Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

23. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Weiss) to Deputy Secretary of State Rush¹

Washington, November 5, 1973.

NSSM 157: Review of United States Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions

Background

On September 4, 1973, the NSC requested agencies to submit their views regarding NSSM 157: Review of United States Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions. Agencies were to consider two aspects of a possible CW initiative: substance (the NSSM options) and mode (declarations—unilateral or otherwise—contrasted to the treaty form). In an Action Memorandum of September 13, 1973, PM recommended a blended “package” proposal, centered on NSSM option 2 (a production and transfer ban). Specifically:

—a unilateral U.S. declaration announcing that we would not produce lethal agents for chemical warfare;

—a concurrent announcement that the United States intends to seek effective measures to lead to an international agreement prohibiting the production and transfer of such substances;

—reaffirmation of earlier U.S. expressions of commitment to more comprehensive measures—a ban on stockpiles—when effective measures can be devised.

Your decision on this recommendation was deferred, pending the outcome of an informal canvass of the views of other agencies, which you requested PM to undertake. This memorandum reports the results of our canvass, and submits recommendations for a Department of State position for your consideration.

Views of Other Agencies

ACDA’s position is highly compatible with the initiative PM proposed, and Dr. Ikle is prepared to make this clear to the NSC (see Tab A, September 20, 1973, memo from Dr. Ikle to me). DOD, however, has reversed the judgments of former Secretaries Laird and Richardson, both of whom favored NSSM option 2 (production and transfer ban). DOD, along with JCS, now supports NSSM option 1: a treaty reducing stockpiles—but permitting production, including modernization, up to the agreed level. This would permit production for weapons purposes of binary systems (in which two “precursor” agents are combined into a highly toxic agent at time of use). (See Tab B, October 5, 1973, memo from Ambassador Hill to me.)

The DOD rationale, as we understand it, is:

—The United States should have an adequate deterrent to first use of CW by an enemy.

—A proper deterrent requires significantly greater forward deployment of chemical weapons than we now have.

—Owing to extreme Allied sensitivity to the presence of chemical munitions on their soil, U.S. forward-deployed stocks have necessarily been limited in that they are sufficient for retaliation only; any use would be severely limited in scale and duration. The problem is compounded by major legal and political constraints on the transportation and storage (in peace-time) of chemical agents and munitions in the United States.

—The root cause of these difficulties is civilian fear of the proximity, in transit or in storage, of large quantities of deadly chemical agents in bulk or in munitions. Binary munitions, being no more lethal than some industrial chemicals (until fired), may mitigate this concern.

—Transportation of binary chemical munitions would not be constrained by existing U.S. law. More importantly their availability would assuage Allied concerns and make possible a very considerable expansion of our forward-deployed stocks.

—NSSM option 2 rules out acquisition of binary munitions. NSSM option 1 does not. Hence, NSSM option 1 is preferable.

While DOD has now retreated from its original position, proposed by Secretary Laird in favor of a U.S. initiative for a production ban, I have some reason to believe that Secretary Schlesinger has not personally reviewed this position in detail and thus may not be fully committed to it. Obviously, however, it is a matter of consequence that OSD is now in line with what had earlier been the JCS dissenting position. I understand that the NSC intends, once all agencies have reported their positions, to conduct an analysis of major points of difference which will almost certainly touch on arguments for and against binaries. We will participate in that exercise and are prepared to adjust our views in the light of such new information as may then develop. Meanwhile, before reporting back to you with recommendations for a Department of State position on NSSM 157, we have looked into the binary question ourselves—taking DOD’s reasoning, as we understand it, fully into account—and have come to certain conclusions.

Our View

DOD’s position regarding NSSM 157 rests heavily on the case for binaries, which in turn, depends on two assertions: 1) that binaries will alleviate the U.S. domestic, political and legal constraints on the transportation and storage of chemical weapons, and 2) that binaries will overcome Allied resistance to a substantial increase in forward-deployed stocks of chemical weapons. In our view, these assumptions are very questionable.

—Allied resistance to chemical weapons is a product of the aversion of their publics to having any such stocks in their countries, and of a general skepticism as to the military utility of CW.

—Legal advice in the Department of State is of the view that existing legislation in the U.S. does extend to binaries (see Tab C, Memorandum of Law from L). We are aware, of course, that DOD probably has legal counsel to the opposite effect. Our point, however, is that the issue is at the very least in doubt, and will, as L points out, be likely to lead to multiple challenges in the courts, presumably over a protracted period of time.

—Finally, my own view would be to oppose a treaty reducing stockpiles since it is probably unverifiable short of intrusive on-site inspections which we could not negotiate.

Proposed State Department Position

On balance, it is our conclusion that the analysis and recommendations in our original Action Memorandum are valid (Tab D, September 13, 1973, PM Action Memorandum, provides detailed rationale). A unilateral declaration in which we undertake not to produce lethal chemical munitions, including binaries, would do us little military harm and some good in terms of our international image. We should, for similar reasons, also indicate our willingness to negotiate a treaty banning production of lethal chemicals providing there were adequate provisions for verification. Congressional response, which probably would be favorable, is also well worth taking into consideration.

At this point, therefore, I suggest we stick with our original recommendations (Tab E). Aside from some updating, and minor modifications for greater clarity, we have made only one noteworthy change: the Arab-Israeli war has temporarily created a climate in which a new arms control initiative would not fit very well. Consequently, we no longer recommend that the proposed U.S. initiative begin promptly, but rather, at an appropriate time in light of this factor.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Dr. Kissinger incorporating the proposed CW initiative.

1. Summary: Weiss sent Rush a comprehensive review of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Department of State views on U.S. chemical weapons prohibitions proposed in the NSSM 157 study, and recommended that Rush sign a memorandum to Kissinger incorporating a proposed chemical weapons initiative.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Fuerth on November 2; cleared by Sloss and Baker, and in substance by Gathright (S/PC). A notation on the memorandum in an unknown hand reads: “signed—to S/S 11/12 copy to D.” Tab A is Document 15. Tab B is Document 19. Tab C is Document 20. Tab D is Document 14. Tab E is a draft of Document 25.