Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

17. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 1, 1973.

SUBJECT

• NSSM 150: U.S. Policy on Transfer Abroad of Highly Enriched Uranium for Power Reactors

NSSM 150 questioned whether we should supply large quantities of highly enriched uranium to foreign countries for a type of power reactor (High Temperature Gas Reactor or HTGR) being developed and, if so, whether we should adopt certain constraints on supply. (The export of slightly enriched non-weapons grade uranium, which will continue to be the predominant nuclear power fuel source, is not at issue here.)

The export of highly enriched uranium is at issue because it can be used for weapons and therefore presents more problems of control, and is being addressed now because if HTGR’s prove competitive, requests for quantities abroad may well rise very significantly. In the future, it would be more difficult and disruptive to alter our supply policy.

Current Policy. We now consider any requests for large quantities of highly enriched uranium on a case-by-case basis without a presumption that we will supply (although the European Community has been told its requests would receive sympathetic consideration). But we have not informed other countries of this process and they may well assume that we will supply highly enriched uranium with restrictions no different than apply to slightly enriched uranium.

Highly enriched uranium presents special problems regarding possible seizure by a state or by a terrorist or dissident group because:

—It is a key strategic ingredient of primitive and advanced nuclear weapons.

—Compared to plutonium, which is more abundant but very toxic and difficult to fabricate, highly enriched uranium would be a much more desirable material for a weapon made by a dissident or terrorist group.

—Physical security measures for nuclear materials are often inadequate.

Given the above, there are two basic policy questions. 1. Should we continue to supply any highly enriched uranium abroad? 2. And, if so, should we adopt some additional constraints regarding supply abroad?

Continued Supply. The study considered whether we should stop or severely restrict supply abroad. This could (1) cause some adverse reaction from other countries, including allies, and from Gulf Oil (the U.S. HTGR reactor developer); and (2) cast doubts on our reliability as a supplier of nuclear fuel services generally. Therefore, all agencies agree that we should not stop supplying highly enriched uranium but that we should consider supply requests on a case-by-case basis.

Additional Constraints. Additional constraints were considered, recognizing that they might produce an attenuated version of the adverse reactions associated with stopping the supply.

AEC recommends that in deciding on a supply request we should (1) require that a recipient has, in our estimation, an acceptable system of physical security measures to protect against diversion and theft, and (2) consider both a recipient’s position regarding the NPT and the location where the fuel would be fabricated and reprocessed, as these are particularly vulnerable segments of the fuel cycle. The views of State, Defense, and ACDA regarding the extent to which these constraints should be applied are outlined at Tab B.

My Views. Since physical security measures are generally inadequate and since requests for supply may well arise where we do not wish to supply large quantities of weapons grade material because of the concern of diversion by a state or by individuals, I recommend we establish a policy of a case-by-case review of requests and adopt AEC’s recommendations for some further constraints. Consistent with this recommendation, we should also encourage multinational ownership of fabrication and reprocessing facilities abroad where appropriate.

Domestic Council (Richard Fairbanks) and OMB (John Sawhill) have concurred in the recommendation.

Recommendation

That you approve the policy of reviewing requests for large quantities of highly enriched uranium abroad on a case-by-case basis within the context of the above mentioned constraints and considerations as outlined in the proposed implementing memorandum at Tab A.

1. Summary: Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the policy of reviewing requests for large quantities of highly enriched uranium by foreign countries on a case-by-case basis within the context of several constraints and considerations.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 32, Security Aspects of Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries (1). Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Tab A, NSDM 235 as approved, is Document 18. Tab B is not attached and not found.