69. Memorandum from Battle to Bundy, November 171
[Facsimile Page 1]
Enclosed is a proposed text of a message from the President to Prime
Minister Macmillan replying to
the latter’s letter of November 16. I believe it conforms in substance
to the agreement you and Dr. Seaborg reached about the nature of a reply.
[Typeset Page 196]
However, since the proposed reply is a little more forthcoming in
response to some of Mr. Macmillan’s expressed concerns, you may wish to consider
whether the President should review it prior to dispatch.
L.D. Battle
Executive
Secretary
[Facsimile Page 2]
[Typeset Page 197]
Attachment
Draft reply to Macmillan
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have read your letter of November 16. I share your sense of the
gravity of a decision to conduct nuclear testing in the atmosphere.
The sober picture emerging from analyses to date of more than two
score Soviet tests warns us however that we may well need to
strengthen our nuclear posture. It may interest you to have the
criteria which I have provided my defense and atomic advisers in
preparing recommendations for me:
1. Tests will be conducted in the atmosphere only if:
a. The test will provide information of substantial importance
to the national defense.
b. The information needed can be obtained in no other way, with
reasonable time and effort.
c. Atmospheric fall-out is minimized in all practicable ways.
d. The military need for the test outweighs the [Facsimile Page 3] general desirability
of avoiding all atmospheric fall-out.
2. Each proposed atmospheric test will be submitted to the President
for decision:
a. For the present, recommendations will be restricted to
tests which relate importantly to weapons development and
weapons effects.
b. Approval of either proof tests or systems tests can be
expected only if there is a convincing demonstration of unusual
need in each case.
While no decision has been made to resume atmospheric testing, and of
course no specific tests have been approved, our program is being
developed under these guidelines. As these studies proceed, I will
be in touch with you further regarding the consultations you
propose.
Because of the time and effort likely to be required in the
preparation of an island test site, we are eager to get underway the
necessary work. I accept your suggestions [Facsimile Page 4] concerning the reconnaissance
party. [Typeset Page 198] Dr.
Seaborg will approach
your people to make arrangements for immediate despatch.
Attachment
I have read your letter of November 16th. I share your sense of the
gravity of a decision to conduct nuclear testing in the atmosphere.
The sober picture emerging from analyses to date of more than two
score Soviet tests warns us however that we may well need to
strengthen our nuclear posture.
While no decision has been made to resume atmospheric testing, and of
course no specific tests have been approved, we are developing a
test program and undertaking preparations to be in a position to
conduct tests in the event we decide we must. As these studies
proceed, I will be in touch with you promptly regarding the
consultations you propose. I hope that these consultations will
proceed quickly enough to permit us to reach an understanding by the
end of the year, and if the idea of a meeting in Bermuda works out,
that would be a good time to deal with the matter. Meanwhile, it may
interest you to have the criteria which I have now provided my
defense and atomic advisers to guide them in preparing for
atmospheric tests and in making specific recommendations to me:
1. Tests will be conducted in the atmosphere only if:
a. The test will provide information of substantial importance
to the national defense.
b. The information needed can be obtained in no other way, with
reasonable time and effort.
c. Atmospheric fall-out is minimized in all practicable ways.
d. The military need for the test outweighs the general
desirability of avoiding all atmospheric fallout.
[Facsimile Page 6]
2. Each proposed atmospheric test will be submitted to me for
decision:
a. For the present, recommendations will be restricted to
tests which relate importantly to weapons development and
weapons effects.
b. Approval of either proof tests or systems tests can be
expected only if there is a convincing demonstration of unusual
need in each case.
Because of the time and effort likely to be required in the
preparation of an island test site, we are eager to get under way
the necessary work. I accept your suggestions concerning the
reconnaissance party. Dr. Seaborg will approach your people to make
arrangements for immediate despatch.
Sincerely,
