Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

76. Draft Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, August 31, 1974.

Analytical Summary

NSSM 192 REPORT

UNITED STATES CHEMICAL WEAPONS POSTURE

Basic Issues

Should we improve our CW offensive capability by producing and stockpiling new binary chemical weapons?

If not, should we seek some international agreement on CW restraints, and what are our options regarding CW restraints (recognizing that none could be reliably verified)?

Regardless of the decision on our CW offensive capability, all agencies agree that our CW defensive posture (protective equipment, alarms, et cetera) needs to be improved.

CW Rationale and Utility

The U.S. has a no-first-use policy for lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. We maintain a lethal CW capability as a deterrent against and a response in kind to wartime use of CW by an adversary.

There is no real CW threat to CONUS. Chemical weapons are essentially tactical weapons. The primary concern today is possible use by the Soviet Union against U.S. and allied forces in Europe. Agreed NATO strategy calls for CBR defensive measures and the possession of the capability to employ effectively lethal CW agents in retaliation on a limited scale.

We do not know the size or location of Soviet stocks or production facilities. We do know that their and some of their allies’ chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) defensive measures and training and, therefore, their ability to operate in any toxic environment exceed ours or NATO’s.

The Soviets could initiate use of chemical weapons in a conventional war, despite an international legal obligation not to do so and even though their military writings, doctrine, and exercises indicate that they usually consider that any use of chemical weapons would take place in a nuclear warfare environment. (The U.S. military doctrine considers chemical weapons of limited usefulness in terms of affecting the overall military situation in a nuclear warfare environment.)

If the Soviets were to initiate use of CW on a significant scale in a conventional war, U.S./NATO forces would suffer a serious net disadvantage in casualties and tactical mobility unless:

—We had enough effective defensive equipment and training; and

—We retaliated effectively either with CW (thereby imposing similar severe operational constraints on the attacker, although presumably an initiator of CW would be in a higher protective posture at the outset to operate in a toxic environment), or with tactical nuclear weapons.

A capability to respond effectively in kind with CW would provide the President an option to attempt to redress the situation imposed by an adversary’s wartime use of CW at a non-nuclear level. This option may not eliminate a need eventually to move to tactical use of nuclear weapons to redress the overall conflict situation, but it would allow us to make that determination on its own merits—if existing CW defensive and offensive deficiencies were corrected by the U.S. and its allies.

Background

We had a major interagency study in 1972–73 on possible CW arms control options. The agency disagreement then and now stems primarily from the question of what we want or need for a CW deterrent/retaliatory capability, or specifically, whether or not we should pursue the production and stockpiling of binary chemical weapons to replace a major portion of our current CW stocks.

The binary issue has come to a head as Army development has reached the stage for a production decision on artillery shells. This issue has been somewhat diffused by recent congressional action on OSD’s FY 75 budget request of $5.8 million to establish one binary production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. Defense agreed with us that the funds would not be spent pending the President’s decision on binary production, but wished to seek congressional approval for this long lead-time facility. After being favorably reported out of committee, this $5.8 million request was knocked out on the floor of the House on August 7 by a vote of 218 to 186.

We still need a decision on binaries in order (1) to provide guidance for Defense’s planning, and (2) to help determine the more immediate question of what our position should be on the question of CW restraints. How the decision on binary production will affect our options regarding CW limitations is detailed in the CW posture alternatives section below.

CW limitations have been the major subject at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) for three years. The Soviets have privately and publicly pressed hard for U.S. action on CW negotiations and have generally supported a ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of CW relying essentially on national means for “verification.”

Our position has been that meaningful negotiations on chemical weapons cannot begin until such problems as reasonable verification have been worked out. We have presented several detailed working papers for CCD discussion on verification problems.

The 1974 U.S./USSR summit communiqué indicated agreement to consider a joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare. [The 1972 and 1973 U.S./USSR summit communiqués indicate we will work toward further CW limitations.] The Soviets wish to begin consultations soon. They have given us a draft proposal which gives us serious problems mainly because it envisages the destruction of existing lethal CW stocks and reliance on national means of intelligence for verification.

