Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

14. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Sloss) to Acting Secretary of State Rush¹

Washington, September 13, 1973.

Chemical Weapons Limitations: NSSM 157

An NSC study (NSSM 157) of alternative approaches to limitations on chemical weapons (CW) was recently completed. The NSC has requested agency views on possible CW limitations, and the memorandum from you to Mr. Kissinger at tab A answers the NSC questions and proposes a new CW initiative.

Background

We have said that we will not initiate the use of chemical weapons in conflict, and that our CW stockpiles are for deterrence. We support efforts toward CW limitations by international treaty, with the proviso that such limitations be effective and be adequately verifiable. (Agencies agree, however, that CW limitations cannot be fully guaranteed even with on-site inspection.)

In July 1972 Secretary Laird wrote Secretary Rogers endorsing a treaty prohibiting CW production and transfer. Laird noted that such a treaty would not affect U.S. capabilities, the expansion of which was unrealistic in present circumstances due to domestic constraints. A treaty also would place constraints on other CW nations and would inhibit CW proliferation. Secretary Rogers agreed that such a CW initiative would be in our interest. NSSM 157 was developed, examining basically three possible CW treaty constraints:

a) stockpile reduction, permitting continued CW production including binaries;

b) a production and transfer ban;

c) a production, transfer and stockpile ban.

JCS supported option a), hoping to retain its nascent binary program. State and OSD supported option b). ACDA supported option c), but indicated its willingness to support option b). Supplemental studies have reconfirmed the unverifiability of CW limitations (while noting certain useful partial measures) and confirmed the effective shelf life of present U.S. CW stocks at several decades or even longer.

A Reassessment

We are convinced that there exist very substantial practical constraints on our CW program. We face severe political inhibitions against the movement and even the maintenance of CW stocks in Europe. Of our 25,000 tons of CW stocks, our only overseas deployment is 440 tons in the FRG, and we understand Chancellor Brandt would have no objection to total withdrawal. Although this stock could be made to last for 5–10 days by reducing usage to token levels, the damage to the enemy would be reduced accordingly and we understand that replenishing it in conflict would tie up a substantial portion of our total airlift, or would require at least a 45 day transit by sea.

We also face severe domestic constraints. CW stockpiles within the U.S. have generated considerable political opposition. Federal statutes establish extremely restrictive procedures for movement of lethal chemical weapons within the United States which virtually ensure legal and political obstruction of such movements. Moreover, Congress prohibited the use of FY 69 or 70 funds for lethal chemical munitions procurement, and the administration has made no such procurement request since. In addition, binary development may well require some open-air testing, which would require Presidential approval and public exposure before the fact.

On the other hand, there are disadvantages to a CW treaty. [2 lines not declassified] Acceptance of a non-verifiable agreement would establish precedents that might work to our disadvantage in SALT, MBFR and future test ban negotiations. We could argue that a CW ban does not require as rigorous verification as a SALT or MBFR agreement, but this tends to confirm that the CW deterrent is not of vital importance and could generate further pressures for unilateral reductions. A declaration presents fewer problems of this nature, but would impose fewer restraints on other nations than a treaty. In any event, we believe that verification should be dependent on the strategic utility of the weapons involved and on realistic estimates of the risks of possible violation. As in all arms control agreements, the means of verification should be appropriate to the extent and nature of the controls involved.

A New Initiative

On balance, we believe that our CW “deterrent” is of limited utility, and we have little prospect for improving it. Under these circumstances, a U.S. CW initiative would give up very little for gains both at home and abroad. It could give substance to the administration’s pledge of increased cooperation and reconciliation with the Congress, with particular appeal to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It would fulfill the two summit communiqués on the subject, while leading to at least some constraints on other countries. Since we are not in a position to make our deployments of CW more effective at present, it would seem to be in our interest to do what we can to create an effective firebreak against its use by others. We believe an approach can be developed which would orchestrate the best aspects of the various alternatives outlined by the NSC studies.

If such a course is decided upon, prompt consultations with our NATO Allies (particularly the UK), and Japan would be important, prior to publicly proposing any change in U.S. policy.

Our proposed approach is outlined in the attached memorandum to Mr. Kissinger. In essence it proposes he make a unilateral declaration of our intent to curb production (perhaps at the forthcoming UN session) and indicate our willingness to continue exploring treaty restrictions with adequate verification at the CCD.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to Mr. Kissinger incorporating this new CW initiative.

1. Summary: Sloss submitted to Rush the Department’s proposed approach to chemical weapons limitations, as requested by the National Security Council.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Ramee. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Attached as Tab D to Document 23. Tab A, the memorandum from Rush to Kissinger, is not attached; the final version of that memorandum is Document 25. Laird’s July 12, 1972, letter to Rogers and Rogers’s July 19 letter to Laird are published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, as Documents 259 and 261.