Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

303. Draft Paper Prepared by Unknown Drafter, November 8¹

November 8, 1963

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

I. The Basic Concept

One of the first statements of an American administration’s Basic National Security Policy was made by President Polk when he told George Bancroft, on the day of his inauguration, that he had four main purposes: to re-establish the independent Treasury, to reduce the tariff, to acquire California, and to settle the Oregon boundary.

This statement met the chief requirements of any BNSP: Its goals were sufficiently specific, important, and feasible to be a useful guide to the President in the conduct of his administration and to future historians in appraising its record. Their attainment moved Bancroft to conclude that “viewed from the standpoint of results, this administration was perhaps the greatest in our history, certainly one of the greatest.”

For the next quarter of a century, successive US administrations were able to focus on much the same goals—to extend and maintain the Union—because they could do so within the sheltering framework of a working international order.

This order—which ensured the West a century of predominant peace and unprecedented progress from the Congress of Vienna to World War I—rested on the strength and leadership of the great states of Europe, and particularly on the naval and economic power of the British Empire.

Two great European civil wars destroyed this order. Amid its ruins, an aggressive empire—the USSR—made ready to extend its power and to create a new international system cast in its image.

In response to this threat a new concept of US basic national security policy came into being. It was perhaps best summarized by George Kennan in his 1947 Foreign Affairs article as “long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Soviet expensive tendencies . . . the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographic and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.”

The policy was eminently successful. It is, in part, because of its success that the international scene is now changing in several important respects.

In both the Western and Communist camps, previously polarized around Washington and Moscow, power is proliferating. The problems and opportunities we face in Europe, Asia, and other less developed areas are thus coming increasingly to resemble those of a traditionally multipower world. They arise out of a complex set of interacting trends which can no longer be successfully controlled merely by reacting defensively “to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy”; although Moscow and Peking pursue systematic policies of exploiting [illegible in the original] nationalism in the Free World to their advantage and our discomfiture.

Resistance to Communist threats and pressures is as important as it ever was. But it is not enough. The establishment and maintenance of a viable world order calls for a protracted and creative effort on the part of the United States including, but going far beyond, mere holding operations against Communist encroachment.

Underlying the concept of “containment” was always [illegible in the original] term vision of such a constructive US goal. It is now become possible and necessary to place increasing emphasis on this.

The need for greater emphasis upon our constructive goal is not now. It has been increasingly evident over the last decade, and US actions have increasingly responded to it.

But it would now be useful to define the concept of US Basic National Security Policy on which this approach is based, so that US courses of action can be geared to this concept with increasing effectiveness.

II. Four Main Goals

[illegible in the original] system congenial to our purposes and values [illegible in the original].

First, it must keep the peace—especially the nuclear peace. This means that we must maintain sufficient military strength to deter, or if necessary defeat, aggression with minimum risk of spreading hostilities.

Second, it must be responsive to the diverse interests of the entire non-Communist world. The less developed, as well as developed, countries must have an opportunity to achieve the progress and status they seek within its framework.

Third, it should be able to fend off Communist disruptive efforts and to contribute, by its attractive power, to long-term constructive trends in the Bloc.

Fourth, it must promote relationships among Atlantic [illegible in the original] which would harness effective European power to the [illegible in the original] and constructive purposes indicated above, in greater [illegible in the original] has been the case to date. The same is true of Japan, [illegible in the original] cooperation and sense of meaningful destiny, in concert with the United States and the West, the stability of the Pacific continues to depend.

Each of these four headings is discussed below.

III. Defense

A viable international system presupposes a stable military [illegible in the original] in which aggression both large and small [illegible in the original] or defeated if it occurs, and in which there [illegible in the original] of general nuclear war occurring through escalation or miscalculation.

From this objective certain major US courses of action can be deduced.

First, we must deter the Soviets and Chinese Communist from rationally choosing all-out use of force, and we must be able to deal with such a conflict as rationally as possible if it nevertheless occurs. We thus need so powerful and invulnerable a strategic nuclear force, and so convincing a linkage between our vital interests and its use, that Soviet and Chinese leaders could never doubt that in any general nuclear war their power position would be drastically worsened.

Second, against that strategic nuclear backdrop but in the area beyond its direct and assured effects, we must deter lesser aggressions or defeat them with the least devastation if they occur. We thus need effective non-nuclear strength—including allied forces, ready US forces, and mobilizable non-nuclear US power backing them up. The object should be to maintain a capacity to deal with two simultaneous Communist aggressions in widely separated areas, as well as to maintain enough free world counter-insurgency capability to cope with likely guerrilla assaults on vulnerable countries.

