1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ISA), I–17133/61, dated 20
October 1961, which requested the comments and recommendations of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the “Foster Panel Proposed Disarmament Program,” and reply to
a list of questions related thereto.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the magnitude of the tasks
confronting the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It is paradoxical
that the agency must devise imaginative proposals to meet aggressive
Soviet positions without impairing the capabilities of the United States
to overcome Soviet aggression. Further, it is inevitable that tense
international situations cause a sense of urgency for arms control
negotiations. However, this urgency must not become the only basis for
an arms control program.
3. In the development of a US disarmament position, the unswerving
purposes of the Soviets toward world domination must be kept in mind.
Concurrently, the United States must recognise its basic principles
against which our actions and proposals must be constantly weighed. This
does not indicate inflexibility, but it does indicate the need for well
defined limits in disarmament matters. Such limits are not fully
recognized in the Foster plan
and unless they are established, the United States could move step by
step to the position of our opponent. This trend, coupled with an honest
desire for success in negotiations, could well jeopardize the security
of the United States.
4. The subject proposal is based on the concept that immediate progress
is necessary in the reduction and control of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles and that imbalances in other forms of military power would not
become dangerous until a considerable reduction had taken [Typeset Page 200] place. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider this fundamentally valid. The
proposal would trade off our strategic nuclear superiority for virtually
no concession on the part of the Soviets. The Foster Panel approach implicitly
underestimates the importance of the US strategic nuclear capability to
our over-all defense posture and the extent to which it serves to
maintain stability and peace.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm that the United States cannot
afford to reduce drastically its nuclear capability until there exists
effective means for enforcing international agreements to which it can
entrust its security. Moreover, the premature reduction of the US and
USSR nuclear capabilities to a
status of numerical parity without a corresponding elimination of the
present Soviet conventional superiority, could upset the uneasy balance
of opposing military power that exists today.
6. Additional comments concerning the proposal and the list of specific
questions prepared by the Foster
Panel are contained in the attached Appendix.
7. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognise inherent shortcomings
concerning the US Declaration on Disarmament, that program is considered
more acceptable from a military point of view than the Foster Panel proposal. Accordingly, it
is recommended that the Foster
Panel proposal be withdrawn and that the current Declaration on
Disarmament be utilised as the basic US proposal. Further, it is
recommended that attention be directed toward the development of
detailed negotiating positions and background papers for the US
Declaration on Disarmament. These positions are needed for discussions
with our Allies and with the USSR in
the event the Soviets suddenly choose to enter into serious
negotiations, using the US Declaration on Disarmament as a frame of
reference.
Appendix
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS CONCERNING FOSTER
PANEL PROGRAM
1. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 28 October
1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a recommended US policy on
arms control. At that time, it was pointed out that any proposal
with respect to arms control should only be made after careful
consideration [Typeset Page 201] of the international situation and its inevitable impact on US
military strategy and security policies. This caveat continues to be
valid. A paraphrase of the key principles from this memorandum
follow:
a. The United States should not make concessions in advance of
similar action by the Soviets in hope of inspiring similar Soviet
concessions.
b. Should the Soviets enter into any arms control agreement, their
probable intention will be to achieve net military advantage over
the United States either through the operation of the agreement
itself or reduction of Western defense efforts resulting from
reduced tension.
c. US objective in arms control negotiations is to enhance national
security through balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control
agreements.
d. There should be no major US reductions until all militarily
significant States participate in similar reductions and there is a
reliable system of inspection and verification.
e. We should never take the position of “appealing” for arms control
measures. US eagerness for agreement spells weakness to the
Communists.
f. We must strengthen our military posture vis-à-vis the Sino-Soviet threat until they have
demonstrated sincerity.
[Facsimile Page 4]
g. There must be no restriction on readiness or employment of forces
until suitable international controls exist.
h. We must maintain credibility and retain adequate capability to
back up our Allies.
i. We must maintain a strategic nuclear advantage until:
(1) Soviet bloc conventional forces have been significantly
reduced.
(2) Soviet strategic nuclear capability has been reduced.
(3) There is adequate international peace
enforcement.
j. We must not be in such a hurry that national security is
compromised.
k. The entire Red bloc should be treated as an entity.
l. There should be no restrictions on research and development.
m. Any agreement should have a “fail safe” feature such that
non-compliance by any party would not jeopardize the security of
others.