In August 1973 the Japanese proposed a prohibition on the development, production, acquisition and transfer of “supertoxic” or lethal CW agents and weapons, to include inter alia the possibility of on-site “inspection by cooperation.” Canada has also in effect supported a CW production ban.

Basic Military Considerations

Defensive Capability. The current capability of all U.S. forces to operate in a toxic (chemical, biological, or radiological) environment has been improving but is still generally inadequate and marginal at best. There are deficiencies in many types of defensive equipment—either because quantities have not been procured to date for all forces or because some items have not yet completed development—and in training for operations in a toxic environment. Based on current service projections, an overall adequate defensive posture will not be attained until sometime in the mid-1980s at a DOD estimated cost of $560–$720 million spread out over 8 years.

Estimated Military Requirements. U.S. policy (NSDM 35 of November 1969) calls for the maintenance of a CW deterrent/retaliatory posture. What this posture should be has never been defined any further at higher levels.

The JCS military objective is a CW capability to conduct the operations required at all levels in a conventional/chemical warfare environment until hostilities and/or the use of CW are terminated. Estimated requirements of the commanders-in-chief are based on the 90-day standard stockage objective for conventional equipment for war in Europe and the 180-day capability standard for other theaters. These requirements are being evaluated by the JCS.

Existing Employment Capability. If all currently employable munitions (not including bulk agent) in the national stockpile were provided and distributed in Europe, they would provide full support for 13–15 divisions in that theater for about 30 days but only marginal support for 90 days since there is only 45 days of one type (GB) of 155 mm artillery and about 30 days of full support in filled air munitions. If 13–15 U.S. divisions were to utilize estimated requirements for 30 days, the remaining U.S. stocks of employable munitions (not including bulk) could provide limited support in ground munitions for about 30 allied divisions for this same period.

Existing Offensive Deficiencies. Strictly in terms of total tonnage, the current CW stockpile of 22,400 agent tons in filled munitions and bulk exceeds the 18,000 to 20,000 agent tons which the JCS previously estimated to be required for an adequate CW deterrent/retaliatory capability for all U.S. forces. However, our actual CW offensive capability is limited by two broad deficiencies:

—Composition of existing stockpile. Specifically, it does not include all munitions necessary for a 90-day full support capability for 13–15 U.S. divisions in Europe, not to mention forces for other theaters; about a third of the filled munitions capability consists of mustard agent which is less effective than nerve agent; and about half the stockpile is stored in bulk agent, which could not be loaded into munitions today on a timely basis.

—Limited forward deployment.² It is doubtful that the prepositioned stocks (440 agent tons) in the FRG could support local tactical operations for 4–7 divisions for as much as a week, and no air munitions are prepositioned. Moreover, there are stocks at only one site.

Durability of Stocks. CW agents generally have a storage life of decades or longer. Agents stored in bulk (about half our stockpile) will remain unchanged virtually indefinitely under present storage conditions. Agents in filled munitions will decrease by about 5% each recovery cycle (averaging every 10–15 years).

CW munitions are considered to have a storage life of at least 20 years. The main problem here is possible military desires to phase-out delivery systems rather than any deterioration of agents or the munitions hardware itself. However, almost all our currently filled and useable ground munitions and bombs are not expected to have any problems of inherent obsolescence or deterioration through the 1980s; but our filled spray tank capability could well become unserviceable earlier (though not before 1978).

Binary Munitions. Our most promising development is binary weapons (two relatively safe, separate chemical components which would combine to form the standard lethal nerve agents while the munition is en route to target). Their storage and transportation would involve no special hazards. Binaries could provide a significantly improved CW offensive capability if they alleviated political constraints on storage, transport, and peacetime forward deployment. Binaries are planned to replace a major portion of our current stockpile (beginning in 1976) and not to represent a net increase in the total CW stockpile level.

European Allies’ Capabilities

The central region NATO countries currently have a marginal defensive capability to operate in a toxic environment, on par with the U.S., while other NATO defensive capabilities are worse off. However, most member countries have R&D programs, and some progress in defensive measures is being made.

