55. Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to McNamara, September 291
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Testing In the Atmosphere (U)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is an urgent military, requirement for accelerated weapons development and effects information that can only be satisfied by nuclear tests in various environments, [Typeset Page 161] including the atmosphere. National security requires that our weapons development programs be pursued aggressively without the handicaps of self-imposed restrictions on the manner of testing new concepts. They further consider that careful scientific analyses establish that world-wide radioactive contamination resulting from such tests would be insignificant. By using the same careful procedures of analysis and prediction employed in previous nuclear tests in the atmosphere, control of local fallout can be accomplished without hazards.
2. Because of the potential political impact associated with US initiation of resumption of atmospheric testing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously recommended initial resumption of testing in environments which would preclude atmospheric contamination. The resumption of atmospheric testing by the USSR changes the political implications formerly associated with this question and compounds the military urgency for US resumption of such tests.
3. The Soviet accelerated test program will obviously lead toward significant improvements in their strategic nuclear capability. However, the presently authorized US underground test program is tailored primarily to the slow expensive development of small tactical weapons and is incapable of meeting all requirements for larger weapons. Although the proposed test series following NOUGAT contains some reduced yield tests of strategic weapons, they are limited in number, and the program is unduly slow in meeting the present Soviet challenge.
[Facsimile Page 2]4. The security of the United States depends to a large extent upon our ability to assure superiority in nuclear weapons and our ability to employ them effectively. Although some progress can be made in developing nuclear weapons by underground tests supported by laboratory experimentation and theoretical analysis, only very limited information can be obtained in the vital field of nuclear weapons effects.
5. The present U underground test program, as opposed to atmospheric testing, has some advantages; however, its inherent disadvantages and limitations exceed these advantages. There appears to be a finite yield limitation which cannot be exceeded in underground testing. Pretest operations are inherently time consuming and costly. Tests in the atmosphere offer the greatest opportunity for obtaining significant diagnostic and effects data for the devices or weapons fired.
6. Resumption of atmospheric testing is simply justified for several reasons. Various scientific panels appointed by the President, e.g., the Panofsky Panel, have recognized that important surprises in both weapons effects and development are possible through testing. Although it is not certain that surprises with important military implications will occur if atmospheric testing is resumed, it is certain that only the nation which conducts tests has a chance to discover and exploit these surprises.
[Typeset Page 162]7. In addition to the search for the unknown, there are critical kinds of known deficiencies. Weapons effects measurements are urgently required in several areas:
a. The damaging effect of electromagnetic pulses upon [illegible in the original] and electronic equipment.
b. The disrupting effect of nuclear detonation on radar and communications.
c. The high altitude and outer space kill ratio of nuclear [illegible in the original] warheads against re-entry bodies.
d. The determination of the effects of the new tactical type enhanced radiation and all-fusion [illegible in the original].
The potential impact of such weapons effects information is profound. There are few elements of modern military operations which are not vitally [Facsimile Page 3] dependent upon swift and reliable operation of communications and other electronic equipment. The development of an effective AICBM system would strengthen or weaken enormously the US strategic posture, depending upon which nation achieves such a capability. Information in these critical areas can only be obtained to the degree of accuracy and completeness required by atmospheric testing.
8. It has been stated that world-wide fallout resulting from atmospheric testing presents a real hazard to the population of the world. In considering such charges the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the insignificant increase over normal background radiation which has resulted from such tests. In addition, responsible agencies have calculated that if atmospheric testing equal to that of the combined total of US and USSR tests in 1958 were continued annually, the radiation dosage world-wide would gradually increase until equilibrium (radioactive decay equal to amount injected) was reached at 30% of normal background. This is equivalent to the increase in cosmic ray radiation in moving from Washington D.C. to Denver, Colorado. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this slight increase, when compared to normal variations in radiation background, can only be considered insignificant.
9. Upon completion of the current USSR atmospheric test series, it can be anticipated that there will be a renewal of Soviet offers for a test moratorium and renewed test ban negotiations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it vital to the security of the United States to pursue atmospheric testing irrespective of whether or not the Soviets propose a nuclear test ban.
10. In consideration of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a. The resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere be approved without delay.
b. Preparations be undertaken immediately at all sites necessary to conduct required tests.
[Typeset Page 163]c. Government officials refrain from making public statements concerning the alleged adverse effects of the world-wide fallout resulting from current USSR tests in order to retain maximum flexibility of decision regarding US resumption of atmospheric testing.
d. Regardless of possible overtures by the Soviet Union towards another test ban moratorium at the completion of their current tests, [Facsimile Page 4] no agreement be made which would preclude the United States from conducting a planned series of atmospheric nuclear tests unless an effective inspection and control system is implemented and properly functioning.
11. It is requested that you inform the President of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Recommends U.S. resumption of atmospheric nuclear tests. Secret. 4 pp. Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, June–September 1961.↩