308. Memorandum to Members of Policy Planning Council, December 61

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HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE SECRETARY’S
POLICY PLANNING MEETING HELD
DECEMBER 3, 1963

SUBJECT

  • Comment on Key Issues Underlined by Assistant Secretaries

In the introductory remarks on the paper under discussion two points were noted. First, in the last two years there has been a change in the balance of the problems we face. Whereas two years ago most of our problems stemmed from Communist pressure, today the internal problems of the Free World occupy us increasingly. Second, the trend of the times around the globe—and even in this country—is increasingly one of resurgent nationalism, and the task we face is that of the constructive organization of this nationalism.

In Western Europe and Japan there is still too much of the “Marshall Plan psychology” of leaning on US leadership. Likewise, the US still preempts the lead in situations where the [Facsimile Page 2] allies could and should play a larger role. The time is ripe for the establishment of new machinery for cooperation in handling the world’s problems. Except in the Cold War confrontation against the Communists, it is unnecessary and undesirable for the US to always assume the lead, particularly in problems involving areas with ancient cultures where our experience is limited.

Before Europe can play a larger role in the outside world, however, she must organize herself, and, in this respect, 1963 has been a year of retrogression not advance. Systematic consultation and collaboration are needed among the US, Japan, and the European nations. Unfortunately, the latter too often enjoy their irresponsibility. In contrast to the type of cooperation they exhibit in forums such as the OECD, the European nations tend to pursue narrow selfish objectives on political matters in the outside world.

A greater focus on an Atlantic Community policy toward the outside world is desirable. Even should the US choose not always to lead, [Typeset Page 1382] still the US will have to initiate action to meet problems that are beyond the capacity of regional groups to solve. Machinery is needed that can transcend regional lines. It would be desirable for Japan to earmark troops for a UN peace-keeping force, but unfortunately her constitution prohibits this. At present only the “white” nations have earmarked forces for peace-keeping.

The Morocco-Algeria crisis is an example of a problem best resolved by a regional grouping rather than Big Power intervention. However, there are other problems, e.g., South Africa, in which the participants demand US intervention. The question is whether the US need always agree to intervene.

Discussion ensued on the problems of Portuguese Africa and the Union of South Africa. The participants were divided as to the pace at which the US should encourage movement toward independence or a multi-racial solution. On the one hand, it was held that to hasten this process is to invite chaos of the [Facsimile Page 3] type experienced in the Congo and Algeria. The white settlers would leave and the door would be open for Communist penetration. At the present level of East-West tension a radical change of this sort would be dangerous at this time. Until the tensions of the Cold War are abated, we should slow down, not speed up, our support of the African nationalists. Further, an increase in nationalist terror tactics would only serve to make the Portuguese dig in more firmly and exacerbate the situation in general. On the other hand, it was held that the risks of a bloody upheaval were too great in the status quo. Forward movement is necessary in order to stave off African nationalist extremism; furthermore, movement works as an influence for restraint on the part of outsiders, such as the Asians, demanding African freedom. Forward movement is a better way to play for time than maintaining frozen positions. In the Union the Boer Government was gerrymandered to power and is not so strong and monolithic as it appears. There is hope for the opposition.

Concerning US involvement in regional disputes, the trend has been to give a guarantee to one country in a dispute. This policy has the adverse effects of fragmenting our influence and encouraging the “protectee” to assume a belligerent posture. However, there are limits to what US protection means in a regional dispute. As in the Pak-Indian dispute, there is often a gap between our word and our capacity to act. Thus US protection does not always act as a restraint, except when we have military power in the area.

It was agreed that it would be prudent to produce a contingency plan for the possible collapse or overthrow of the ChiCom regime. The internal situation has degenerated to the point where the Soviets might even be able to bring down the regime with an extended border quarrel. In the ChiCom elite at present there are two strands of thought on the [Typeset Page 1383] Sino-Soviet dispute: one strand adheres to classic Chinese nationalism versus Russia; the other disagrees with the hard line and places economic considerations first, holding that the denial of Soviet aid is too high a price to pay for the current polemics. Furthermore, reports of severe droughts in China indicate that there are still more troubles ahead for the regime.

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There is a lack of an integrated policy on aid matters between the US and the European nations. The latter have improved their performance on burden-sharing, yet their foreign policies have been less adept at integrating the aid element than has ours. In European governments, for example, there is no back-to-back arrangement similar to our State-AID country desk system. A better political framework than the DAC is needed for a coordinated aid policy which would provide for a more rational division of labor. Again, better international machinery for cooperation was advanced as the answer to both the aid and the peace-keeping problem. The British Commonwealth is no longer serviceable for these tasks. It was suggested that the UN might establish regional sub-committees to deal with these matters. This, however, was held to be unnecessary provided the UN backstopped the efforts of other international bodies.

Action: the Assistant Secretaries of the geographical Bureaus were asked to submit a “box-score” (on a simple “plus” or “minus” basis) on whether relations between the US and each country in their area had improved over the past three years.

  1. Highlights of December 3d Policy Planning Meeting. Secret. 4 pp. Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Secretary’s PPMs.