Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

5. Telegram 62848 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, April 5, 1973, 0131Z.

62848. Disto. Subject: U.S./UK Consultation on Chemical Weapons (CW) Arms Control.

1. During visit to Washington on April 2, FCO Asst Undersec Rose and UK EmbOffs engaged in review with Leonard (ACDA) and ACDA off of pros and cons of various approaches to CW arms control negotiations. Leonard made clear he could not state whether or when USG would adopt any specific approach to CW arms control.

2. Rose said UK officials were thinking that next step should be exploration at CCD of comprehensive CW treaty with full-scale verification including on-site inspections. Rose expressed opinion that we were all committed to comprehensive treaty, and, therefore, should at least make initial effort in this direction. Leonard acknowledged that we were committed to objective of ultimately achieving comprehensive prohibitions; however, we were not repeat not committed to doing this through approach of a single comprehensive treaty. Article IX of Biological Weapons Treaty spoke of objective of effective prohibition (including destruction) of chemical weapons through “effective measures”—Leonard stressed that the reference was to measures in the plural. A commitment to work in good faith toward this objective, through “measures,” was very different from a commitment to a single comprehensive treaty, which we did not have.

3. Rose also suggested that possibility of comprehensive treaty prohibitions had not yet really been explored at Geneva and we could put onus on Soviets for failure to achieve this, before considering partial measures. Leonard noted that, on the contrary, in the last several years, there had been extensive work in Geneva on various problems and questions involved in comprehensive CW prohibitions. The U.S. had submitted many relevant working papers, e.g., on extent to which it would be possible to distinguish between stockpiles of chemical munitions and stockpiles of conventional weapons, and on the problems involved in destruction of chemical weapons; a number of delegations had submitted papers outlining verification schemes that they thought might be used in connection with comprehensive approach.

4. In course of discussion, Leonard pointed out that there might be some undesirable operational consequences from tactical standpoint if UK or West were to table proposals for a comprehensive treaty. It could not be safely assumed that one could easily or automatically shift from a comprehensive proposal to a partial proposal once Soviets or others had rejected the Western proposals for verification. Other governments, including some of our allies, might take position that scope of treaty, i.e., comprehensiveness, was fully agreed, and all that was left was to reach “compromise” on verification. It would be open to various delegations to argue that verification, even with on-sites, could not provide 100 per cent reassurance. For example, in verifying whether Soviets had destroyed all their stocks, we might not know where to seek on-sites in order to be sure no stocks were remaining anywhere in the Soviet Union. These governments would then argue that it was only a question of degree as to how good verification needed to be (with or without on-sites), and we ought to cooperate with CCD members, like the Yugoslavs and the Swedes, in seeking “compromise” in which some acceptable amount of reassurance was found without on-sites. Thus we could find ourselves on the classical “slippery slope” towards a comprehensive treaty when we might not think one was practical or sound. (Leonard noted that it was not clear that the U.S. would be willing to join in a UK proposal which implied that comprehensive prohibitions, involving complete elimination of our chemical weapons, could be adequately verified by virtue of inclusion of provisions for some on-sites.)

5. Leonard also pointed out that even if, speaking hypothetically, a Western proposal for a comprehensive treaty with extensive verification, including on-sites, were put forth, it was quite uncertain that the Soviets would be generally blamed thereafter for lack of progress. Although the Soviets would, of course, resist on-site inspections for political reasons, they would certainly argue that on-site inspections are not a genuinely practical method of verification in the case of CW controls. The Soviets and their allies had already argued in Geneva that, given the vastness of chemical industries in large and developed countries, on-site inspections would not be workable in providing significant reassurance regarding possible proscribed activities. As Leonard had already pointed out, it was hard to see how on-site inspections could give you any real grip on the problem of the location or size of CW agent or munition stockpiles in the Soviet Union. The Soviets could then be expected to charge that since on-sites were clearly not a practical solution, the West obviously had the political purpose of frustrating agreement by making a demand which it knew was neither acceptable nor effective. It was questionable in such a situation whether we would really be placing the onus for lack of progress on the Soviets.

6. After lengthy discussion of above considerations, Rose appeared to accept that there might be serious tactical drawbacks to putting forward comprehensive proposal in expectation that this would be way-station to consideration of partial measures.

7. Rose raised question of possible partial measures and specifically possible ban on production of CW agents. Leonard assured Rose that if U.S. were to decide to put this approach before its allies, it would do so only in belief that security interests of the Alliance would be served. Rose expressed opinion that most substantial consideration in favor of conceivable production ban was that West, and U.S. in particular, had very little expectation of substantially increasing its chemical warfare arsenal under present and foreseeable circumstances. Nonetheless, British were still likely to have problems with this approach, in part because they were uncertain as to extent of threat from Soviets on CW. Rose stated that he planned to look in more detail at intelligence picture when he returned to London. Rose concluded that no decision had been taken in London against any partial approach and noted it would take time for British to study matter fully.

Rogers

1. Summary: The Department summarized an April 2 meeting between British Assistant Under Secretary for Defense and International Security Rose and Assistant Director of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau Leonard, during which they and other UK and U.S. officials discussed the advantages and disadvantages of various chemical weapons control measures.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Neidle on April 4; cleared by Mark S. Ramee (PM/DCA); approved by Leonard. Repeated to the Mission in Geneva and the Mission to NATO.