Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

2. Paper Prepared by the NSSM 157 Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group¹

Washington, January 26, 1973.

SUBJECT

• U.S. position on chemical weapons prohibitions: Updating of NSSM 157 study—Verification aspect

I. Summary

In response to the request for a review of the verification aspects of the NSSM 157 study and an analysis of any further verification measures deemed appropriate, it was the consensus of the Working Group that there have been no new developments which would affect the general consideration stated in the NSSM 157 study that there is no dependable way to verify compliance with most prohibitions or limitations on chemical weapons. However, in view of Soviet elaborations on the idea of national committees, it was determined that a more detailed examination than that provided in the NSSM 157 study was warranted. This report contains a description of possible activities for national committees, advantages and disadvantages of the arrangement, background material on the national committee idea, and a description of possible organizational structures for a national committee.

The Working Group believes that the national committee arrangement should be considered in conjunction with verification Option 1 as a possible procedure to reinforce compliance features of that option, perhaps thereby resulting in enhanced overall political constraints.

Option 1 involves international procedures providing for a Consultative Committee of CW experts, exchanges of relevant data, periodic declarations of compliance, and the handling of complaints of possible violations through consultations.

As an adjunct to Option 1, this report discusses adding the requirement that National Supervisory Committees be established to monitor and document compliance procedures within their own countries and to provide other States Parties with reports on their work through the International Consultative Commission.

II. Possible Activities for National Supervisory Committees

The Committees’ activities within their own countries might include requirements for (1) visits to facilities falling within the scope of the treaty, and (2) submission of reports on compliance and data on production and consumption of specific chemical substances. Internationally, the Committees would provide an International Consultative Commission with reports on their activities and confer with other Committees periodically at meetings of the Commission. Countries lacking a chemical industry need not be required to establish a national committee. In this case, the Consultative Commission could set up procedures to assist such countries regarding the observance of the treaty.

III. Advantages and Disadvantages of National Supervisory Committees

Advantages

—These national/international procedures could enhance overall political constraints of the treaty by expanding and elaborating requirements for Soviet participation in institutionalized compliance machinery.

—The procedures could add to our knowledge of the USSR’s chemical capabilities through the Soviet National Committee’s reports to the Consultative Commission on visits to facilities and other matters, and by providing opportunities to discuss CW treaty questions with experts of the Soviet National Committee at periodic meetings of the Consultative Commission.

—Since the Soviets proposed a national committee arrangement, and several other CCD members have supported the idea, the U.S. could obtain negotiating advantages by including the idea in any proposal it makes.

Disadvantages

—The national committee arrangement could not be relied upon to provide assurance of compliance since it would be subject to strict political control in the Soviet Union, and perhaps elsewhere, and thus would be essentially self-inspection.

—There would be a need to persuade the U.S. chemical industry to cooperate with the arrangement (legislation may be required) in return for only a marginal increase in political constraints.

—The political and technical problems in negotiating these arrangements and then implementing them might outweigh potential gains, as illustrated by the following examples: (a) the weakness of self-inspection by national committees could be the object of particular criticism by any domestic opponents of the treaty; (b) the national committees could be misused in an attempt to “whitewash” a possible violation; (c) selection of the U.S. Committee could involve some delicate public relations problems in view of the potential adversary role of the committee in relation to the U.S. Government.

IV. Background

Subsequent to the informal meeting in July of the CCD chemical experts, Ambassador Roshchin outlined to the CCD the official Soviet position on such arrangements, noting that national organizations—under a special program agreed upon by international experts—would exercise general control over treaty compliance, and that they may have reasonably wide access to industrial plants and verify the implementation of the agreement in situ and might periodically inform other parties to the agreement of their work.

N.N. Melnikov, the Soviet expert who participated in the July CCD meeting, recently expanded on his remarks to the CCD in a draft paper for a SIPRI-sponsored working group on CW verification. In this paper, Melnikov described far-reaching and highly specific functions for national committees which would exchange information at annual conferences of experts.

