed borders and over
which her sovereignty would be absolute and inviolable. As the
construction of the canal was left equally at the discretions of
both nations, if the time should come within the limit of the option
when the commerce of the world demanded the opening of this new
waterway, a treaty as to the details of construction and operation
would have to be negotiated, signed and ratified by both countries
before it would be valid. If the canal were not constructed within
the time limit of the option, Colombia would have received
$10,000,000 which, with 5% interest during the option, say 75 years,
would bring to the treasury of Colombia the large total of
$47,500,000. Should the canal be built, Colombia would, in addition,
be the recipient of an annual rental of a handsome sum as well as
the beneficiary of liberal special privileges on the canal during
its operation. Such a canal, if built, would bring both nations into
intimate and important relationship, give to Colombia great
advantages over all other countries, and afford her a strategic
position of inestimable value by connecting her coast lines on
either ocean with a great waterway.
In this suggestion, therefore, is much that made for the welfare of
Colombia and nothing that could by the widest stretch of the
imagination be justly considered as wounding the susceptibilities of
the Colombian people.
The privilege of establishing coaling stations on San Andreas and
Providencia would if granted and utilized result in important
benefits to the Islands, which are situated one hundred and fifty
miles off the coast of Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea and nearly
five hundred miles from the north coast of Colombia. They are
inhabited mostly by foreigners, who are engaged largely in the
cultivation of cocoanuts.
By granting to the United States the privilege of coaling stations,
the absolute sovereignty of Colombia over the Islands would in no
way be affected, while on the other hand the privilege if utilized
would benefit commerce, increase the revenue to the Colombian
Government and bring life and trade to the Islands. Should
$2,000,000 of the $10,000,000 to be paid for the Atrato option and
the coaling station privilege be set aside for the Islands, it
would, at 5%, produce an annual revenue for the Colombian Government
of $100,000. The present revenue above the cost of administration is
about five thousand dollars. As under this suggestion Colombia
continues her absolute sovereignty and supervision of the Islands,
it is impossible to conceive wherein this arrangement could in any
way clash with the susceptibilities or patriotism of the Colombian
people.
The “good offices” suggestion means that the
United States, moved by a friendly desire to aid Colombia to settle
at an early date the troublesome boundary question on its
northwestern frontier, and other questions resulting from
circumstances out of which the boundary dispute arose, and
comprehending the peculiar difficulties which confront the Colombian
Government in dealing with these questions, would, if Colombia so
desired and requested, use its good offices in settling all
differences between Colombia and Panamá. If a treaty were made
between the United States and Colombia, the former would take a
sincere interest in the prosperity and development of the latter,
which borders on both oceans and is contiguous to the canal
country.
The reversionary rights. Notwithstanding the
fact that the United States believes the reversionary rights of the
Panamá Railroad vested in the Government [Page 291] of Panamá at the time of its separation from
Colombia, and has paid Panamá liberally for those rights, still in
its oft-manifested desire to settle its differences with the
Republic of Colombia, the United States, mindful of the justiciable
character of this difference of view, is willing to submit this
question to an arbitral tribunal constituted for that purpose and
under a convention which must clearly specify the points to be
considered.
As Colombia for nine years has demanded arbitration, and as the
United States, in harmony with the attitude of all the great powers,
cannot permit the arbitration of a political act, it has decided,
owing to its wish to secure a just and friendly arrangement with
Colombia, to arbitrate the material claims of that country relating
to the reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad. Under the
circumstances, these are the only claims that can be admitted to
arbitration.
This suggestion should meet with the approval of the Colombian
people, as there are many persons who believe that the claims of
Colombia in this matter are legitimate and justiciable.
Preferential rights, on the canal. The
principal and most important feature of the proposed arrangement was
the completion by Colombia of the tripartite treaties and of the
accomplishment of this the Government of the United States was
greatly in hopes. But as the Colombian authorities positively
refused to accede to this suggestion Minister Du Bois was authorized
by cable to withdraw it and suggest an amendatory treaty that would
remove all of the features which were objectionable to Colombia in
the Root-Cortes Treaty. By this amendatory treaty Colombia was asked
simply to grant the right of refuge for ships in distress, which all
civilized nations permit, and was to receive all the preferential
rights on the canal granted by the Root-Cortes Treaty.
The peculiar position of Colombia with her extensive coast line on
either ocean would make such special privileges far more valuable to
her than they could be to any other Latin-American Republic. By the
amended treaty Colombia would have great advantage over all other
countries in both peace and war. In peace the products of her
industry and soil would be admitted to the Canal Zone subject to
only such duties as are paid by similar goods from the United
States; her mails would have the same privilege as those of the
United States at Cristóbal and Aneón, and her troops, materials of
war and ships of war would have at all times special privileges on
the canal. In the future development of Colombia these advantages
would be of more value than it is possible to estimate at present.
