24. Memorandum JCSM–487–73 From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger1

SUBJECT

  • Use of Riot Control Agents (U)

1. (S) Reference is made to:

a. DOD Directive 5210.41, dated 14 August 1968, subject: “Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons.”

b. DOD Directive 5210.56, dated 6 May 1969, subject: “Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties.”

c. National Security Decision Memorandum 78 (NSDM 78), dated 11 August 1970, subject: “Authorization for Use of Riot Control Agents and Chemical Herbicides in War (NSDM 78) (C).”

d. A memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 1 December 1970, subject: “Use of Riot Control Agents in Civil Disturbances (C).”

2. (S) Recent planning for the evacuation of noncombatants from a hostile environment and examination of means to increase the security of nuclear weapons from dissident/terrorist activities have highlighted a need for clarification and amplification of national policy concerning the use of riot control agents (RCAs) in these areas.

3. (S) NSDM 78 does not address the use of RCAs outside of U.S. bases during peacetime nor the use of RCAs in situations short of war in which U.S. forces might become involved. The use of RCAs by Active military forces is not specifically authorized within the United States or its territories or possessions except during domestic civil disturbance operations (reference 1d). Similarly, references 1a and 1b do not clearly authorize the use of RCAs as an alternative to lethal force.

4. (S) The use of RCAs is a highly desirable means to preclude, or at least delay, the use of lethal force in operations, such as emergency evacuation of noncombatants; the active defense of nuclear weapons and their storage sites and recovery operations in which U.S. forces are involved; or extraction of U.S. personnel abducted or captured by dissidents, terrorists, or riotous mobs. These types of operations could well occur outside of U.S. bases or posts. For example, some nuclear [Page 53] weapons which are in the custody of U.S. personnel are located at storage sites on foreign bases; convoys transporting personnel, equipment, or nuclear weapons regularly operate outside of U.S. installations; and temporary encampments frequently are established on foreign soil during tactical exercises and contingency operations.

5. (S) The potential advantages to be gained by the use of RCAs require their timely employment. Delays inherent in obtaining the necessary authority to employ RCAs could negate these potential advantages. It would be highly impractical to prepare a contingency plan for each of the numerous likely situations favoring the use of RCAs in order to obtain prior delegation of authority for their use.

6. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, substantially the same as that contained in Appendix A hereto, be forwarded to the President requesting authority for the use of RCAs by military forces as a means to preclude, or at least delay, use of lethal force in the types of situations and locales cited above when there arise circumstances of a sufficiently serious nature that the use of lethal force is authorized as a last resort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that, subsequent to Presidential approval, the referenced DOD directives be modified as indicated in Appendix B hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T. H. Moorer
ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Summary: Moorer recommended that the U.S. military be authorized to use riot control agents to preclude or delay the use of lethal force in situations where noncombatants, U.S. military personnel, or U.S. nuclear and other forces were endangered.

    Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0117, 384 Jan.—1973. Secret. Appendices A and B are not attached.