11. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Soviet Activities on the U.S./Soviet Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW)
Following up on our brief discussion of possible problems in the UN involving the PNW Agreement, I would like to suggest that it might be useful soon to advise the Soviets about difficulties that their PNW initiatives might provoke. The Soviets have approached the British and might be planning démarches to other governments to accede to the agreement. In addition, they might intend to float a resolution at the next UN General Assembly endorsing the agreement. Both types of initiatives could be designed to isolate Peking.
Accession to the PNW Agreement
We do not expect that the UK will respond positively to the USSR suggestion that they “accede” to the agreement. (The State Department is preparing a telegram to London which would discourage any positive UK reaction.) However, a round of such Soviet démarches to other friends of ours could elicit a variety of responses hard to control for us and result in a certain amount of mischief.
Use of the Agreement at the UNGA
The Soviets have urged us to join them in tabling the PNW Agreement at the CCD in Geneva. This could be preparatory to tabling a resolution in New York giving general praise to the agreement and urging all states (or perhaps all nuclear powers) to accede to it, or support it, or negotiate similar agreements. Such a move would be a natural sequel to (and transformation of) their major agenda item last year on the Non-Use of Force, on which we abstained.
[Page 26]Recommended Action
In order to head off further Soviet approaches to third parties and the raising of the agreement in the UNGA in a manner embarrassing to us, we recommend that a firm approach be made to the Soviet Union as soon as possible. This could include the following elements:
a. We stand by the agreement and will naturally be more than willing to see it given attention at the UNGA as a valuable and significant achievement.
b. However, the agreement is a matter between the U.S. and the USSR. Its internal wording, referring to the Moscow “Basic Principles” of May 29, 1972, and the circumstances of its conclusion emphasize the uniquely bilateral nature of the agreement.
c. The agreement is not a treaty or other international document which might be considered open to accession by other parties. There is no provision in the agreement for accession.
d. The USG considers this bilateral agreement as part of the ongoing dialogue between the U.S. and the USSR on matters of grave importance to the two countries. It is the view of the USG that neither party to the agreement should attempt to establish a relationship between the agreement and any third party or solicit the endorsement of others for it in a UN context. The bilateral character of the agreement and of the ongoing dialogue of which it is a part indicate that nothing should be done by either party in this regard without the full agreement of the other party.
e. The USG would greatly regret it if any unilateral actions by the USSR concerning the agreement were to complicate further discussions between our governments on these important matters or lead to differences regarding the meaning and purpose of this agreement.
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Summary: Iklé forwarded to Kissinger a list of recommended actions regarding Soviet activities on the U.S.-Soviet Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 199, Agency Files, ACDA (Jan 1972–(Aug 1974)) Vol. IV. Secret. For the text of the 1972 “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–635. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, on November 10, Hyland indicated no further action was required.
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