Although France may have some stocks or is at least expected to acquire some, no other NATO ally possesses any CW stocks. Public opinion, governmental attitudes, and budgetary considerations in Western European countries make it unlikely that any NATO ally (except possibly France) will develop or acquire chemical weapons under existing circumstances.

CW POSTURE ALTERNATIVES

There are three basic alternatives relative to the U.S. CW offensive posture. As noted below, each posture alternative has different implication for the arms control options considered in the NSSM 157 report. Each posture alternative also envisages improvements in our CW defensive posture.

Alternative 1. Acquisition of Binary Chemical Weapons.

Description. Full military plans for the binary program have not been completed. Current projections would include the acquisition of about 7,600 nerve agent tons in ground and air munitions, at a DOD estimated cost of $333 million over 5 or more years. This cost estimate does not include any inflation factor, operation and maintenance costs, or substantial demilitarization costs for an equivalent portion of the existing stockpile. Much more than the currently projected level of binary acquisition, combined with the existing filled munitions, would be required to achieve what the JCS have estimated for an adequate CW deterrent/retaliatory capability for all U.S. forces.

Arms Control Interface. This alternative would be compatible with only Option 1 of the NSSM 157 study (limiting stocks to agreed or declared retaliatory levels), whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral declaration of policy, or bilateral U.S./USSR moratorium. [ OSD and the JCS have supported this arms control option.]

Advantages

—Binary acquisition at the currently projected level (coupled with an improved defensive posture) would provide a significantly improved CW retaliatory capability for U.S. forces; and may provide a better deterrent against use of CW in a future conventional conflict (unless the Soviets viewed our improved capability as signalling a U.S. intention or threat to initiate use of CW in wartime).

—The binary portion of our stockpile would involve essentially no special safety hazards in their peacetime manufacture, storage, handling, and transportation; and therefore may not be subject to the same political and legal constraints on peacetime storage and movement in CONUS as are the current stocks.

—The binary portion of our stockpile would facilitate rapid deployment in war or crises.

—If the Navy were to carry binary chemical weapons routinely in peacetime, which they do not do with existing CW stocks, this could reduce dependence on forward deployment in Europe.

—Binaries would provide the only possibility for increasing peacetime forward deployment in Europe, which could greatly reduce problems of CW munitions resupply in a conflict. (However, increased peacetime forward deployment could not be achieved, if at all, without incurring strong political opposition in allied governments and publics.)

Disadvantages

—Acquisition of binary chemical weapons in peacetime would undoubtedly be at best, controversial in Congress. (The DOD FY 75 budget request of $5.8 million to establish a binary production facility was just knocked out on the floor of the House. Binary dollar costs, not to mention costs for defensive improvements, would require sustaining far more substantial budget increases over the current funding level for several years. If funds for binaries were authorized, but at an inadequate level, we could incur many of the disadvantages below without achieving a significant military advantage.)

—Limited open-air testing may prove necessary prior to procurement, and this would certainly be controversial in the U.S.

—Binary acquisition would be perceived internationally and domestically as contrary to our declared interest in further CW arms control, and the U.S. would be criticized by the Soviets and others for “refueling a CW arms race.”

—This might spur further Soviet programs in the CW area, an area where they are not subject to similar political restraints, and the adequacy of the proposed improvements with binaries could be called into question by a significant augmentation in the Soviet capability.³

—This might lead to further proliferation of CW capabilities.

[The JCS support this alternative. They believe that a significant improvement in our CW offensive retaliatory capability is needed to overcome deficiencies in the composition of our current stocks and to provide a credible and adequate CW deterrent.]

[Comment. The main problem with this choice is that it is unlikely we could attain a significant binary capability, not to mention necessary defensive capabilities, given congressional constraints which reflect public attitudes toward CW and budget priorities. It would also appear contrary to our declared interest in CW restraints and provide no real leeway for arms control negotiations should we desire such.]

Alternative 2. Reliance on Existing CW Offensive Capability.