Third. We must achieve these military goals in ways which reinforce the [illegible in the original] and confidence of other free nations. To do this, we must maintain substantial and visible power overseas, as tangible evidence of our will and ability to back up free nations with effective military strength.

Fourth. We must minimize the risk that general nuclear war will occur by accident, miscalculation, or unintended escalation. This requires (i) safeguards to ensure effective Presidential control over US strategic forces and over tactical nuclear weapons in US and allied hands; (ii) that the design, protection, and planning of these nuclear forces be such as to reduce the need for their early or pre-emptive use in response to ambiguous evidence of impending enemy attack.

Fifth. Arms control should be envisaged as an additional means of contributing to a stable military environment; it should reinforce, rather than weaken, the contribution of our military programs to such an environment. Partial reductions in armed forces should not be envisaged which would jeopardize our strategic nuclear superiority or our ability to frustrate non-nuclear aggression. High priority should go to measures which would reduce the risk of miscalculation.

IV. Less Developed Areas

Whether a workable international system can be created will depend, in large part, on the outcome of present trends in less developed areas.

Emerging from colonialism and traditionalism of various kinds, political elites in these areas seek to achieve greater material progress and otherwise modernize their countries.

The obstacles they face are formidable: lack of resources, of trained manpower, of needed institutions, and of innovation-minded leadership.

To the extent that these obstacles prove insuperable these countries may well end by playing somewhat the same role in world affairs that the Balkan nations played before 1914; i.e., generating instability which creates tempting opportunities for external intervention and thus draws the great powers into conflicts equally ruinous for them and the nations over which they dispute.

In the degree, on the other hand, that these countries’ constructive efforts to modernize seem to be making headway, the likelihood is increased that they will gradually emerge as responsible members of the international order, capable of maintaining their independence and of evolving slowly toward forms of government based on consent. The inherently revolutionary character of the modernization process makes it inevitable, however, that we will live and operate over the foreseeable future in a setting of chronic crisis.

A major US objective should, therefore, be to assist constructive modernization efforts in less developed areas. Arrangements within the US Government should be such as to ensure that this objective continues to receive high priority and emphasis, and is not overshadowed by day-to-day crises and problems. In line with this basic policy:

—The economic purpose of our aid should be to encourage and reward modernization efforts. We should hold to this criterion as firmly as we can without damaging other US security interests, recognizing that diversions in one instance may quickly become precedents in another. In applying this criterion, it should be borne in mind that under-developed nations range over a wide spectrum and that the standard of self-help performance that can be expected—and the type and amount of aid that is needed under that standard—will vary with the degree of under-development.

—Since successful modernization will require far greater external resources than are likely to be provided under US appropriated aid, efforts to elicit a maximum contribution from other sources—the EximBank, IBRD, IMF, other developed countries, and private investment—should receive increased emphasis.

—Since cultural change in less developed areas is one of the major prerequisites to their modernization, we should encourage the emergency of innovation-minded groups through exchanges of persons and information, assistance for education, programs and projects that will promote private enterprise, and like measures.

All of this will only bear fruit if the less developed countries are, at the same time, discouraged from pursuing disruptive external adventures. It should be a US purpose to apply external constraints, as necessary, for this purpose—using UN mechanisms, wherever possible.

V. The Bloc

Our first objective vis-à-vis the Communists is to protect the constructive tasks on which we are embarked in the free world against disruption as a result of Communist pressures or diversions.

This means not only maintaining the military force referred to under III, above, but also making clear to the Communists that, if necessary, it will be used—and sometimes specifying the circumstances. We should promote communications—informal as well as formal—with Moscow to this end. And we should try, over the longer run, to develop tacit understandings with the USSR as to the ground rules governing our competition.

It also means trying to close out crises, when they erupt, (i) in such a way as to make crisis-mongering seem an unprofitable occupation to the Communists; (ii) with as little diversion of free world energies from our long-term constructive programs as consistent with this purpose.

Our second objective vis-à-vis the Communists is transformation of the imperialistic Communist dictatorships into regimes which can play a constructive role in the international order we seek to create. If such a transformation is to occur without conflict that would pose an intense danger to our security, it must be brought about chiefly by pressures and trends within the Bloc. We can contribute to this evolution in two ways:

First: By the way in which the free world arranges its own affairs. The extent to which the Communists perceive that the emerging international free world order seems likely to work, i.e., to offer diminishing—rather than enlarging—opportunities for Communist trouble-making, cannot help but influence the Soviets’ view of their own role in world affairs.