Colombia has five hundred thousand square miles of territory of all
climates and all soils where may be produced every product known to
or required by the human race. To develop these wonderful resources
Colombia must obtain increased transportation facilities on a large
scale and the Canal would be for all time the most important and
useful of these facilities.
[Inclosure 2.]
Memorandum which the American Minister may present
to the Colombian Government.
The Government and the people of the United States honestly regret
anything should have ever occurred to mar, in any way, the long and
sincere friendship that existed for nearly a century between
Colombia and the United States, and the latter country has for years
earnestly desired to remove the ill feeling aroused in Colombia by
the separation of Panamá. In all former efforts for a settlement
Colombia has urged the arbitration of the political act of the
United States in this matter, but the United States following in the
footsteps of the older nations of the earth, has refused to submit
its political acts to the consideration of any arbitral tribunal, in
matter what was the character of the political transaction. It was
not until the Minister of the United States at Bogota, Mr. Du Bois,
submitted his report to the Department of State, dated September 30,
1912,1 informing
it that Colombia had reached a point where the Government saw its
way clear to directly negotiate a settlement of their differences
with the United States on just and honorable terms, that it found
itself in position to act and with commendable promptness [Page 292] it considered the matter.
Believing that the friendly relations of Minister Du Bois with the
Government and the people of Colombia had created a favorable
atmosphere in which to discuss an adjustment, the Minister was
instructed to return to Bogota and take steps looking to a
satisfactory settlement.
The Minister was instructed to present informally five propositions
for the consideration of the Colombian Government.
They were as follows:
- First. The completion of the tripartite treaties by
Colombia.
- Second. The payment of ten millions of dollars to Colombia
for an option to construct an interoceanic waterway in the
Atrato route and for privilege of coaling stations on the
islands of San Andreas or Providencia.
- Third. The good offices of the United States in the
settlement of all disputes between Colombia and
Panamá.
- Fourth. The arbitration of the claims of Colombia to
reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad.
- Fifth. The granting of extraordinary preferential rights
to Colombia in the Panamá Canal.
The Government of Colombia promptly rejected the proposal to complete
the Root-Cortes and the Cortés-Arosemena treaties, and the United
States, deeply desirous of securing a friendly settlement, promptly
withdrew this proposition although it earnestly desired the
conclusion of these treaties by Colombia.
The second suggestion, that of an option for
the construction of an interoceanic waterway on the Atrato route and
the privilege of coaling stations on the islands of San Andreas and
Providencia would result in the following advantages to Colombia. If
the canal were ever built, Colombia would have a great interoceanic
waterway within her own borders over which her sovereignty would
remain undisturbed. As the question of the actual construction of
the canal is left equally at the discretion of both nations, the
United States would have to negotiate a treaty with Colombia if the
increased commerce of the world demanded the opening of the canal
within, say, seventy-five years, and at that time Colombia would
have the right to dictate the terms upon which the canal should be
constructed, such as administration of zone, rent, preferential
rights, etc. If at the end of the option term the canal were not
constructed, Colombia would have had the use of ten millions of
dollars for, say, seventy-five years, which at 5% interest during
that period would have, together with the principal, amounted to
$47,500,000. Besides, Colombia would be sure of a perpetual revenue
from the ten millions alone of $500,000 annually. If the canal were
built, Colombia would not only have had the ten millions but from
the day of the actual operation of the waterway she would commence
to receive a rental amounting to a sum to be agreed upon by the two
nations, which might be quite as large or larger than that paid for
the Panamá Canal. Such an interoceanic waterway would bring the two
countries into close and valuable relationship, giving to Colombia
extraordinary advantages over all other nations of the world and the
prestige that would come to Colombia, if this canal were ever opened
to the commerce of the nations under these conditions, would be of
inestimable advantage to the Republic, which possesses extensive
coast lines on both oceans with excellent harbors. In this second
suggestion everything is favorable to Colombia and there is nothing
which in the widest stretch of the imagination could wound the pride
or susceptibilities of the Colombian people.
The privilege for coaling stations on San Andreas and Providencia
would have this advantage to Colombia: that if there were set aside
$2,000,000 of the $10,000,000 for this privilege, this sum at 5% per
annum would produce an annual revenue for the Colombian Treasury of
$100,000, while the net revenue from the islands to-day is not more
than five thousand dollars. The granting to the United States by
Colombia of the privilege to maintain coaling stations on the
islands would not in any way affect the sovereignty over or the
superintendency of the islands by the Colombian Government, while on
the other hand if the privilege were ever utilized it would enhance
the value of the islands and increase the Colombian revenues by
bringing a larger amount of business to their shores, as well as
more life and people, and all the inhabitants would be the
beneficiaries of the new activity. As Colombian sovereignty would
remain absolute and inviolate over the islands there would be
nothing in this arrangement that should in any way wound the
feelings of any reasonable and thoughtful citizen of the Republic,
and, besides, this arrangement would be another link to [Page 293] draw the two nations
closer together in friendship, in trade and in commerce.