Description. This alternative would essentially rely on the existing CW filled munitions capability and not entail production of any CW agents (binary or non-binary). But it would not rule out filling munitions from existing bulk agent stocks to compensate for any phasing-out or deterioration of delivery systems in the 1980s. (If we wished to maintain the filled munitions capability at its current level, some filling actions might be required in the late 1970s or early 1980s.) Significantly improving our CW retaliatory capability, by reconfiguring most existing bulk agent stocks into munitions, is not contemplated under this alternative. This alternative envisions maintenance of an adequate CW R&D program in all phases and does not rule out continuing R&D on binaries.

Arms Control Interface. This alternative would be most compatible with Option 2 (prohibiting further production and international transfer of CW agents) of the NSSM 157 study, whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral U.S. declaration of policy, or parallel U.S. and USSR declarations of policy. As long as the manufacture of casings and hardware and the filling of these munitions with existing bulk agent stocks were not prohibited, the U.S. would retain the right to compensate for any diminution of its existing capability through possible phase-out or deterioration of delivery systems in the 1980s.

[State and ACDA support this arms control choice, and believe the prohibition on both production and stocks should be our objective.]

Advantages

—The U.S. would retain its existing CW capability (although limited) to deter the use of CW against U.S. forces and, if deterrence fails, to retaliate in kind.

—This would be a less controversial and provocative posture, domestically and internationally, than any other alternative (although any filling actions to compensate for phase-out of some delivery systems later would be controversial).

—This would be consistent with our declared commitment to seek effective measures to control CW, and could provide more flexibility for arms control negotiations than the other alternatives if a ban on production of CW agents were desired.

—This would be less likely than Alternative 1 to encourage either an increase in the Soviet CW capability or any further proliferation of CW capabilities.

—This would cost much less than Alternatives 1 or 3 (only somewhat less if filling actions were undertaken later) and substantially less than the following alternative.

Disadvantages

—This would not enable us to begin attaining what the JCS estimates to be an adequate deterrent/retaliatory CW capability.

—To maintain the existing filled munitions capability would require some reconfiguration of existing bulk stocks into munitions sometime after 1978, which would undoubtedly be controversial in Congress and U.S. public opinion and involve highly visible budget increases.

—Potential safety hazards associated in the public mind with peacetime storage and transportation of existing lethal chemical weapons would not be alleviated. (However, no need for peacetime transportation of existing agents or munitions is foreseen for at least 5 years; and significant local pressures to destroy stocks at certain storage sites is considered unlikely in the foreseeable future although this could occur as manifested by the experience with the stocks at Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver.)

[State strongly supports this choice on grounds that it gives us (1) a substantial CW deterrent/retaliatory capability (although not a wholly satisfactory one from the military standpoint), and (2) maximum flexibility in seeking restraints on CW should we desire such.

[ ACDA thinks likewise and believes that a CW production ban should be sought, even though reliable verification in the USSR would not be possible, inter alia to forestall proliferation of CW capabilities.

[ OSD supports this choice for now, but wishes to continue R&D on binaries and to keep our options open for future binary production (which means they do not support a production ban). OSD notes that a “U.S. only” CW capability, with or without binaries, is not an adequate posture against the Warsaw Pact and that we need discussions and agreement with our allies prior to any binary procurement.]

[Comment. This choice would not enable us to improve our CW offensive capability, but this is unlikely at any rate given congressional, public, and budget constraints. This would still provide for a significant (though limited) CW capability as a hedge against possible CW use against U.S. forces, whether or not we decide to support a production ban.]

[A production ban could (1) place political/legal constraints on the Soviet programs in areas where our programs are already constrained and likely to remain so, and (2) possibly constrain further proliferation of CW capabilities. Before deciding to take such a step, however, a quick interagency review of detailed verification questions is merited. Recognizing that no limitations could be reliably verified in the USSR, we should know what types of on-site inspections and information exchanges could significantly increase the probability of detecting non-compliance.]

Alternative 3. Reliance Only on Conventional and Nuclear Forces and Improved CW Defensive Capability, with No Ready CW Stockpile.

