Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

25. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 12, 1973.

SUBJECT

• A Proposed Initiative on Chemical Weapons Limitations (NSSM 157)

The Department of State proposes a new initiative on chemical weapons limitations, which combines several aspects of the various options and approaches outlined in the NSSM 157 studies. We support an early unilateral declaration renouncing production of CW agents, including binary munitions, with a simultaneous statement of intent to seek treaty limitations, with appropriate provisions for verification, banning CW production. We should also reaffirm the U.S. commitment to more comprehensive measures—a ban on stockpiles—when effective measures can be devised.

A Reassessment

There are very substantial practical constraints on our CW program.

—As NSSM 157 points out, we face severe political inhibitions against the movement and even the maintenance of CW stocks in Europe. Our only overseas deployment (in the FRG) would be adequate only for token, usage, and we understand Chancellor Brandt would have no objection to total withdrawal.

—We also face severe domestic constraints: CW stockpiles within the U.S. have generated considerable political opposition. Federal statutes establish extremely restrictive procedures for movement of lethal chemical weapons within the United States which virtually ensure legal and political obstruction of such movements.

Binary chemical munitions (in which two chemical precursors combine in flight to produce a nerve agent by time of impact or detonation) are now in a late stage of development in the US. Some maintain that these munitions would make it possible materially to alleviate constraints on present types of chemical agents and ordinance. The Department of State would be pleased to see the rationale for binaries subjected to rigorous scrutiny, and is prepared to adjust its views on the basis of such new information as might then be developed.

In arriving at its position on NSSM 157, however, the Department has already given considerable thought to this matter. We conclude that binary CW munitions are probably subject to the constraints on transportation and storage imposed by current U.S. law, and we have been advised that prolonged litigation on this point is probable, if the U.S. decides to produce binaries. Binary development may well require open-air testing, which would require Presidential approval and public pre-announcement of the fact. Congressional attitude towards chemical weapons has been clear for some years: Congress prohibited the use of FY 69 or FY 70 funds for lethal chemical munitions procurement, and the administration has made no such procurement request since.

A New Initiative

We believe that our CW deterrent is of limited utility, and has little prospects for substantial improvement, considering the unlikely combination of prerequisites: a significant change of attitude on the part of the U.S. public, the Congress, and our allies. Since we are not in a position to make more effective deployments of CW, it would appear to be in our interest to do what we can to create an effective firebreak against uninhibited actions on the part of others.

A significant U.S. CW initiative would give up very little for some positive gain both at home and abroad. It could give substance to the administration’s pledge of increased cooperation with the Congress, with particular appeal to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It would fulfill references to CW limitations in the two summit communiqués, and would lead to some constraints on other countries.

There are, of course, disadvantages to a CW treaty. It would not be possible to verify with confidence compliance with either a production ban or a stockpile limit. Acceptance of a non-verifiable agreement would establish precedents that might work to our disadvantage in SALT, MBFR, and future test ban negotiations. A declaration presents fewer problems of this nature, however, and is therefore a logical first step. As for the precedential aspect, we believe that verification should be dependent on the utility of the weapons involved and on realistic estimates of the risks to our security involved in violation, in relation to the gains we see in a negotiated political constraint. On this basis, we might express a negotiating position which defines as “adequate” verification measures which are, on the one hand, more specific than those in the Biological Weapons Convention (which are minimal) but, on the other hand, far less specific than anything in SALT or likely to emerge in an MBFR agreement. Such a posture should enable us to avoid having to seek the unattainable in verification measures—on the grounds that chemical weapons are not of vital importance—but to resist further pressures for unilateral concessions—on the grounds that chemical weapons do have security relevance.

We propose, therefore:

1) A Unilateral Declaration on Production

At the earliest appropriate date, the U.S. should declare unilaterally its intention not to produce lethal CW agents and other highly toxic agents for weapons purposes, and welcome similar restraint by other nations. We strongly favor a unilateral declaration over the bilateral and multilateral approaches, due to the inherent problems in the latter two, such as loss of U.S. flexibility, and possible violation of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

2) Willingness to Seek a Treaty Banning Production

We should combine our unilateral declaration with a statement of intent to seek effective measures for incorporating a production ban in treaty form. However, having unilaterally declared a U.S. production ban, we should retain some flexibility for the present on how we define adequate verification. For example, it would not be desirable to publicly press for “guaranteed verification,” but rather we should espouse such measures as are deemed adequate in proportion to the security considerations involved and which pose sufficient risks to a potential violator to be effective. We have not yet clearly defined what these measures should be for CW verification.

It is generally conceded that complete verification of a CW production ban cannot be guaranteed, even with on-site inspection. Measures short of “guaranteed” verification can nevertheless increase the political risks to the Soviets of noncompliance. Moreover, it is in our interest to try to open up Soviet practices somewhat, even if verification cannot be fully guaranteed. We should take up the recent Soviet indications at the CCD of some flexibility on this issue, regarding “cooperative” verification.

3) Reaffirmation of Interest in a Treaty Banning Stockpiles

We should also reaffirm our continued interest in the development of effective treaty measures banning stockpiles, linking this to past expressions on the subject in the two Summit statements, at the UNGA and at the CCD. This element of our initiative should be couched in language which clearly conveys the thought that we regard the development of a ban on stockpiles as a longer-range proposition than a ban on production.

As noted above, the State position is subject to review should a further study of binary agents develop new information that would warrant it.

Kenneth Rush
Acting Secretary

1. Summary: Rush transmitted to Kissinger three proposals for an initiative on chemical weapons limitations, with particular emphasis on the question of binary chemical munitions production, based on options outlined in the NSSM 157 studies.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. Drafted by Fuerth on November 2; cleared by Sloss, Baker, and Rutherford, and in substance by Gathright. Published from an uninitialed copy. For the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, also known as the Biological Weapons Convention, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 10, 1972 (26 UST 583), see Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations, pp. 117–123.