12. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- NSSM 150: U.S. Policy on Transfer Abroad of Highly Enriched Uranium for Power Reactors
In response to our earlier memorandum on NSSM 150, U.S. policy on the transfer abroad of large quantities of highly enriched uranium to fuel a particular type of power reactor (High Temperature Gas Reactor or HTGR) being developed, you raised two questions (Tab D):
1. How many countries are getting highly enriched uranium?
2. What if a country simply abrogates the agreement and keeps the uranium?
Supply Abroad. We presently have only one contract to supply large quantities of highly enriched uranium abroad (in Germany). Supply began in May 1972 and is being spread out over a couple of years.
Other countries which are most likely to be interested in acquiring reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium include Japan, Brazil, India, France, Spain and perhaps the UK. No request for supply is now at issue, but there could well be some problems if HTGRs prove competitive and are promoted widely. (The relatively small and insignificant quantities of highly enriched uranium sent abroad for research purposes are not at issue.)
Abrogation of an Agreement. A country could of course abrogate an agreement and seize the highly enriched uranium. The safeguards against such action rely mainly on supplying only those countries in which we have confidence. To determine this, each request would be [Page 28] reviewed separately and Presidential approval to supply would be required. We will also rely in part on the U.S. HTGR promoter (Gulf) to show discretion in promoting sales abroad, since Gulf will be advised of our more selective policy process. Of course, we will ultimately be depending upon the good faith of countries which we decide to supply with weapons grade uranium over a period of many (25–30) years.
We believe that the policy recommended in the attached memorandum for the President (Tab 1) provides sufficient safeguards in relation to the threat and to the possible alternatives for weapon development by any determined state.
An additional policy alternative would be to go one step further and actively discourage sale or development of the reactors abroad. However, the NSSM 150 working group analyzed this question and decided that this could not productively be a general policy guideline since we have an interest in supplying some countries (e.g., West Europeans and Japan). Rather than adopt a broad and discriminatory policy of discouraging any sales to all others, it was concluded that the case-by-case review process provided adequate protection against supplying problem countries.
Recommendations
1. That you forward the memorandum for the President (Tab 1); and
2. That, if he approves, you issue the NSDM (Tab A).
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Summary: Guhin addressed Kissinger’s questions regarding U.S. policy alternatives for the transfer abroad of highly enriched uranium for high temperature gas reactors. He requested that Kissinger forward a memorandum on highly enriched uranium to President Nixon for his approval and issue a National Security Decision Memorandum if Nixon approved the memorandum.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 32, Security Aspects of Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Elliott. Kennedy initialed his concurrence. The earlier memorandum on NSSM 150 has not been found. NSSM 150, “U.S. Policy on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium,” March 13, 1972, and the NSSM 150 study are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Box H–190, NSSM 150. Tab 1, the memorandum to Nixon, and Tab A, a draft NSDM, are attached; the memorandum to Nixon is Document 17 and the NSDM as approved is Document 18. Tab D is not attached and not found.
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