Description. This alternative envisions within 10–15 years reliance only on U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities, combined with a much improved CW defensive posture, to provide deterrence against the wartime use of CW by an adversary and for retaliation in the event such deterrence fails. If CW were used on a significant scale against US forces, retaliation with tactical nuclear and conventional weapons could redress the overall military disadvantage imposed by the adversary’s use of CW.

The existing filled munitions capability would, however, remain for the first 5–8 years. This alternative would envision as a minimum the attainment of the improvements in the defensive posture at DOD’s currently projected levels before any substantial disposal of the existing munitions stockpile were made.

Arms Control Interface. This alternative coincides with Option 3 (prohibiting stockpiles, production, and international transfer of CW agents and munitions) of the NSSM 157 study, whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral U.S. declaration of policy, or bilateral U.S./USSR moratorium. (ACDA believes this should be our ultimate objective.)

Advantages

—This would be welcomed internationally and domestically by some as a U.S. initiative to restrain CW.

—This would avoid the political costs of binary acquisition under Alternative 1 or any possible reconfiguration of existing bulk stocks under Alternative 2.

—This would provide an opportunity (if desired) to place political and legal constraints on Soviet CW stockpiling and production through CW arms control, although such constraints could not be reliably verified.

—A much improved defensive posture would reduce the overall advantages an adversary could gain through initiating the use of CW in a conventional conflict.

Disadvantages

—The absence of any significant ready CW retaliatory capability could be more likely to tempt the Soviets to initiate use of CW in a conventional war, although they would still have to consider the likelihood of a tactical nuclear response by the U.S. or its allies.

—If chemical weapons were used by the Soviets against U.S. and allied forces on a significant or large scale in a conventional war, there would be no military option to respond in kind and it would probably be necessary to use tactical nuclear weapons to redress the military situation. (However, as noted previously, unless the existing CW offensive and defensive deficiencies were corrected by the U.S. and its allies, tactical nuclear weapons may at any rate provide the only effective response to redress the military situation should the Soviets initiate chemical operations in war.)

—There would be strong controversy in Congress and, to a lesser degree, with some allies for the above reasons and because we would not be able to determine what the Soviets are doing in this area.

—This would entail higher dollar costs over the next 10–15 years than Alternative 2 and somewhat higher dollar costs than Alternative 1 (but possibly lower costs thereafter).

[ACDA believes this should be our ultimate objective and that we should rely on improved CW defenses and conventional forces for deterring CW use in wartime—recognizing that any large-scale conventional attack in Europe would pose the risk of nuclear warfare for the Soviets whether or not they initiated use of CW.]

[Comment. This option would be in our interest were reliable verification of a comprehensive CW ban possible. But it is not, and retention of our existing capability provides some relatively inexpensive insurance. A decision now to destroy existing stocks would be controversial in Congress and with some allies.]

1. Summary: The NSC Staff provided an analytical summary of the report on U.S. chemical weapons posture prepared in response to NSSM 192.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 14, Senior Review Group Meeting, 1/27/75—Chemical Weapons Policy (NSSM 192) (1). Top Secret. All brackets are in the original. NSSM 192 is Document 29. The NSSM 192 report that this paper summarizes is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, as Document 39. NSDM 35, issued on November 25, 1969, is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, as Document 165. Regarding the NSSM 157 report, see Document 2. For the Soviet draft proposal for the destruction of existing lethal chemical weapons stocks, see telegram 100009 from Geneva, April 28,1975. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750151–0278 and D750152–1013)

2. If stocks were moved during strategic warning time or any time prior to an adversary’s use of CW, then limited forward deployment in peacetime is not a major deficiency. If they were not moved beforehand, however, it would take at least 5–7 days before stocks could begin to arrive from CONUS, and this could require 25% of the Air Force’s strategic airlift capability (although a significantly lesser percentage of our national airlift capability). [Footnote is in the original.]
3. There was some evidence a few years ago that high level Soviets considered the U.S. to have a superior CW offensive capability. This judgment apparently induced them to increase their own CW effort, although the extent of any increase is not known. [Footnote is in the original.]