Office of the Historian

15. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Weiss)1

Washington, September 20, 1973.

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Position on Chemical Weapons Limitations—NSSM 157; Your memo of September 17, 1973
[Page 35]

I agree that there is a high degree of compatibility between ACDA’s views on NSSM 157 and the proposed State position which you were kind enough to send us. We will be glad to make this clear to the NSC Staff.

I would like, however, to comment on one aspect of the proposed State position. The last paragraph of State’s comments is entitled a “willingness to seek a treaty banning stockpiles” and discusses the possibility of seeking “adequate” verification for such a ban. I think that if the U.S. should adopt the Option II approach, that is, a ban on production, we ought to take the position that a treaty eliminating stockpiles is not realistic or achievable at this time. We would explain that verification to ensure that stockpiles are eliminated and that some stockpiles are not illegally retained is beyond our practical grasp. We would say, however, that the elimination of stockpiles, which is the essence of Option III, remains our long-range objective.

If we should come to believe after further study in the U.S. Government that C weapons are basically useless as a deterrent, as we came to feel in the case of B weapons, then I believe we might want to proceed with treaty prohibitions which treat C weapons as we did B weapons, that is, eliminates them without additional formal verification requirements, except perhaps observation of destruction. However, until we make a decision of this sort, negotiation of verification procedures to check on retention of illegal stockpiles could be a blind alley unless, of course, we accepted verification that does not tell us whether or not there are illegally retained stockpiles. But this, in my judgment, would be an undesirable precedent as to weapons which are regarded as having military value.

Fred C. Iklé

  1. Summary: Iklé offered his comments regarding the Department’s proposed position on NSSM 157, underscoring that a “high degree of compatibility” existed between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s views of NSSM 157 and the Department’s approach.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Attached as Tab A to Document 23. An unknown hand underlined several sentences in the first and second paragraphs of the memorandum. Iklé signed “Fred Iklé” above his typed signature. The reference to the September 17 memorandum is presumably to Document 14.

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