309. Memorandum from Gordon to President Johnson, December 91
SUBJECT
- Additional adjustments in the Minuteman program
This memorandum outlines my reasons for believing that adjustments in the Minuteman program are feasible and desirable. The actions I have in mind would save $571 million NOA in the 1965 budget and $200 million in 1965 expenditures.
Fundamental to my recommendation is the analysis in the Secretary’s draft memorandum to the President on Strategic Retaliatory Forces, dated November 13, 1963, which clearly indicates that the need for additional Minuteman missiles over and above the 950 approved in the 1964 budget for deployment by end-FY 1966 is questionable.
As stated in the Secretary’s memorandum, the essential test of and most valid objective for our strategic forces is the capability in a second strike situation to assure destruction of 150 cities and 30 percent of the population of the Soviet Union (68 million fatalities), 50 percent of industrial capacity, and the Soviet Government and military controls. Against this objective of “assured destruction,” the Secretary’s memorandum analyzes four different force levels for end-FY 1969 under assumptions using both “expected” and “pessimistic” factors for relative US-USSR capabilities (see attached table which is from page 14 of the Secretary’s memorandum). Two very striking conclusions from the Secretary’s analysis are:
1. That U.S. forces without any Minuteman missiles could satisfy the objective of “assured destruction” under “expected” conditions and “median” Soviet force estimates as of end-FY 1969.
2. That U.S. forces, with the 950 Minuteman missile force approved in last year’s budget for deployment by end-FY 1966, virtually meet the objective of “assured destruction” by end-FY 1969 under “pessimistic” conditions.
[Facsimile Page 2]For these reasons, the relatively small reduction I am recommending in the Minuteman missile force in the period 1965–1967, as shown below, would not appear to affect significantly our capability to inflict “assured destruction.”
[Typeset Page 1385]| End-FY | End-FY | End-FY | End-FY | End-FY | End-FY | |
| 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | |
| Proposed | 600 | 800 | 950 | 1000 | 1100 | 1200 |
| Recommended | 600 | 750 | 850 | 950 | 1100 | 1200 |
| Difference | – | −50 | −100 | −50 | – | – |
If desired, the proposed end-FY 1969 objective of 1200 Minuteman missiles would continue to be used for planning purposes at this time, since it could still be achieved by providing the necessary funds in the 1966 and 1967 budget.
The Secretary has already reduced the end-FY 1969 Minuteman objective from 1300 in previous projections to 1200. He has also reduced the end-FY 1967 objective, so that the force increase proposed for approval in the 1965 budget is 50 missiles instead of 200 previously projected.
One of the reasons for the 150 missile reduction in the end-FY 1967 force, as stated in the Secretary’s memorandum of November 13, is to “reduce the risks of extensive modification which can arise from difficulties discovered in the Improved Minuteman development cycle” and to “permit a more orderly deployment.” This reasoning is also a basis for the further adjustments in the Minuteman program which I am recommending below. Proposed schedules for procuring improved Minuteman missiles are compared with schedules reflecting recommended phasing adjustments as follows:
| FY 1964 | FY 1965 | FY 1966 | FY 1967 | FY 1968 | FY 1969 | |
| Proposed | 30 | 293 | 249 | 301 | 176 | 80 |
| Recommended | – | 150 | 250 | 300 | 300 | 129 |
It should be noted that, in spite of the reduced 1967 force, the number of improved Minuteman missiles proposed for procurement in 1965 (and subject to the risks of extensive modification) is actually higher than under previous projections, largely because of early initiation of a program to retrofit the first 800 basic Minuteman missiles with improved missiles.
[Facsimile Page 3]My recommendation involves three possibly separate actions as follows (in millions):
| Possible | |
| 1965 | |
| NOA Reduction | |
| 1. Refer 1965 approval and funding of 50 missiles (20th Squadron) over the approved 950 missile force | $−167 |
| 2. Stretchout production of the 150 improved Minuteman missiles included in the 950 missile force by 6 months (missiles 801–950) | −176 |
| 3. Refer to 1966 initial funding of program to retrofit first 800 basic Minuteman missiles with the improved missiles | −228 |
| Total recommended reduction | $−571 |
The arguments against the course I am recommending, as I understand them, are (1) the uncertainties necessarily involved in estimates of our relative position to the USSR; (2) the fact that the Secretary’s recommendations represent a substantial reduction in the Air Force’s recommendations and have been agreed to by the other Chiefs of Staff; (3) difficulties in gaining Congressional and public acceptance of a military budget which, for the first time, does not include a further build-up in strategic forces or weapons systems.
On the other hand, the arguments for my recommendation are: (1) there is a solid basis for our present intelligence estimates and forecasts; (2) the Secretary’s analysis has made ample allowances for the relevant uncertainties, especially in his “pessimistic” case; (3) the force levels I am recommending are actually not significantly lower than those recommended by the Secretary—when all strategic missile and aircraft systems are considered the maximum difference is about four percent of operational vehicles at end-FY 1966; (4) the stretchout of the improved Minuteman production program would permit more development and testing prior to production, resulting in deployment of a more reliable and standardized missile and requiring fewer of the costly modifications which have been experienced in other missile programs; and (5) there is growing general recognition that our strategic forces are growing to the level where further additions serve no useful purpose and, therefore, a 1965 budget calling for a reduced rate of build-up in strategic forces may now be acceptable to the Congress and the public if given strong Presidential support.
- Provides rationale for adjustments to Minuteman program. Top Secret. 4 pp. Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency Series, Def Bud 65.↩