Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976
1. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Eliot indicated that the United States needed to reaffirm the high priority it attached to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that entered into force on March 5, 1970. He recommended a reaffirmation be included in President Nixon’s annual foreign policy report in order to encourage key countries to adhere to the Treaty’s provisions.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–6. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert Loftness (SCI/AE). Miller signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature. Pollack, Spiers, and Farley sent the memorandum to Eliot under cover of a January 23 action memorandum, requesting that Eliot sign the memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid.) The text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 VST 483) is in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 84–91. Nixon’s “Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy,” May 3, is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 348–518. For the introduction to the foreign policy report, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 9.
2. Paper Prepared by the NSSM 157 Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group
Summary: The paper updated the verification aspects of the NSSM 157 study and provided a more detailed examination of the idea of national supervisory committees.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 14, Senior Review Group Meeting, 1/27/75—Chemical Weapons Policy (NSSM 192) (3). Secret. A January 26 covering memorandum from Farley to Kissinger is attached but not published. In a January 5 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Smith, and David, Kissinger requested that the ad hoc group review and update certain aspects of the NSSM 157 study relating to verification and submit the report by January 21. Kissinger’s memorandum is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, as Document 275. NSSM 157, issued on July 28, 1972, directed a “prompt review” of the U.S. position on negotiations concerning chemical weapons, then ongoing in Geneva. The NSSM also specified that the review be conducted by an ad hoc working group chaired by a representative designated by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and comprised of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the President’s Science Adviser, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Ibid., Document 263) The NSSM 157 study is ibid., Document 264.
3. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: In response to Kissinger’s request, Sonnenfeldt provided a proposal on chemical weapons as a “possible agreement” between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev that Nixon could raise during Brezhnev’s upcoming visit to the United States.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973 (1 of 3). Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. This memorandum is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, as Document 82. For the text of the 1972 joint communiqué, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 635–642. The paper Sonnenfeldt described (Tab A) is attached but not published. The minutes of the March 5 SRG meeting, at which the participants discussed the NSSM 157 study, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H–66, SRG Meeting NSSM 157 3/5/73.
4. Telegram 47705 From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Administration in Vienna
Summary: The Department communicated Rogers’s instructions to the U.S. delegation to the IAEA regarding discussions with the Soviets of a comprehensive test ban.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Drafted and approved by William Givan (ACDA/IR). Repeated to Ottawa. Telegrams 798, 854, and 919 from Geneva are ibid., Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–6. For the August 1972 working paper see Documents on Disarmaments, 1972, pp. 590–611.
5. Telegram 62848 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Summary: The Department summarized an April 2 meeting between British Assistant Under Secretary for Defense and International Security Rose and Assistant Director of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau Leonard, during which they and other UK and U.S. officials discussed the advantages and disadvantages of various chemical weapons control measures.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Neidle on April 4; cleared by Mark S. Ramee (PM/DCA); approved by Leonard. Repeated to the Mission in Geneva and the Mission to NATO.
7. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: In a meeting with ACDA and Department of State officials, Chief of the Disarmament Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nomura indicated that the Japanese Government had suggested at the last UN General Assembly session and at the recent Conference of the Committee of Disarmament meeting the possibility of a “partial approach” to the control of chemical weapons but that the government had received few reactions to this effort. Nomura also indicated that the partial approach—preventing production and development of super-toxic chemical weapons—appeared “feasible” due to Soviet reluctance to permit on-site inspections.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Confidential. Drafted by Mayhew on May 3. Initialed by Neidle. There is no indication as to the location or time of the conversation.
9. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Rush) to President Nixon
Summary: Rush recommended that Nixon direct the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee to review the utility of weather modification as a military weapon and direct the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide all data necessary for the completion of such a study.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee: Lot 81D309. Secret; Limdis. Brandon Grove, Staff Director of the Under Secretaries Committee, forwarded copies of the memorandum to Clements, Kissinger, Moorer, and Helms under a June 28 memorandum. (Ibid.) NSDM 165, “International Aspects of Weather Modification,” May 2, 1972, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Box H–208, NSDM 151–200 (Originals).
11. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Iklé forwarded to Kissinger a list of recommended actions regarding Soviet activities on the U.S.-Soviet Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 199, Agency Files, ACDA (Jan 1972–(Aug 1974)) Vol. IV. Secret. For the text of the 1972 “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–635. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, on November 10, Hyland indicated no further action was required.
12. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Guhin addressed Kissinger’s questions regarding U.S. policy alternatives for the transfer abroad of highly enriched uranium for high temperature gas reactors. He requested that Kissinger forward a memorandum on highly enriched uranium to President Nixon for his approval and issue a National Security Decision Memorandum if Nixon approved the memorandum.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 32, Security Aspects of Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Elliott. Kennedy initialed his concurrence. The earlier memorandum on NSSM 150 has not been found. NSSM 150, “U.S. Policy on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium,” March 13, 1972, and the NSSM 150 study are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Box H–190, NSSM 150. Tab 1, the memorandum to Nixon, and Tab A, a draft NSDM, are attached; the memorandum to Nixon is Document 17 and the NSDM as approved is Document 18. Tab D is not attached and not found.
13. Information Memorandum From the Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser (Aldrich) to Acting Secretary of State Rush
Summary: Aldrich informed Rush that the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs planned to submit a recommendation on the question of U.S. chemical weapons policy as stated in the NSSM 157 study. Aldrich indicated that the Office of the Legal Adviser concurred in PM’s recommendation and offered several conclusions drawn from the PM analysis.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Steven C. Nelson (L/UNA) on September 11. The date on the memorandum is stamped. Rush served as Acting Secretary from September 3 until September 22 after Rogers tendered his resignation on September 3. The memorandum prepared in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs is Document 14. For the text of the “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (26 UST 571),” commonly known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, see Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations, pp. 14–17. In November 1969, Nixon indicated that he would resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification. (NSDM 35; Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 165)
14. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Sloss) to Acting Secretary of State Rush
Summary: Sloss submitted to Rush the Department’s proposed approach to chemical weapons limitations, as requested by the National Security Council.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Ramee. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Attached as Tab D to Document 23. Tab A, the memorandum from Rush to Kissinger, is not attached; the final version of that memorandum is Document 25. Laird’s July 12, 1972, letter to Rogers and Rogers’s July 19 letter to Laird are published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, as Documents 259 and 261.
15. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Weiss)
Summary: Iklé offered his comments regarding the Department’s proposed position on NSSM 157, underscoring that a “high degree of compatibility” existed between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s views of NSSM 157 and the Department’s approach.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Attached as Tab A to Document 23. An unknown hand underlined several sentences in the first and second paragraphs of the memorandum. Iklé signed “Fred Iklé” above his typed signature. The reference to the September 17 memorandum is presumably to Document 14.
16. Telegram 3522 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
Summary: The mission reported a Soviet disarmament official’s “definite views” concerning the necessity for the People’s Republic of China and France to participate in a comprehensive test ban.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, London, the Mission in Geneva, and the Mission to NATO.
17. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Summary: Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the policy of reviewing requests for large quantities of highly enriched uranium by foreign countries on a case-by-case basis within the context of several constraints and considerations.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 32, Security Aspects of Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries (1). Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Tab A, NSDM 235 as approved, is Document 18. Tab B is not attached and not found.
18. National Security Decision Memorandum 235
Summary: Outlining U.S. policy on the transfer of highly enriched uranium to foreign countries, President Nixon decided that the United States would review any future requests for large quantities on a case-by-case basis, require recipients have security measures in place, weigh recipient adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and not require that fuel fabrication or reprocessing occur in the United States or multinationally-owned facilities as a condition of the request. Nixon also directed the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to obtain the views of the Secretary of State before making any “informal or formal commitments” regarding supplies and that any proposal should be referred to the President for consideration.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 31. Secret. A copy was sent to Rush. Scowcroft signed for Kissinger above Kissinger’s typed signature.
19. Memorandum I–25739/73 From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hill) to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Weiss)
Summary: Hill commented on the Department of State’s initiative on NSSM 157, concerning the U.S. position on chemical weapons limitations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. The date on the memorandum is stamped.
20. Memorandum of Law Prepared in the Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser
Summary: The memorandum addressed whether statutory restrictions on the transportation, testing, deployment, storage, and disposal of chemical and biological weapons were applicable to munitions currently under development by the Department of Defense.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Limited Official Use. All brackets and ellipses are in the original. Attached as Tab C to Document 23.
21. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Pollack provided Kissinger with background on correspondence related to Senator Pell’s resolution calling for a treaty prohibiting the use of environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war. He requested that Kissinger sign an attached letter to Pell.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, Lot 81D309. Secret. Sent through Rush. The date on the memorandum is stamped. An attached note from Rush to Kissinger reads: “I would like to emphasize the main point in this memorandum, namely that we examine our policy on weather modification—by a restricted group if necessary—on the basis of classified as well as unclassified information.” Kissinger added the following notation to Scowcroft at the bottom of Rush’s note: “To Brent—Get NSSM on weather modification.” Grove sent copies of Pollack’s memorandum and Rush’s note to Davis under a November 6 memorandum, indicating that Rush had asked him to send the documents to her. (Ibid.) Tab A is Document 22. Tab B, a copy of Senate Resolution 71, is attached but not published. Tabs C–F are not attached and not found; Tab G is Document 9.
22. Letter From Secretary of State Kissinger to Senator Pell
Summary: Kissinger informed Pell that he intended to take seriously Pell’s Senate resolution concerning the prohibition of environmental and geophysical modification activities.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, Lot 81D309. No classification marking. Kissinger signed “Henry” above his typed signature. Attached as Tab A to Document 21. Grove sent a copy of the memorandum to Davis under a November 6 memorandum. National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee: Lot81D309.
23. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Weiss) to Deputy Secretary of State Rush
Summary: Weiss sent Rush a comprehensive review of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Department of State views on U.S. chemical weapons prohibitions proposed in the NSSM 157 study, and recommended that Rush sign a memorandum to Kissinger incorporating a proposed chemical weapons initiative.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Fuerth on November 2; cleared by Sloss and Baker, and in substance by Gathright (S/PC). A notation on the memorandum in an unknown hand reads: “signed—to S/S 11/12 copy to D.” Tab A is Document 15. Tab B is Document 19. Tab C is Document 20. Tab D is Document 14. Tab E is a draft of Document 25.
24. Memorandum JCSM–487–73 From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Summary: Moorer recommended that the U.S. military be authorized to use riot control agents to preclude or delay the use of lethal force in situations where noncombatants, U.S. military personnel, or U.S. nuclear and other forces were endangered.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0117, 384 Jan.—1973. Secret. Appendices A and B are not attached.
25. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Rush transmitted to Kissinger three proposals for an initiative on chemical weapons limitations, with particular emphasis on the question of binary chemical munitions production, based on options outlined in the NSSM 157 studies.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Fuerth on November 2; cleared by Sloss, Baker, and Rutherford, and in substance by Gathright. Published from an uninitialed copy. For the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, also known as the Biological Weapons Convention, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 10, 1972 (26 UST 583), see Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations, pp. 117–123.
26. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Weiss) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush)
Summary: In a follow-up memorandum on proposed NSSM 157 initiatives, Weiss underscored his conviction that prior to asking President Nixon “to decide on a negotiating program for constraining chemical weapons, issues relating to the U.S. need for such weapons in general and for binary munitions in particular ought to be subject to very close scrutiny.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Fuerth and cleared by Baker. George Ward (S/S–S) initialed for Fuerth and Baker. A notation in an unknown hand on the first page of the memorandum reads: “Sent to S/S 11/28 Copy to D.” Tab A is Document 27. Tab B, a memorandum from Weiss to Porter dated November 26, is attached but not published. Tab C is Document 25.
27. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Rush recommended to Kissinger that the National Security Council conduct an interagency review of “essential unexplored questions” relating to binary chemical munitions prior to advancing a final decision on NSSM 157.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Fuerth. Attached as Tab A to Document 26.
28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Summary: Kissinger informed Schlesinger of President Nixon’s request that the Department of Defense conduct a study of the military aspects of environmental or geophysical modification activity.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860123–0519. Secret. A copy was sent to Rush. For the resultant study, see Document 42.
29. National Security Study Memorandum 192
Summary: President Nixon directed an ad hoc group, comprised of representatives from the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and National Security Council Staff, to study U.S. deterrent and retaliatory posture options for chemical weapons.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 14, Senior Review Group Meeting, 1/27/75, Chemical Weapons Policy (NSSM 192) (3). Top Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 33. A draft paper summarizing the ad hoc group’s report on NSSM 192 is Document 76 in this volume.
30. National Security Study Memorandum 195
Summary: President Nixon directed that an ad hoc group, comprised of representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, and National Security Council Staff, conduct a study of U.S. policy on nuclear testing.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 29 (Office of Deputy Director of Intelligence), Job 82M00587R, Box 5, Folder NSSM 195. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Moorer.