2. Specifically, the United States must be able to maintain, at any
stage of disarmament, an adequate response to the entire spectrum of
the remaining Sino-Soviet bloc threat; namely, an evident, secure
nuclear retaliatory capability and an evident flexible capability
for military operations short of general war. In particular, the
United States should retain an attitude and posture which would make
credible to friend and foe alike its capabilities to fight with or
without nuclear [Typeset Page 202] weapons to maintain its security interests.
The Foster Panel proposal
does not meet these basic criteria.
[Facsimile Page 5]
3. The list of questions prepared by the Foster Panel is based on three assumptions designed
to achieve military evaluations of specific features of the
proposal. These assumptions are unrealistic. The answers developed
therefrom would result in unreliable and dangerous military opinions
which would serve no useful purpose. The answers, even if not
separated from the assumptions, could be misleading and could place
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the position of tacitly agreeing to a
proposal regarding which they thoroughly disapprove. In this sense
the military security of the nation could be jeopardized. Further,
several of the questions are unanswerable since they relate to
future judgments involving not only military but political and
economic considerations. Such judgments on precise levels of forces
and armaments are meaningful only if developed at a time when the
requirements to maintain secure and effective forces are imposed.
Then, the international political atmosphere, the nature of the
threat, and the national security policy, will dictate the levels of
forces and armaments. For these reasons a specific response to each
question proposed by the Foster Panel is not provided. However, comments, by
Stage, using the questions as a guide, follow.
[Facsimile Page 6]
STAGE A
1. The surrender of 30 medium jet bombers was noted by the Foster Panel as being a “gimmick”
to show earnestness of intent. Implementation of this measure would
create the misleading picture for the American public that some
progress was being made in disarmament. This could result in a false
sense of security and thereby jeopardize other defense efforts.
2. The Soviets could be expected to point out that there is already
an imbalance in long range aircraft in favor of the United States
and that this measure merely aggravates the imbalance and is
therefore inequitable. Further, they might be the first to label the
measure as “deceptive,” pointing out that it is public knowledge the
United States had previously planned to phase out the B–47 medium
bombers. It is a fact, however, that the worsening political
situation has caused the USAF to
set aside their plan to phase out the B–47’s. Therefore, to
surrender these airplanes would be to the military disadvantage of
the United States at this time.
3. If it is essential to create an environment of earnestness, it
appears that some other confidence-building measure which would not
involve early and substantial reductions in military capabilities,
could be proposed to achieve this objective. Such measures could be
in the category of those designed to safeguard against war by
miscalculation, e.g., [Typeset Page 203] advance notification of major military
movements or the exchange of information or limited mutual
inspection teams.
[Facsimile Page 7]
STAGE B
1. It is proposed in this stage to accept numerical parity in
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Since World War II, the United
States has relied on its strategic nuclear capability to deter
nuclear attack on the United States. The United States must continue
to rely on strategic nuclear weapons as the “backbone” of this
deterrent strength. In a speech on 21 October 1961, at Hot Springs,
Virginia, the Deputy Secretary of Defense re-emphasized this
strategy while at the same time reiterating President Kennedy’s determination to improve
the US ability to make swift selective responses to enemy attacks
regardless of time, place or choice of weapons. This capability
cannot be maintained if a measure to reduce strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles is treated as an initial measure in isolation from
other measures in a comprehensive disarmament program. Basic
National Security Policy does not rest upon a concept of “stabilized
parity,” nor, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should
“stabilized parity” be accepted as a goal of national security
policy. It is nevertheless important to note that the Foster Panel proposal to accept
numerical parity in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in advance
of reductions in other armaments is incompatible even with any
arguable interpretation of the concept of “stabilized parity.” It
would neither add to stability to accept numerical parity in
delivery vehicles, nor would a condition of over-all parity exist in
circumstances where a numerical strategic stand-off lends
disproportionately large weight militarily and psychologically to
Soviet superiority in conventional forces and CBR warfare and to Soviet emphasis on
large weapons.
2. The basic concept of the proposed program is that “immediate
progress is necessary in the reduction and control of strategic
delivery vehicles”. There is an implication that the panel believes
the existence of these vehicles constitutes the major threat of
general war. This concept is not considered valid and [Facsimile Page 8] any
disarmament proposal based on this assumption involves grave danger
to the security of the United States.
3. It has been erroneously argued that the United States accepted a
form of “parity” when it tabled the 25 September 1961 Declaration on
Disarmament. Although various meanings of the term “parity” can be
asserted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their consideration of the
25 September plan, never at any time intended to accept the notion
of numerical parity. The 25 September plan was based on a concept of
“balance,” in which many factors other than numerical parity must be
taken into account; e.g., geographic, economic, political, and
ideologi[Typeset Page 204]cal. It is unlikely that under the “balance” concept a numerical
parity as envisaged by the Foster Panel would result.
