Dear Mr. President,
I have been asked to pass to you the enclosed text of the Prime
Minister’s reply to your letter of February 27 about Nuclear
Tests.
London, February 28, 1962
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TEXT OF MESSAGE
Dear Mr. President,
Many thanks for your message about nuclear testing. It is of
course very short notice and as you frankly say represents a
change of plan. I hope you will understand that [illegible in
the original] this before [illegible in the original], which I
will do tomorrow morning, Thursday, March 1.
With regard to the [illegible in the original] for the tests, I
feel then the need to [illegible in the original] the statement
I made in the House of Commons on October 31, conforms with the
discuss [illegible in the original] and the communiqué we then
issued; and as the programme has been discussed between our
experts I will stand by you on this in full. The point about the
last two tests is perhaps more difficult to reconcile, but I
agree with you on this, that in for a penny in for a pound.
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There will of course be a violent reaction in this country and I
think in many parts of the world against
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this sudden decision and
we shall have to face it. Worthy people all over the world are
hoping against hope that the conference opening on March 14 will
lead to some result and allow us to end what we called this
sterile contest. At the same time I see the dangers of waiting.
It is rather evenly balanced.
I must plead that you will meet us on two points. First on the
date of your announcement. If you make it tomorrow night, March
1, it will be published here on Friday morning, March 2. The
House of Commons meets on Fridays, but will not regard it as a
suitable day for so dramatic a discussion, and would even
suspect it had been arranged so as to avoid a debate until
Monday. This is only my private difficulty. But I do feel also
that we should give advance warning to the other three members
of the Western Five, Canada, France and Italy—the first country
being particularly sensitive about decisions of this kind being
taken without prior knowledge. We should also perhaps consider
informing N.A.T.O. on the morning of the announcement. If you
could see your way to a short postponement therefore it would be
helpful.
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The announcement could be either Friday or Saturday morning,
and you would only have lost two or three days.
Now as to the contents of the statement. If you wished to put us
absolutely straight with world opinion you could say that tests
would be resumed on June 1, by which time the Committee of
Eighteen ought to report to the United Nations, unless the
Russians had signed a test agreement by then. But if this is
really too far off for you could we not at least postpone the
date from April 15 to say, May 3? That would allow us to argue
that we had given two months’ grace from the date of the
announcement, and we would point out that the Russians could get
in touch with us immediately for preliminary talks for a treaty.
Even if they did not, there would still be a full six weeks’
discussion in the conference itself.
The first alternative would be much the best but even the second
would be much easier to defend. We would of course use the
argument that after the last moratorium we cannot be dragged
along from month to month. At the same time we want to convince
people we are giving
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the Russians a reasonable time to make up
their mind. I beg you to consider this. It would make all the
difference in presentation throughout the world. I realise the
technical difficulties involved but I have no doubt they can be
overcome by your experts.
On the wording of your proposed announcement as communicated to
David Ormsby Gore
there is a further point of importance. We are both committed to
making a supreme effort to break the deadlock on the problems of
nuclear disarmament, and in the light of this commitment I would
not find it easy to open the Geneva conference by tabling
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again
the draft treaty on a nuclear test ban of April 1961, which we
know in advance that the Russians will reject. We have some
other ideas which we wish to put to you. They do not, I think,
represent any concession of principle and the Russians are
likely enough to reject them. They would however represent in
the eyes of the world a genuine and fresh effort to break the
deadlock.
I am not going to put these ideas forward in detail now for your
consideration. What I would ask you is not to
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shut the door
finally in any announcement about the resumption of tests to the
possibility of putting forward at Geneva some ideas which are
not included in the treaty text of April 1961. With this end in
view I would propose that the second sentence in the formula
which you gave to David Ormsby
Gore (beginning “The United States and the United
Kingdom . . . .”) should be replaced by the following
sentences.
“The United States and United Kingdom, represented at the
outset by their foreign policy chiefs, will present to the Geneva
disarmament conference opening March 14 their proposals
for a separate comprehensive treaty, with appropriate
arrangements for detection and verification, to
halt the testing of nuclear weapons in every environment: in
the air, in outer space, underground or under water.
Alternatively they would be ready to discuss these proposals
earlier with representative of the U.S.S.R., if they so
desire”.
This would give us all opportunity to consider fresh ideas, and
not preclude us from going back to the 1961 treaty text, if that
ultimately seemed best.
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I should be grateful if you could let me have a message in time
for the Cabinet which meets at 11.00 a.m. tomorrow morning (6.00
a.m. your time).
One last point which I am sure you have considered. The Russians
may do one of two things. First they may boycott the conference
on the grounds that your statement is a provocative action.
Secondly, and more tiresome, they may take some action over
Berlin which will precipitate a crisis. And we must remember
that it is not altogether impossible that Khrushchev really wants to get
in touch with us for some constructive purpose.
With warm regard,
Yours sincerely,