The Soviets have discussed the national committee arrangement only within the context of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. The Soviets might not, however, accept it in the context of a partial prohibition.

Some CCD members have urged strict international verification, but this has been largely in the context of comprehensive prohibitions involving the elimination of stockpiles. Several CCD members have supported the idea of national committees in some form and it is expected that the idea would receive considerable support in the context of partial measures.

For the U.S., there are uncertainties regarding the Soviet position on the functions of the national committees and their relationship to an international forum. Ambassador Roshchin has described only a few general functions for such committees while remaining silent on any related international machinery. If reporting requirements resulted in any information concerning the location of and production data for Soviet plants producing chemicals with carbon-phosphorous bonds as well as production data for Soviet plants producing certain chemicals of the dual-purpose or precursor variety, this could add to our knowledge of Soviet activities in the chemical field. The publication of such information, however, would be subject to strict political controls in the Soviet Union, and we do not know whether the Soviets would provide data on individual plants. (We are not certain to what extent the U.S. chemical industry would wish to provide such data to the rest of the world.)

V. Possible Organizational Structures for a National Supervisory Committee

The Parties might be divided into two groups according to the state of development of their chemical industries:

1. States which possess plants capable of manufacturing single-purpose chemicals and/or plants actually manufacturing specified dual-purpose chemicals (the “haves”);

2. States which do not possess such plants (the “have-nots”).

There is no need for the “have-nots” to establish elaborate supervisory arrangements. It would probably be sufficient for the head of government to designate a single individual to be responsible for preparing the required reports and declarations. The “haves” would be required to set up national supervisory committees (NSC). However, the “haves” will differ greatly among themselves as to levels of development of their chemical industries and types of administrative systems.

The general functions of an NSC might be specified in the treaty. In addition, the International Consultative Commission might make recommendations concerning committee activities. However, each State Party could remain free, within the context of treaty provisions, to determine the size and complexity of the NSC necessary in its own particular situation to fulfill its treaty obligations.

The possibilities for an NSC range across a broad spectrum of complexity. Two examples are discussed below. It should be understood that these are presented only for purposes of illustration.

1. National Supervisory Committee plus a very small staff

The Committee would be an independent body, responsible directly to the President. Representatives from the government, from the scientific community, and from the general public would be appointed to the committee by the President. The day-to-day work of the committee would be conducted by a staff of about five people. The committee itself would meet one or two times a year to review U.S. implementation of the Convention and to certify reports and declarations prepared by the staff for transmission to other States Parties and to the ICC.

2. A National Supervisory Committee plus a medium-sized staff

This example differs from the first one in that a larger staff is provided, allowing more extensive supervisory activity. A national supervisory committee would be established in the same manner as discussed under 1.

The staff might: issue regulations to govern reporting and inspection activities; monitor production and use of chemicals under control; develop technical procedures for inspections; monitor scientific and technological developments related to the subject matter of the treaty; and maintain liaison with other national committees and with the ICC.

Under the first example, about five additional personnel would be hired. The annual cost to the U.S. Government would be about $250,000. In the second example, 20–25 people would be needed. Some experts might be made available by appropriate government agencies. Annual costs for the second model would be roughly $1–1.5 million.

1. Summary: The paper updated the verification aspects of the NSSM 157 study and provided a more detailed examination of the idea of national supervisory committees.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 14, Senior Review Group Meeting, 1/27/75—Chemical Weapons Policy (NSSM 192) (3). Secret. A January 26 covering memorandum from Farley to Kissinger is attached but not published. In a January 5 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Smith, and David, Kissinger requested that the ad hoc group review and update certain aspects of the NSSM 157 study relating to verification and submit the report by January 21. Kissinger’s memorandum is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, as Document 275. NSSM 157, issued on July 28, 1972, directed a “prompt review” of the U.S. position on negotiations concerning chemical weapons, then ongoing in Geneva. The NSSM also specified that the review be conducted by an ad hoc working group chaired by a representative designated by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and comprised of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the President’s Science Adviser, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Ibid., Document 263) The NSSM 157 study is ibid., Document 264.