Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

7. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 26, 1973.

SUBJECTS

• Arms control consultations with Japanese: Chemical Weapons (CW), Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), World Disarmament Conference (WDC), Chinese participation in arms control efforts, French Nuclear Testing, and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Mr. Alan F. Neidle, Chief, Political Affairs Division, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
  • Mr. Herbert Levin, Deputy Director for Japanese Affairs, State Department;
  • Mr. Robert Martin, Deputy Director, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, Politico-Military Affairs Bureau, State Department;
  • Mr. Donald Black, International Organization Affairs Bureau, State Department;
  • Mr. James Shea, Chief, Special Weapons Division, Bureau of Science and Technology, ACDA
  • Mr. Leon Fuerth, PM/DCA, State Department
  • Mr. Philip R. Mayhew, ACDA/IR

• Japanese

  • Mr. C. Nomura, Chief, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
  • Mr. Hiroyuki Yushita, First Secretary, Japanese Embassy

1. CW

Mr. Nomura noted that the Japanese government had suggested the possibility of a partial approach to the control of chemical weapons both at the last UN General Assembly session and at the Spring CCD session. At this time, he continued, a partial approach prohibiting the production and development of super-toxic agents, seemed to be the only feasible one because of the reluctance of the Soviet Union to agree to the on-site inspections which the Japanese believed necessary for adequate verification of a comprehensive CW ban. Mr. Nomura added that thus far there had been very little reaction from other countries to the Japanese statements and asked our view of their initiative.

Mr. Neidle answered that over the past year the USG had intensively reviewed all the possible approaches to controls on chemical weapons. We had as yet taken no decisions on the basis of this review. However, our review indicated that complete elimination of chemical weapons presented many difficult problems. The destruction of CW would be a long and difficult process; more importantly, it would be virtually impossible to verify destruction of all stockpiles. For these reasons we regarded it as a useful contribution to the discussion of CW for the Japanese to have suggested the possibility of a partial CW treaty.

Mr. Nomura asked whether, if we decided to make a proposal on CW, it would be in the form of a draft treaty and if so, when such a proposal could be expected. Mr. Neidle responded that while it was not decided whether we would have a specific CW proposal, we hoped for a decision on CW in the relatively near future. If we decided to take an initiative it might well be in the form of a draft treaty. We would want to consult in detail with the Japanese when our decision on CW had been made.

Mr. Nomura then asked our opinion of the Brazilian CCD proposal for a partial CW treaty beginning with a prohibition on stockpiles. Mr. Neidle answered that we had considered the Brazilian idea, but regarded it as very impractical to attempt the elimination of stockpiles when they could be easily replenished if there were no production ban. If a production ban were combined with a stockpile proposal, a possibility the British had raised last summer, we then would have a comprehensive ban with all the attendant problems. Moreover, the Brazilian proposal did not solve the difficulty of verifying destruction of all stockpiles. The Japanese proposal would not involve the problem of verification to the same extent, since if CW stocks (i.e. the existing deterrent) were retained, verification might not be as critical an element of an agreement. Brazil, Mr. Neidle continued, had advanced its proposal with the explanation that it did not want to “disarm the disarmed”, i.e., that it did not wish merely to prohibit acquisition of chemical weapons by those countries that did not now possess them; rather the U.S. and USSR who have stocks should carry out the first “disarming” and destroy their stockpiles. The problem with this, Mr. Neidle said, was that we have a great deal to give up in so limiting ourselves; to do so without adequate verification would be quite unbalanced and could be a serious risk to security. Speaking in the abstract, Mr. Neidle went on, a good argument might be advanced, as the Japanese have done, that a production ban might be a good way to start on the control of CW. It would halt production by countries now able to manufacture CW, prevent production by others, and could thus be viewed as a measure based on the status quo, preventing any new competition or build-up in CW.

Mr. Nomura then asked if we thought the Soviets could accept a partial measure such as the Japanese had suggested. Mr. Neidle said it was difficult to speculate, but the Soviets had shown themselves very flexible at Geneva and anxious to consider even partial CW measures. The Japanese proposal was a stop-where-we-are proposition; it might not be inherently difficult for the Soviets to go along with it.

Mr. Nomura commented that “everyone” at Geneva was waiting for a U.S. CW proposal; it was time for the U.S. to put forward its approach to CW. Mr. Neidle said we appreciated this desire and pointed out that the Secretary of State had said at the UNGA that we would present our views at an early date. We have taken time to respond, he continued, because any CW measure would touch on our security, and could affect on-going programs. Therefore, while we are naturally interested in the views of those non-aligned who are pressing for sweeping action on CW, these views cannot be central to our consideration of the issue. We were pleased that the Japanese have taken a much more reasonable, practical approach and hoped they would not be discouraged by adverse non-aligned comments. Mr. Nomura replied that he shared our concerns on security and felt that the Japanese would not be affected by non-aligned criticism of the partial proposal.