4. The effect of a numerical limitation of delivery vehicles on the
strategy and military posture of the United States could be profound
and adverse. For example:
a. Acceptance by the United States of the parity principle in
strategic delivery vehicles might not permit us to make a
substantive second strike, thereby making a pre-emptive strike more
tempting to the Soviets.
b. A parity compact with the USSR
might result in a higher threshold of provocation, which would in
turn encourage more aggressive behavior in limited or cold war
activities by the Communists, including the CHICOMS. This action
would be in fields in which the Communists currently have a higher
capability, that is, subversion and conventional forces.
c. A quantitative limitation on strategic delivery vehicles could
result in a “quality race” to reduce reaction time, and to increase
the effectiveness and sophistication of strategic weapon systems.
This would require an expensive mobilization of R&D assets on a “crash” basis. Such
a race might well [Facsimile Page 9] increase world instability and therefore
increase the chances of accidental wars utilizing more deadly and
ingenious weapons (including CBR).
5. NATO strategy, in itself a
critical political issue, would be affected and would have to be
altered. Before the sword is shortened, the shield must be
reinforced. Neither the burdens of substantial build-up of
nonnuclear defenses in Western Europe nor the possibility of the
devastation of Western Europe alone in tactical nuclear warfare
would be attractive to the important NATO nations directly involved.
6. There are many imponderable factors to be considered in the
calculation of minimal acceptable strategic force levels. It is
doubtful that a level of 1000 or 500 or any other number can be
established without continued and intense military study and
judgments involving the impact of technological advances, source and
nature of the threat, and the political environment at the time the
vehicles are required. Moreover, the need for a precise figure does
not seem to be an essential element of this proposal. Such words as
“agreed levels” have served in other disarmament proposals and
certainly with less risk.
7. The proposed definition of strategic delivery vehicles is based on
the range capability of missiles and on empty weight of combat
aircraft. Neither this or any other definition will serve the
purpose and intent of the Foster Panel. In reality, most vehicles capable of
delivering a nuclear weapon are potential strategic delivery
vehicles. Therefore, a definition to cover this field will not be
helpful. It would be necessary [Typeset Page 205] to designate specific vehicles
within agreed categories of systems for reduction, in order to
achieve the objective of the panel.
[Facsimile Page 10]
8. Restriction on deployment, production and testing of weapons
designed to counter strategic delivery vehicles is not desirable.
Effective defensive weapons systems tend to increase international
stability, just as it is conceived that hardened or hidden offensive
weapons increase stability. Defensive systems are a matter for
unilateral decision, not a matter for negotiation.
9. Cessation of production of fissionable materials is acceptable and
to the advantage of the United States ONLY if the following
conditions exist:
a. Any agreement to cease production of fissionable materials must
include an agreement for the implementation of an effective
inspection system which must be installed and properly functioning
prior to a cessation of production. The consequences of the nearly
three year long nuclear test moratorium demonstrate the necessity
for adherence to this principle.
b. Any agreement to cease production of fissionable materials must
exclude provisions for reduction of the nuclear weapons stockpile
except as a subsequent arms control measure.
c. Tritium should be totally excluded from cessation negotiations or
agreements.
d. Modernization of the stockpile must not be precluded.
e. A concurrent nuclear test ban, adequately enforced, is necessary
if conclusions on the advisability of an agreement on cessation of
production are to remain valid.
10. It is realized that the random zonal inspection concept is now
being studied by a panel formed by the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA). This concept
deviates from the previously stated position of the United States
which requires verification that force levels and armaments which
remain do not exceed agreed limits at any stage. In addition, the
subject [Facsimile Page 11]
proposal utilizes an untested random sampling technique developed to
be unintrusive. Actually, it could result in procedures which might
be impracticable to implement, noting that manpower and logistic
problems have received only limited consideration. In fact, it could
result in a major invasion into national territories if inspectors
were stationed at all key production facilities, airfields, ports
and highway centers. It is unlikely that the Soviets would agree to
such an invasion. In the present situation, this type of inspection
system would be inadequate to provide the degree of control and the
security required in the most sensitive areas of arms control. Some
reasons for this opinion follow:
a. The proposed inspection plan is geared to detection of evasion on
a limited basis and therefore does not cover evasion on a militarily
[Typeset Page 206]
important scale. The most promising evasion opportunities lie in the
organization of secret armament schemes during the early stages of
disarmament agreements. The Foster Panel inspection system cannot be expected to
operate at maximum effectiveness during this critical period.