The third proposition was that of exercising
the good offices of the United States to settle the disputes of
Colombia with Panamá, and incidentally with other countries if so
desired. This means that the United States, moved by a cordial
desire to aid Colombia to adjust at an early date the troublesome
boundary and other questions in dispute between Panamá and the
Republic of Colombia, and comprehending the peculiar difficulties
which confront the Colombian nation in dealing with these questions,
would, if Colombia desired, act in its behalf to bring about an
adjustment and thus minimize and possibly avoid direct negotiations
with a state whose independence she denies. There are many other
disputes in which the United States would use its good offices, if
requested by Colombia, but could not and would not use these good
offices except at the request of Colombia and then only in the
interest of harmony and justice. If a treaty were concluded between
Colombia and the United States the latter would have an increased
friendly interest in the former, whose territory lies next to the
great waterway soon to be opened and is washed by the tides of the
two great oceans which it connects. It would naturally desire to see
Colombia develop and prosper and that peace should reign throughout
her wide-reaching confines, and all disputes with adjacent countries
adjusted upon lines of justice, equity and right.
Reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad.
Notwithstanding the fact that the United States believes that these
reversionary rights vested in Panamá at the time of the separation,
and notwithstanding that the United States has already compensated
Panamá for these rights, still, with a sincere desire to renew the
ancient friendship which it deeply regrets has ever been disturbed,
the United States is willing to arbitrate the question with
Colombia, who claims that she is the lawful owner of the
reversionary rights in the Panamá Railroad.
Colombia, ever since the separation of Panamá, has earnestly demanded
the arbitration of the whole question before The Hague Tribunal; but
as the United States, in harmony with the attitude of all the great
powers, is unalterably opposed to the arbitration of any of its
political acts, it has been impossible to comply with Colombia’s
demands. The Government of the United States, however, mindful of
the justiciable character of the difference of views concerning the
material claims of Colombia, is willing to submit these claims to an
arbitral tribunal constituted for that purpose and under a
convention that must clearly specify the points to be considered.
This decision should meet with the warm approval of the Government
and the people of Colombia, especially as the rights of Colombia in
the Panamá railway are considered by many as a perfectly legitimate
and justiciable claim. Under the contract of 1867 Colombia ceded the
trans-isthmian railway to the Panamá Railroad for a period of 99
years, at a royalty of $250,000 a year; when the payments ceased at
the time of the separation the contract had 64 years to run. This
left 64 payments or a total of $16,000,000 to complete the contract.
This claim might by mutual consent be submitted for arbitration. As
Senator Bristow officially reported in 1906 that the value of the
Panamá railway was $16,446,000, the total amount that might be
submitted for arbitration would be $32,446,000. Besides this sum
there is the amount of the Salgar Wyse concession which was to
expire in 1984, and for which the Colombian Government was to
receive $250,000 per annum from the opening of the canal. Should the
canal open next year this would make 70 payments that would have
been due Colombia or $17,500,000. Should the arbitral tribunal
consider this claim the total amount under arbitration would be
$49,946,000.
This sum, which is possible, together with the $10,000,000 for the
option and privilege on the Atrato and islands, which is certain,
and the interest on this sum during the life of the option, say 75
years, of $37,500,000 make a total amount under consideration of
$97,446,000. Of this sum Colombia is certain of $47,500,000 for the
say, 75 years option, and would probably be awarded the value of the
railroad, say $16,446,000, and might receive awards in the other two
claims amounting to $33,500,000 if they were admitted to the
tribunal.
Preferential Rights.—The fifth suggestion
considered in the preliminary conference was the preferential rights
of Colombia in the Panamá canal which was unquestionably the most
important feature under contemplation. As Colombia positively
refused to complete the tripartite treaties, and as the United
States earnestly desired to remove the Colombian grievances, it
withdrew that suggestion and proposed an amendatory treaty to the
Root-Cortes Convention that [Page 294] does away with all features that were unacceptable to Colombia,
leaving in the treaty only the right of refuge, which is an
international right, and the special right on the canal which gives
to Colombia extraordinary advantage over all other countries. The
peculiar position of Colombia with extensive coast lines on each
ocean makes such privileges far more valuable to her than they would
be to any other country in South America. By the amended treaty
Colombia will have not only superior advantages in times of peace,
when she may enter all of the products of her soil and industries
into the canal zone free, but in times of war her troops, materials
of war and ships of war together with her agents and employees may
pass freely through the canal and in addition her mails have special
privileges at Cristobal and Ancon. In the future development of
Colombia these privileges will increase in importance and value.
Colombia is a country containing 500,000 square miles of territory
of all kinds of climates and soils in which may be produced every
product and mineral known to or required by the human race. To
develop these wonderful resources Colombia needs increased
transportation facilities on a large scale and the canal would prove
to be the most valuable of all these advantages.
Note.—On February 13, 1913, the
American Minister informally presented the above-printed
memorandum (inclosure 2 with his despatch of February 5) to the
Colombian Government, and notified the Department thereof, by
telegraph.