Mr. Yushita commented that if the Soviets had sufficient chemical weapons they might be willing to consider a production ban. What quantities did we think they had? Mr. Neidle said that although it was difficult to estimate, we assumed they possessed the amount of CW they believed militarily necessary. It was conceivable the Soviets might therefore see some advantage in freezing the present situation through an agreed halt in production.

2. CTB

Mr. Nomura asked for our assessment of the Japanese proposal for an informal meeting on a CTB in the CCD summer session, saying he had the impression the U.S. had not been enthusiastic about the proposal. Mr. Neidle, noting that he welcomed the chance to comment, said that in fact we fully supported some aspects of the Japanese proposal but were quite unenthusiastic on others. We supported the basic idea of an informal experts meeting on the CTB, and intended to contribute to the discussion on seismic means of verification, bringing up to date and providing more detail on the subjects in our 1972 seismic verification working paper. We were not enthusiastic, however, about the idea of discussion at the informal meeting on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). This was a partly technical, partly highly political question and could become a starting point for attacks on the NPT. Brazil and India were likely to state their belief that any country has the right to make its own peaceful explosive devices, contrary to the basic rationale of the NPT. We hoped Japanese representatives at the CCD would try to head off such discussion as nothing can be gained from the Pakistan-India argument likely to ensue if India expresses its view of the right to build explosive devices. Mr. Nomura accepted the point adding, however, that Pakistan, India and Brazil were not likely to ratify the NPT whether or not PNEs were discussed at the CCD. Mr. Neidle replied that there was also a question of whether discussion of the PNE issue was useful with respect to a CTB. We believed the problem on PNEs in relation to the CTB was not ready for solution. Moreover, there was an indirect effect on the NPT as such discussion did not improve the climate for the NPT. We hoped PNEs would not be discussed. Mr. Nomura responded that the Japanese experts who would attend the meeting were seismologists not competent to discuss PNEs; it was even possible that the subject would not come up in the informal meeting.

Mr. Nomura then asked why we were reluctant to discuss non-seismic means of verification, specifically reconnaissance satellites. Mr. Neidle, drawing Japanese attention to his terminology, said that “national means of verification, other than seismic” touched on a very sensitive security area. If we discussed these means, to whatever extent they bore on test ban questions, it could reveal information about national means more generally. He assured the Japanese that we have not discussed these means in relation to a possible test ban, not because we did not wish to advance work on a test ban but because we are flatly unable to do so on security grounds. Mr. Nomura mentioned satellites in the SALT context and Mr. Neidle pointed out that the SALT agreements referred only to national means of verification. We did not discuss these means with the Soviets; we merely agreed that neither side would attempt to interfere with the other’s national means. This was quite different from the full report on the possibilities of national means for test ban verification that the Japanese had requested when proposing the informal meeting. Mr. Neidle expressed the hope that the Japanese would not press the exploration of “national means other than seismic.” Mr. Nomura said he understood and he believed that the Japanese would not do so.

Changing the subject, Mr. Nomura commented that perhaps for the time being we regarded nuclear tests as necessary for weapons development. Mr. Neidle noted that we had been asked by Sweden last year whether this was the case and whether this led us not to want a CTB. Our response was that, while there were advantages to testing, we were willing to forego these advantages if we are sure other parties are doing the same; a test ban must therefore be adequately verified.

Mr. Neidle then mentioned that the Japanese had discussed two possible forms of attendance at the informal meeting: experts together with political officers; and experts meeting alone. He noted that the Japanese delegation had apparently urged that both types of meetings be held. We were strongly against a meeting of the second type since this could result in an effort to come to conclusions with the purpose of embarrassing some participating governments. We had had one very bad experience with a test ban experts meeting (without participation of political officers) some 15 years ago and we could not contemplate such meetings now. He added that, on the other hand, meetings of the sort we had held in recent years, i.e., experts participating with heads of delegations, had proved genuinely valuable. Mr. Nomura said he understood Mr. Neidle’s point, and the Japanese would not urge a meeting of experts alone.