Second: By our posture toward the Bloc. We should seek to maximize the exposure of the USSR to the outside world, and to widen the contacts between the peoples of Eastern Europe and the West at every level. We should welcome temporary or partial détente, in the belief that this will be conducive to such exposure and contribute to long term evolution in the Bloc. We should evidence a willingness to enter into business-like negotiations on outstanding issues, and seek otherwise to suggest to the Soviet leaders that they can find rewarding opportunities for participation in the emerging international order if they are willing to do so on terms consistent with its basic purposes.

VI. The Atlantic Hard Core

If our only aim were only to prevent Communist expansion, US policy would have achieved its objective in Europe. This area has been strengthened to the point where its subjection by Communism is difficult to [illegible in the original].

If our purpose is to create a viable world order, however, then our European policy has fallen short of its objective in two respects:

First: The building of a workable international system requires that Europe’s resources be available for defense and for aid to less developed areas in much greater amounts than has so far been the case. The European will to bear these sacrifices is lacking, in part, because individual governments remain preoccupied with relatively local interests and, shocked by the dramatic postwar decrease in their national power, do not believe that increased national effort could have significant effect. The situation might change, however, if decisions about increased effort could be taken by a single European Community for its members as a whole. Europe’s potential for contributing to the defense and development of the free world might then become sufficiently clear to move the Europeans to needed external action.

Second: The existing situation in Europe makes it difficult to pursue the strategy vis-à-vis the Bloc outlined under V, above. For a Europe of fatherlands will, over the long run, include a German fatherland recovering its sense of national pride and purpose. The thought which the Soviets would perceive, rightly or wrongly, in this development could pose serious obstacles to a relaxation of tensions. Only in a genuinely integrated Europe is the German sense of national identity likely to be submerged in sufficient degree to eliminate this problem.

It is for these reasons—related to our broader purposes vis-à-vis the Bloc and the free world as a whole—that the outcome of the contest in Europe between proponents of genuine integration and of a loose confederation of nationally conscious states is of vital moment to the US.

That issue will be decided in Europe, and by Europeans.

The US can influence the outcome, however, in three ways.

—By reiterating its dedication to genuine European unity with clarity and force, as was done on the President’s recent trip to Europe.

—By avoiding actions which would give aid and encouragement to nationalist forces. It is worth remembering that de Gaulle represents, in some sense, both “European” and nationalist [illegible in the original] we must distinguish between them in responding to his [illegible in the original].

—By holding out clearly US readiness to enter into more meaningful partnership with a united Europe—i.e., our willingness to set up the political “directorate” de Gaulle proposes, but only if our opposite number could be a unified Europe; and our willingness to see the MLF evolve toward new forms of control if the Europeans can speak with one voice on this matter.

Europe’s progress toward integration will be slow, however. In this instance, there are pressing items on the Atlantic agenda, which must be dispatched through such instruments as are feasible in the present state of Europe.

These will generally be instruments in which the US and other Atlantic nations deal with each other severally, rather than in which the US and a European entity confront each other bilaterally.

In the [illegible in the original] we must seek to concert domestic economic policies for more rapid growth, and to coordinate national programs of assistance for developing areas.

In NATO we must press ahead with efforts to build an agreed NATO strategy and to make allied political consultation more effective.

In the MLF working group we must progress towards an Atlantic missile fleet under multilateral manning.

In GATT we must get on with the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations.

In all these forums we must try to move ahead with the urgent business of the Atlantic partnership, even while the question “who speaks on behalf of Europe” awaits an answer.

VI. Conclusion

The courses of action outlined in this paper are focused on the creation and defense of a viable world order, to replace the one which existed before 1914 and which has been destroyed by a half century of war and revolution.

Implementation of these courses will involve slow and gradual progress in [illegible in the original] with very difficult problems.

By their very nature, the long-term, constructive trends which we seek to encourage in Western Europe, the less developed areas, and the Bloc will take time to work themselves out. We have a clear national obligation to lead the Free World, but US attempts to force the pace are likely to be unavailing or contra-productive.

We will, therefore, need consistency in holding to our goals and patience in pursuing them. We will need to resist the recurring temptation to seek ostensible short-term “successes” at the expense of our long-term objectives, in the face of the occasional set-backs and diversions which are unavoidable in such a long-term effort.

To this end, a clear articulation of our strategic concept is called for.

This paper suggests such a concept. The steps needed to give it effect are elaborated in more detail in the longer document that follows.

1. “Basic National Security Policy.” Top Secret. 14 pp. Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, TS–BNSP.