Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

18. National Security Decision Memorandum 235¹

Washington, October 4, 1973.

TO

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
• The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

• NSSM 150, United States Policy on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium for Fueling Power Reactors

The President has reviewed the interagency study in response to NSSM 150 and has considered the views of the interested agencies.

The President has decided that the United States will:

—Review any future requests for the supply of large quantities of highly enriched uranium abroad on a case-by-case basis without an a priori presumption of supply.

—Require that a recipient has acceptable physical security measures in effect.

—Weigh the position of the recipient with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in reviewing and deciding on requests for supply.

—Not require as an essential precondition of supply that fuel fabrication and reprocessing take place in the United States or in multinationally-owned facilities, but will consider this factor in reviewing and deciding on requests for supply.

In addition, the President has directed that:

—The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission should obtain the views of the Secretary of State prior to making any informal or formal commitments and contracts regarding the supply of large quantities of highly enriched uranium, and any proposal to make a supply commitment should be referred to the President for his consideration. (It is recognized, however, that the U.S. has informed the European Community that its requests for supply of highly enriched uranium will receive sympathetic consideration.)

—The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, after consultations with the Secretary of State, should advise interested U.S. parties, including producers of equipment, of these more selective and restrictive procedures, as compared to our policy on supplying slightly enriched uranium, and the rationale behind them.

—Although diplomatic representations need not now be made on the decisions contained herein, an action program (with options and argumentation as appropriate) should be developed by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee for diplomatic and other steps the U.S. can consider taking with other nations, and in particular other supplier nations, with regard to the security, nonproliferation, political, and economic aspects associated with the increasing growth and dissemination of nuclear power industries, with particular focus on potential problems associated with highly enriched uranium.

Henry A. Kissinger

1. Summary: Outlining U.S. policy on the transfer of highly enriched uranium to foreign countries, President Nixon decided that the United States would review any future requests for large quantities on a case-by-case basis, require recipients have security measures in place, weigh recipient adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and not require that fuel fabrication or reprocessing occur in the United States or multinationally-owned facilities as a condition of the request. Nixon also directed the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to obtain the views of the Secretary of State before making any “informal or formal commitments” regarding supplies and that any proposal should be referred to the President for consideration.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 31. Secret. A copy was sent to Rush. Scowcroft signed for Kissinger above Kissinger’s typed signature.