b. The Foster plan does not
preclude national space rocket programs. The existence of such
programs in any form complicates the arms control problem and
simplifies the task of evasion. Both the United States and the
USSR utilize military type
rocket boosters in their space efforts. Thus, the USSR could declare the number and
location of “strategic” nuclear delivery vehicles in the designated
inspection zone; it could freely permit their inspection, including
the ascertainment that they are armed with nuclear weapons. There
could exist, undeclared, an additional number of similar vehicles
positioned in readiness for firing. However, these would not have
nuclear warheads. They could have instrumented or manned system nose
cone or have no nose cone mounted. Upon discovery by some [Facsimile Page 12]
inspector exercising his right of unimpeded access, these vehicles
would be described as intended for the “peaceful” exploration of
space. However, at some contiguous, concealed location, there could
exist a supply of nuclear warheads specifically intended for
marriage to the vehicles at an opportune and propitious time. No
inspection system has yet been envisaged which would ensure, with
sufficient confidence, the detection of concealed nuclear warheads.
Actually, in the proposed scheme, warheads are exempt from control
and inspection.
c. In Stage B, the plan requires the declaration of the number of
delivery vehicles by zone at home and in other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In
addition, numbers and types of vehicles not in any of these areas
will also be declared. This would require the USSR to declare X number of vehicles
outside these zones, but would not require the naming of the
country, e.g., Red China. This would enable the USSR to avoid the proposed inspection
system since countries outside the agreement are not subject to
inspection. Thus the USSR would be
provided a storage site for vehicles above the declared level. In
the short period of eight months in Stage B, the Soviets could gain
major advantage in this critical field.
[Facsimile Page 13]
STAGE C
1. In this stage the participation is extended to all militarily
significant States in the Western and Eastern blocs, including Red
China. This scope of participation is considered essential from the
outset of any suitable disarmament program. Ideally, the membership,
at the least, would include any nation that is developing a nuclear
capability.
2. One of the major defects of the proposal is the underestimation of
the necessity to link the reduction of conventional forces and
arma[Typeset Page 207]ments with reductions of strategic delivery vehicles. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff maintain that, in accordance with accepted US
disarmament principles, there should be a linkage between these two
areas so as to provide for balanced progress in both the nuclear and
nonnuclear fields, assuring that no nation would acquire an
advantage over the United States during the disarmament process.
Only by adherence to such an approach will the United States be able
to retain an adequate response to the entire spectrum of the
remaining Communist threat.
3. The dangers and difficulties in seeking numbers of quotas of
non-strategic armaments as the principal criterion for stability are
the same as those discussed for strategic vehicles. This approach is
further complicated when force levels are excluded from these
considerations as in the proposed program. In any event, the use of
quotas to effect these reductions would probably be the most
difficult to work out and negotiate because of the various weapons
involved. It seems percentage-type reductions would be the most
manageable once the member nations declared their inventories.
4. The suggested figure of 25% representing total reductions of
armaments in this stage is not appropriate. The degree or percentage
of such cuts should only be determined, if at all, [Facsimile Page 14] after an evaluation of
the existing strategic and tactical weapons and delivery systems
which would be available to support conventional operations. This
evaluation is not feasible until some progress has been made in the
early stages of this proposal.
5. One of the measures in this stage relates to advance notification
of major military movements and maneuvers. As previously indicated
in the comments on Stage A, this appears to be a measure more suited
for an earlier stage of disarmament, therefore would offer no
greater risk here.
[Facsimile Page 15]
STAGE D
1. Discussion of measures in this stage are limited by lack of detail
in the proposal and lack of a clear picture of the nature of the
international environment at the end of Stage C, which the panel
considers essential for movement into this stage.
2. It does appear that the United Nations Peace Force, which is to be
created in this stage, would be more effective if basic
organizational elements of the force were set up in the earlier
stages.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Throughout the Foster Panel
program there are provisions for the withdrawal of participating
states. The effect on the United States of a planned withdrawal by
the Soviets should be contemplated. These tactics, so recently used
in the test ban negotiations, can be expected. [Typeset Page 208] Upon acceptance of the
Foster Panel program,
the United States could only proceed in good faith. The nature of
our open society, public pressures and funding requirements would
preclude major contingency preparations for a break in negotiations.
The Soviets, on the other hand, could and probably would, make all
the preparations necessary to gain the advantage by a deliberate
break. The United States, faced with the considerably longer lead
time in producing strategic vehicles, would be seriously handicapped
in this rearmament race. The disadvantage could be so pronounced
that the Soviets might choose to strike while they had a clear
nuclear advantage.