3. WDC

Mr. Nomura then turned to the WDC, saying that he understood those countries which did not believe the WDC Special Committee should meet were discussing two possible approaches: immediate adjournment; and transforming the meeting into informal consultations. He asked for our latest information. Mr. Neidle said that it appeared that these two alternatives had now, in effect, been merged and he summarized for the Japanese a USUN cable on the tactical situation. He noted that while we were not a direct participant in the WDC Special Committee, we believed that there was no utility to the Committee. Given the absence of most of the nuclear powers, the circumstances surrounding the formation of the composition of the Committee, and the fact that the meeting was designed by the Soviets to embarrass the Chinese, the Special Committee could not help the cause of serious arms control. We therefore had been encouraging those who asked our views to attempt to avoid a meeting or, if a meeting were convened, to try to take no decisions. At this stage, however, an informal meeting for consultations was probably unavoidable; we believed the result of the consultations should be a decision that no formal meeting should take place. Mr. Neidle expressed the hope that the Japanese would support whatever move developed either to prevent a formal meeting or to see that it took no decisions.

Mr. Nomura said that it was likely the Japanese UN delegation would that evening answer the Secretary General’s letter by naming a representative to the meeting. He added that he would cable Tokyo recommending that his government support tactical moves of the sort described above.

4. Chinese Participation in Disarmament

Mr. Nomura stated that it was very desirable to have Chinese participation in disarmament discussions and asked what ideas we had on inducing their participation. Mr. Neidle said that many countries had made it clear to the Chinese, in a variety of ways, that they would be welcome at the CCD. The U.S. had made a public statement to that effect at the CCD in June, 1971. These overtures have not elicited a positive Chinese response; however, the Chinese have indicated in conversations with others that they have not taken any final decision on the question of possible participation in the CCD at some future time. They have also asked that they not be pressed on this issue. We do not ourselves see any tactics which could force a favorable Chinese decision in the near future. Others, like the Japanese, may naturally wish to continue to express publicly the desirability of PRC participation in disarmament efforts. However, we should be careful to avoid any actions that might push the Chinese to the extent that they felt compelled to respond more negatively about arms control negotiations than they otherwise might have.

Mr. Nomura said that he basically agreed, and noted that “quiet diplomacy” rather than public pressures seemed to be the best approach.

5. French Nuclear Testing

Mr. Nomura raised the possibility of some joint Australia-New Zealand action on French nuclear testing and asked if we had any comments. Mr. Neidle said that we would naturally like all countries to adhere to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but we did not think we should try to force it on anyone. The question of possible GOA–GNZ action was one in which we would not wish to involve ourselves. Mr. Nomura said his government was sympathetic to an Australian suggestion of a protest conference. He added that the Japanese had suggested to the Australians that if a protest conference was held when France tested, one should also be held when China tested. The Australian reaction to that had been “sympathetic.”

6. NPT

Mr. Neidle raised the Non-Proliferation Treaty, saying that we had on the whole been encouraged by the generally positive nature of the Japanese Foreign Minister’s recent statement in the Diet on the NPT. However, we had thought there was some suggestion of uncertainty over the question of security as it related to ratification of the NPT. Indeed, there had been some reference to the fact that the security part of the situation was “unsatisfactory.” Was there concern in the Japanese government that the PRC had not subscribed to the 1968 UN Security Council assurances for non-nuclear countries? Mr. Nomura said he didn’t believe his government was now concerned about security in relation to ratification. It was primarily concerned with implications for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in securing the same safeguards treatment as that negotiated by EURATOM with the IAEA. Mr. Neidle said he would like to comment further on the security aspect, which he believed should not be a problem. The 1968 Security Council resolution had expressed the political reality that assurances were desirable to support the non-proliferation regime. However, the fact that the PRC had not subscribed to that resolution is not significant since, for Japan’s security, the U.S.-Japan treaty relationship and our deterrent nuclear forces are the relevant factors. Moreover, real circumstances could not be envisioned in which Chinese non-adherence to the resolution would have any practical impact. For example, would the Chinese behave any differently in the SC in the case of a Soviet nuclear threat against Japan whether or not they had been present and had voted for the 1968 Security Council Resolution? Mr. Neidle concluded by expressing the hope that realistic analysis would be the key factor in viewing the security question and the NPT. Mr. Nomura said he agreed with Mr. Neidle’s points.

1. Summary: In a meeting with ACDA and Department of State officials, Chief of the Disarmament Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nomura indicated that the Japanese Government had suggested at the last UN General Assembly session and at the recent Conference of the Committee of Disarmament meeting the possibility of a “partial approach” to the control of chemical weapons but that the government had received few reactions to this effort. Nomura also indicated that the partial approach—preventing production and development of super-toxic chemical weapons—appeared “feasible” due to Soviet reluctance to permit on-site inspections.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Confidential. Drafted by Mayhew on May 3. Initialed by Neidle. There is no indication as to the location or time of the conversation.