File No. 893.00/1890.
The American Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary of State.
Peking, August 22, 1913.
Sir: Referring to my No. 983 of this date, detailing the progress of events connected with the suppression of the revolt in certain southern provinces of China, I have the honor to observe that this insurrection will not have been an unmixed evil if it serves to correct the false impression, apparently quite prevalent in the western world, that the “heroes” of the Revolution, as President Yuan loves to call them, have a great hold upon the affections of the Chinese people.
The success of the Revolution of 1911 was due principally to two tilings: (1) The degeneracy of the Manchus and their unwillingness to die for their cause, and (2) the indifference of their Chinese Premier, Yuan Shih-k’ai, to the continuance of the Dynasty, shown in his unwillingness to follow up his victories at Hankow and Hanyang and by his readiness to spare his own countrymen the horrors of civil war, provided the north and south should unite in a Republic of which he was to be President. Yuan Shih-ka’i, after all, was the real founder of the Republic.
The southern leaders failed to realize their own weakness and although they have been permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of the public since the Republic was established they have been disgruntled by their loss of control of affairs and have constantly attempted to place obstacles in the way of President Yuan’s government and to make it a failure.
The statement in Dr. Sun’s recent manifesto that the insurrection was but a protest against the President’s despatch of troops into the southern provinces, which he had predicted would follow the negotiation of a foreign loan, is ridiculous in the light of his own seditious utterances to Bishop Bashford and others long before this movement of troops began.
That the rising was caused by any desire to avenge the death of Sung Chiao-jen is equally without foundation. No better proof of this is needed than the action of Chen Chi-mei in taking advantage of the fighting in Shanghai to secure the escape of Ying Kuei-sheng, the man in whose house the assassin of Sung found refuge and who was accused by the assassin himself of hiring him to murder Sung. This man Ying was the author of the letters to Hung in the Ministry of the Interior which letters were regarded by some as evidence of the complicity of the Cabinet in the crime.
[Page 129]When the Revolution of 1911 broke out, the commercial classes of the Chinese who had been hampered all their lives by official corruption, were induced to support the movement in the hope of bettering their condition. Many, however, even then, gave support very reluctantly; the disreputable character of Oven Chi-mei and his followers was well known and both Dr. Sun and Huang Hsing were regarded as impractical. The racial feeling, however, was strong and when the cry was raised for the overthrow of the Manchus, an alien dynasty, it was comparatively easy to find a response in the hearts of most Chinese.
In the recent insurrection, on the contrary, there was no such rallying cry. The inscription on the rebel banners: “Punish Yuan,” met with no enthusiastic response. The business men of the country, although some of them might dislike Yuan, knew that a loan was absolutely necessary to the carrying on of the administration and, so, approved of the negotiations.* * *
The great problem in China up to the present has been that of finance. So long as the disaffected leaders maintained their provincial armies and refused to send the revenues to Peking, so long Peking was kept weak. The use of these provincial levies to make war upon the Government has given the best possible excuse to Peking for their disbandment and the substitution of national troops in the disturbed provinces. The dissolution of the rebellious assemblies and the flight of rebel governors have also aided in making it possible for the Central Government to obtain control of these provinces, and thus also the control of their revenues. If this control should be realized, the Republic will be stronger than ever before. But all depends upon the wisdom with which the President shall use his victory. * * *
The constitutional committee is drawing up a constitution which bids fair to be unworkable. Little heed is given to the advice of those who are able to point out the practical difficulties which interfere with the application of a beautiful theory. The constitution, when drawn, will have to be reported to the Assembly and the final decision will be taken there. Possibly the President may be able to secure amendment at the time, but, if not, he is likely to find his exercise of the office so hampered as to make the administration of the government more difficult than ever.
I have [etc.]