304. Memorandum from Keeny to Bundy, November 151
SUBJECT
- 15 November Budget Meeting with Secretary McNamara
The Bureau of the Budget has prepared a detailed briefing paper that you have received covering the principal issues which the staff believes should be discussed with Secretary McNamara at the 15 November meeting. Some of these issues, particularly in the R&D paper, are not very important and will probably not be brought up by Gordon at the meeting. Without attempting to comment on all of the questions raised by the BOB, I believe that the most important issues involved in the five draft memoranda submitted by Secretary McNamara are the following:
[Typeset Page 1367](1) National Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC). Secretary McNamara recommends that a DUCC for the Washington area be approved now and that it be authorized at an austere size suitable for 50 men at a cost of $110,000,000. The first issue is whether we should consider constructing a DUCC facility at all at this time. I believe that a DUCC facility would significantly increase the chance that the President or his successor would survive a nuclear attack and would be critical to our ability to attempt to direct a controlled response under top civilian and military direction. In the 1970 period without the DUCC, it is difficult to justify much of the expensive command and control apparatus that we are now purchasing. Although it is often argued that the President cannot support this proposal since it is directed toward his own safety; I do not believe that this should be a decisive consideration since this is not the basic reason for the facility and the facility would not, in any event, be available until after President Kennedy’s second term was finished. While it might also lead to some adverse comment abroad, I believe it would help to make our talk about controlled response more credible and would drive home the implications of nuclear war both at home and abroad.
[Facsimile Page 2]The second issue is the proposed size of the installation. I believe there is agreement in all quarters (DDR&E, JCS, OST, and BOB) that while the 50-man DUCC would protect the President and his successors, it would be entirely inadequate to fulfill the command and control mission. I believe, therefore, that it would be a mistake for the Administration to request a facility that clearly could not accomplish its advertised purpose. This would appear to invite the charge that the Administration is initiating a project and intentionally misrepresenting its ultimate cost. I recommend, therefore, that, if we decide to proceed with the DUCC, we either (1) approve the 300-man facility or (2) fund the 3500 foot shaft for the facility separately and indicate that further study must be given to the required size of the facility itself.
(2) Air Force Tactical Aircraft Program. The most interesting issue raised by OSD in their paper is the proposal to substitute Pershing missiles with QRA aircraft. I believe there is general agreement that this is a very good idea.
The BOB will question the OSD proposal to buy war consumables against 180-day objective as opposed to the existing plan to have a 90-day supply. The BOB will also make the new proposal that the European MACE force be phased out in view of extreme vulnerability. I believe the BOB is correct on both of these items.
The procurement program for F–4C aircraft presents a major issue that is not considered by the OSD or BOB memoranda and which we will bring up at the meeting. This program involves a total of about $900 million in FY 65. In its present configuration, this aircraft is not [Typeset Page 1368] suited for the ground support role for which it is being procured and is not, in fact, particularly well suited as an interceptor which would be its secondary role. The aircraft will be substantially improved and made suitable for its intended role when new avionics become available in late 1966. A retrofit program would either be impossible or extremely expensive. I would propose, therefore, that the large FY 64 purchase of F–4C aircraft be stretched out until the improved version becomes available and that as much as possible of the $900 million be deferred. It is estimated that this can result in a real reduction of FY 65 funds by $700 million. This deferral should also make possible a more rational decision as to whether we really want to buy F–4C, F–111 or some other aircraft for future ground support in the European theater.
[Facsimile Page 3](3) Attack Carrier (CVA Forces). This paper does not directly bring up the FY 65 budget issues. In general I believe it is a very poor paper that does not really make a case for the indicated force levels and does not address itself at all to the key issue of nuclear vs. conventional power.
In the event we should have a very tight FY 65 expenditures budget, I believe we should still consider deferring the FY 63 CVA which McNamara has just directed be constructed as a conventional carrier. No case has been made that there is a requirement for this carrier or that there is any urgency in proceeding with its construction. There is very widespread feeling that “if the carrier is built,” it should be nuclear. Therefore, I believe that even at this late date it might be possible to defer actual initiation of the project on the basis of a desire to give further consideration as to whether it should be nuclear or conventional.
In any event it seems most unwise to commit the Administration firmly to construction of an additional carrier in FY 67 before the problem has been given serious study.
[Facsimile Page 4](4) Research and Development. In general, I believe that the proposed R&D program is very sensible. Most of the points raised by the BOB are small and not of real policy interest. I believe the most important issues for discussion are the following:
a. Dynasoar. While the R&D memo suggests that this program might be unnecessary, the actual decision is not faced. I believe that serious consideration should be given to cancellation of this project in connection with a reorientation of Gemini to a joint DOD-NASA undertaking.
b. MMRBM. Secretary McNamara wants to proceed with a full-scale MMRBM development. The BOB staff believes that the MMRBM project should be either cancelled or substantially cut back. I believe that an MMRBM type system might represent a significant capability in future as yet unforeseen circumstances. Therefore, I believe the MMRBM development program should be continued at a reasonable [Typeset Page 1369] rate; however, it should be made clear that the program is not developed to any specific systems concept such as road mobile truck system proposed for deployment in Germany.
c. B–70. In view of possible forthcoming decisions relating to “O” project, I believe that serious consideration should be given to eliminating the third aircraft in the present B–70 program which was conceived primarily as a test bed for equipment relating to the B–70 system. I understand that this could result in a saving of some $90 million but would still permit flight of the first two aircraft which would yield information of aerodynamic interest to the supersonic transport program and give some yield for the billion and one half dollar investment in this program.
- Provides comments and agenda for November 15th budget meeting with McNamara. No classification marking. 5 pp. Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Def Bud 65.↩